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Economic Expansion in Ireland

by DAVID O'MAHONY

A PENETRATING analysis of the Irish economy is to be found in Mr Whitaker's *Economic Development*. It cannot be taken for granted, however, that the proposals concerning capital investment made in it or the Government's *Programme for Economic Expansion* follow from this analysis.

Most of the problems of the Irish economy arise from its two most characteristic features—or peculiarities, as some might say. The first of these is its unusual openness, familiar to us by reason of our constant need for vigilance with regard to the balance of payments. The second, but more important, is the fact that ' proximity to and ease of intercourse with Britain tend to set, at British levels, the *expected* standards for Irish wages and salaries, private consumption and services generally, irrespective of differences in natural resources and productivity.'[1]

Our economy is one of the most open in the world. Relatively speaking, we are far more dependent on the outside world than Britain is, although the British seem to be more conscious of the limitations imposed by an open economy on policy-making than we are. It is well to remember that our imports consist to a very great extent of capital goods, raw materials and other inputs for use in industry and agriculture. In 1957, for example, imports of consumer goods amounted to only 23% of the value of all imports.[2] This implies that an expansion in the demand even for what we regard as Irish-made goods results in an increase in imports. Any increase in domestic income will, of course, also give rise to an expansion in the import of consumer goods. Taking everything into consideration and especially our very high level of food consumption, it is probable that in the long run the tendency will be for imports to rise rather than fall. Hence, any kind of expansionist programme is almost bound to run us into balance of payment difficulties unless it is accompanied by increased foreign earnings to an appropriate amount. A good example of what can happen is the large increase in imports which was associated with expansionist policies from 1949 onwards. Admittedly, other events such as the Korean War may have played their part too, but there can be little doubt as to the effect of the stepping-up of the Government's programme of capital expenditure. Presumably,

[1] *Economic Development*, p. 11.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 153.

in order to avoid a repetition of the external deficits of the period before the special import levies, the new *Programme* assures us that ' any tendency for consumer spending to cause an external payments deficit . . will be checked.'[1] We are not told, however, how this is to be done, should the need arise, nor how the contraction in output and employment which would follow is to be avoided.

Important as the openness of our economy is, it is very much overshadowed by the second matter already mentioned. The ' ease of intercourse with Britain ' is frequently referred to in discussions about emigration, but its nature and significance for the national economy have not yet received the attention they deserve. It is, therefore, worthwhile examining them at some length.

Irish people are able to go to Britain to work just as if it were part of Ireland itself. They do not require a labour permit, as other foreigners do, prior to taking up employment. There are no barriers whatever to the free movement of people between Ireland and Britain—we do not even require passports. Moreover, the cost of travel between the two countries is low enough not to be a deterrent to cross-Channel travel. The result of this free movement of people is that Ireland and Britain form one labour market. In other words, there is no separate Irish labour market. This places Ireland in a very unusual position indeed, because in most countries the markets for labour are coterminous with the national frontiers. Furthermore, all the conventional types of economic policy are based on the assumption that the labour markets are *national* markets. This is true even of protectionist policies designed to foster industrial development. It is true, of course, that Commonwealth countries also enjoy the right of free entry into Britain but for various reasons, with the possible exception of the West Indies, they do not exercise this right to the extent that they form common labour markets with Britain. Ireland, however, is in a radically different position from say, Greece or Portugal, whose people, although they would like very much to be allowed to go to work in Britain or other European countries, simply cannot do so as they would not be permitted to work in them except under very restricted conditions. Thus, emigration from Ireland would not be possible on anything like its present scale were it not that our people have other places, and especially Britain, to which they can go quite freely, whereas the people of other countries cannot emigrate on a large scale because they have nowhere to go.

Since Britain and Ireland form one labour market and since the degree of mobility of labour within this market is high, the price of labour, i.e., the wage *rate*, tends to be very similar in all parts of the

[1] *Programme for Economic Expansion*, p. 9.

market. Thus, wage rates in Ireland tend to be about equal to those which prevail in Britain, even though output per head is much lower here. One of the most striking aspects of the common Anglo-Irish labour market is that wage rates even before the war tended to be similar in both countries though the acute competition for labour, which was a feature of the post-war full employment era, did not then exist.[1] It need hardly be pointed out that the difference in output is due mainly to the difference in the pattern of production in the two countries and not to any unwillingness on our part to work hard. There is no real evidence to suggest that Irish people work less hard than those of other countries. Earnings, on the other hand, are higher in Britain because of the greater stability of employment, greater opportunities for overtime and the relatively greater number of high-paying occupations e.g. in engineering, steel, ship-building, etc.

Britain, being far larger than Ireland—it is some thirty times as large as the Republic from the economic point of view, i.e. taking account not only of the difference in population, but also that of real income per head—it follows that the actual rates set are determined by forces which originate in Britain. Irish conditions probably have so little effect on their determination that we are safe in assuming that, as far as Ireland is concerned, the rates are ' given '. Had we a national labour market, the rates would be determined by the conditions which exist here and they would almost certainly be lower than they are now. Earnings need not, of course, be lower. They could well be higher, not only because there would be more employment but also because the numbers in the skilled trades would probably be relatively greater.

As Britain is a very highly developed country, wage rates there are high compared even with countries like the Netherlands or Western Germany. The result is that Irish wage rates tend to be higher than those in European countries whose economies are far more highly developed than ours. It may be objected that social service charges and overtime bring up labour costs abroad, but when it is remembered that average output per head tends to be lower here there can be little doubt but that labour costs in Ireland are higher—and probably much higher—than they are in Britain and other European countries. The important point, however, is not so much their actual level but the fact that they are determined by forces which in the main are outside this country and that they therefore cannot counterbalance the other elements making for relatively high costs in Ireland as they would if a national labour market existed. These considerations apply not only to wage rates as usually understood but also to all *rates* of money income—even profit expectations are ultimately related to wages and salaries.

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[1] See I.L.O. *Year Book of Labour Statistics* 1939, pp. 151, 152.

The vital *rôle* played by the wage rates is recognized in *Economic Development* and it is emphasized that future expansion could be made impossible by excessive labour costs. It is stated, for example, that: 'The opportunities for the expansion of industrial production and employment will not be fully realised unless labour costs per unit of output are low enough to make the price of the product competitive in world markets. To ensure competitive costs per unit of output it may be necessary to accept for a time lower wages rates than in Britain, however efficiently production may be organised or however modern the capital equipment may be.'[1]

A similar situation exists with regard to the capital market. Here again we form one common market with Britain so that the interest rates determined by conditions prevailing there must necessarily be accepted as 'given' by us. Our position in this respect is not as exceptional as in the case of the labour market and in any case interest rates do not form a large proportion of manufacturing costs. As *Economic Development* remarks: 'Interest is not of great consequence in production costs and high interest rates have not prevented Germany, for instance, from achieving a vast expansion in production and prosperity.'[2] Indeed it could well be that the high interest rates were necessary in Germany to ensure that only those investments would be undertaken which would give a quick return, otherwise too much capital might have been devoted to 'social' investments—in which interest charges form a large element of cost. Moreover, if a national capital market existed in Ireland, interest rates would probably be higher than those to which we have been accustomed—unless our saving habits changed to a marked extent. The openness of the economy would prevent any attempt being made to bring down the short-run rates by monetary expansion. Rates, therefore, would be determined both in the long and short runs by the supply of and demand for savings. It need hardly be remarked that there would be no point in trying to create a national capital market, e.g., by Exchange Control, while a national labour market does not exist. However, just as in the case of the labour market, the important factor is that interest rates are 'given' as far as we are concerned (slight differentials, largely for administrative reasons, do not vitiate the argument). Thus, manipulation of interest rates and exchange rates are instruments of economic policy which cannot be used here.

Our lack of resources which necessitates the import of raw materials, our remoteness from large markets which involves high transport costs, the small scale of our industry, and other cost-raising factors, combined with our labour costs, result in a level of costs which is relatively high as compared with Britain and many European countries. An expansion

[1] *Economic Development*, p. 27.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 26.

in the scale of our industries would tend to bring down their costs per unit of output but hardly to an extent which would make them competitive. It is not so much that our costs are high because the rate of output is small, but that our costs are high irrespective of the rate of output.

As has already been indicated a national labour market would tend to set wage rates and money incomes generally at levels that would counterbalance the other factors making for high costs so that the general level of costs which would emerge would be in a satisfactory relationship with the cost levels of other countries. Should it ever move out of alignment it could be re-adjusted, e.g., by devaluation or by a general reduction in money incomes. In our case, however, there appears to be no ordinary instrument of policy which could be used to effect an adjustment of this kind. The only way by which costs could be reduced here, it would seem, is by an increase in efficiency, i.e., the achievement of a greater output for a given input. Clearly, this is a matter which cannot easily be made the object of economic policy as, unlike protection or devaluation, for example, it cannot easily be made the subject of legislation or administrative regulation.

The cost problem, though it does exist in agriculture, is not quite so acute as it is in the rest of the economy. This is because the farmer's income is a residual. It is simply what is left after he has sold his products and paid for whatever purchased inputs he uses. If agriculture were organized in such a way that the farmer's income was a contractual wage which had to be met irrespective of the prices obtained for the products and if this wage were equivalent to the rate for hired agricultural workers, it is quite likely that production costs would be higher, with the result that the numbers which could be employed on the land would be smaller than the number at present employed.

Economic Development points out that growth can take place only if we can produce at prices which would be competitive on the world markets. There can be no doubt whatever of the truth of this. Owing to the absence of a domestic labour market, however, and to our dependence on imports, we cannot in general produce at costs which would enable us to sell at competitive prices. If, in some way our costs could be reduced, then we would have achieved the necessary pre-requisite for development. As it is, the development of our economy as a whole is held up because costs are too high. In other countries excessive costs often hold up the expansion of particular industries but the economies as a whole of these countries need never suffer from this disability since their general level of costs can be adjusted as a matter of policy.

Thus the level of activity in the Irish economy *as a whole* is determined by the relationship between costs and prices rather than by the aggre-

gates such as domestic consumption and investment, which tend to determine the level of economic activity in other countries. It follows, therefore, that policies based on aggregative explanations—commonly but rather incorrectly referred to as 'Keynesian'—would simply be irrelevant in our case.

The true nature of our economy is certainly recognized in *Economic Development*. Nevertheless, the general theme of the suggestions made in it seem to be rather of the 'Keynesian' type, while the *Programme for Economic Expansion* is almost entirely 'Keynesian'. In the last analysis the main theme of both documents is that an increase in investment and an expansion in demand—coming from agriculture—will set in motion a general expansion in the national product. In other words, the 'dynamic' which it is sought to release turns out to be something very similar to the conventional 'multiplier'.

Despite the assertion on page 7 of *Economic Development* that the dynamic 'is not necessarily increased capital investment' we find on page 36 that 'an increase in real national income requires the productive investment of present savings to ensure the utmost expansion of productivity in industry and agriculture. Increases in industrial productivity would make additional resources available for investment . . . increases in agricultural productivity would lead to greater savings by farmers, taking the form not only of direct investment in livestock, farm buildings, equipment, etc., but also of increased monetary savings which could be used for capital formation by other sectors of the economy.' On the same page it is stated that 'allowing for the expansionist effect on real national income of carrying out the proposals in this study, it may not be too optimistic to expect that out of the addition which they will make to real income in each year £2 million will be saved.' In other words, the savings to finance the increased investment will come from the increased income brought about by the increased investments. This is exactly what the multiplier effect is supposed to be. Similarly, although the White Paper points out that: 'While capital is a condition precedent to, it is not a condition sufficient for, economic progress', the *Programme for Economic Expansion* is almost entirely a matter of capital expenditure. The claim is also made that agricultural expansion would set up an expansion in demand for goods and services[1] and would raise incomes all round.[2] Again it is implied that there would be a multiplier effect. Is it perhaps forgotten that demand does not necessarily create its own supply?

It may be argued that the insistence on 'productive investment' and the suggestion with regard to particular industries anticipates this objection. If productive investments are undertaken then the national

[1] *Ibid*, p. 20.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 27.

product will automatically expand and speculation as to whether policy ought to be derived from Keynesian or non-Keynesian theory is merely an irrelevant academic exercise. The crux unfortunately, however, is that owing to the nature of our economy with its high cost-level, we cannot take it for granted that productive investment opportunities exist in general nor that they can be brought into being by way of an expansion of domestic demand, even if it does come from richer farmers. Obviously enough, an expansion in demand arising from increased agricultural income is not likely to cause balance of payments difficulties because the greater part of the increased output from which the incomes would come would be exported—assuming that export outlets exist. But, the increased demand for industrial products is not likely to be such as to enable industry to produce at competitive prices. It would enable some industrial expansion to take place—provided protection is continued—but not the kind of general expansion which would amount to ' a dynamic of progress '. Thus the use of the term ' productive investment ' tends to assume away the problem.

The real obstacle to the development of the Irish economy at a pace which would go some way towards reducing unemployment and emigration and raising real income appreciably is that productive investment opportunities do not exist on a sufficiently large scale. Except perhaps in agriculture there is very little scope for the productive use of capital and as *Economic Development* points out ' the possibilities of absorbing labour in agriculture are limited.'[1] This lack of investment opportunities is due to our high cost level and, as has already been pointed out, the high costs result mainly from the absence of a national labour market. The increased industrial production which *Economic Development* shows to be necessary for a sustained expansion of the economy cannot be achieved unless costs are first reduced, since a sustained increase in production can only be attained on the basis of exports and exports are possible only if prices are competitive.

Now, if costs could be reduced, opportunities for productive investment would be found to exist in all parts of the economy—they would not have to be sought for, as at present, in a few exceptional industries —and even in these protection is usually required. If the opportunities existed, the capital would be forthcoming without any difficulty—either from home or foreign sources, once they had been discovered. Anyone who has practical experience of trying to set up all but the smallest enterprises knows this. Almost invariably the problem, from the point of view of the Irish businessman, is not to find the capital but to find productive uses for it. This view is confirmed on page 154 of *Economic Development* where it is said that ' there is no evidence that any really good project has hitherto been stifled through lack of capital.' The next

[1] *Ibid,* p. 20.

two sentences on the same page sum up the whole problem of development perfectly in these words : ' For future development capital will be necessary but the real shortage is of ideas. These may have to come in part from external sources and are likely to fructify only if domestic conditions and policy are favourable to profit-making, and direct taxation is relatively light.' Conditions will be favourable to profit-making when costs are reduced. Thus, a general lowering of costs is the necessary pre-requisite of increased investment and general over-all expansion.

Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, neither *Economic Development* nor the *Programme for Economic Expansion* contains any concrete proposals for reducing costs. Worse still, both documents, although they recognize the need to reduce taxes, propose increased governmental expenditure which will add to the National Debt. Thus the falling-off in the existing rate of government expenditure for capital purposes is to be lost as a means of bringing down taxes.

Although *Economic Development* contains a number of exhortations to the public to be realistic about wages and salaries and says that it would be ' a policy of despair to accept that our costs of production must permanently be higher than those of other European countries either in industry or agriculture,'[1] no mention is made as to how the public is to be persuaded to accept the wages and salaries which would enable our costs of production to be as low as they are elsewhere. The truth is, of course, that while Irish people can continue to go freely to Britain the possibility of keeping down wages and salaries and profit expectations is slight. The Trade Unions—whatever influence they may have with regard to restrictive practices—are more or less powerless with regard to wages and salaries.

It seems then that the only way by which we can hope to reduce costs to a satisfactory level is by increasing efficiency at a much faster rate than other countries have attained. Measured in terms of output per man, however, we are falling behind most countries rather than catching up with them. If this state of affairs is to be changed, it would appear that we will have to reach standards of education and training higher than those of other countries and give tangible inducements in the shape of large general tax reductions, e.g., by drastically reducing income tax rates, exempting those earning up to, say, £750 per annum from this tax altogether and by a rationalization of the system of local taxation so that it will operate as an incentive rather than as a disincentive. This would mean that a far bolder and more imaginative approach would have to be made to education and public finance than anything envisaged up to now. In particular it would mean that the Budget, instead of being

[1] *Ibid*, p. 2.

regarded as a means of stimulating the economy through capital programmes, would have to be regarded as a measure of what the Government could afford without inhibiting economic growth.

If the foregoing reasoning is correct the *Programme* is neither the solution to our problems nor even a good way of trying to solve them. Perhaps the greatest defect of a programme of this kind is that it all too easily leads people to believe that once it is drawn up the problems are automatically solved and all that remains is to implement it. Professor McCord Wright's well-known criticism of 'Planning' can justly be levelled at 'programming' also. '"Planning" today derives a great part of its emotional force,' he says, 'not from the idea that it is a better way of going *at* problems but from a notion that once we inaugurate general planning there simply will *be* no problems.' It is greatly to be feared that this *Programme* by clouding the real issues once more will still further delay the day when a general policy will be formulated within the framework of which not only Government programmes but also private investment projects will have a real chance of success. While the absence of such a policy will not prevent the Government from carrying out its present *Programme*—since after all it is only a matter of spending money—it is most likely that the private sector, on which the onus for productive investment has been thrown, will be unable to respond owing to the lack of investment opportunities, the creation of which ought to be the primary objective of policy.

Mr Whitaker and Industry

by GARRET FITZGERALD

THE State's industrial policy has never been subjected to the detailed study and intelligent criticism that have been applied to its financial and agricultural policies for decades past. Possibly this deficiency reflects the highly complex and diverse character of the industrial sector—in contrast to the largely homogeneous nature of agriculture with its limited range of products, and to the issues of principle that are a feature of financial policies.

The fact is that in industry the diversity of activity, and the enormous variety of products imported, produced and exported, makes any kind of generalization extremely difficult for lack of adequate data upon which to base conclusions. These difficulties have not deterred Mr Whitaker from attempting a survey of the industrial sector of our economy, but they have inevitably deprived this survey of some of the breadth of vision which characterizes the sections of his study that deal with agriculture and finance, and have also, it would appear, discouraged comment upon the aspects of industrial policy to which Mr Whitaker has referred, at times all too briefly, in the course of *Economic Development*. In discussing these matters there is, however, nothing to be gained by going over in detail Mr Whitaker's proposals and suggestions, many of which concern specific industries ; it would seem desirable rather to confine attention to those aspects of his study which are of a controversial character, or which seem to merit criticism on the one hand, or further expansion on the other.

Among these issues may be mentioned the problems connected with the promotion of new industries and their location, the encouragement of research, the expansion of the market for Irish goods, the question of protection, and the *rôle* of the State in the development of industry.

The Promotion Of New Industries

The facilities provided by the State for those seeking to start new industries, or to develop older ones, are already so comprehensive that Mr Whitaker's criticisms and proposals in this field are necessarily somewhat restricted in character. Under the terms of a succession of Acts of Parliament, industrial promoters can obtain access to capital, free grants to cover a large part of the cost of factory construction in many parts of the country, and of the training of staff, and complete tax relief on profits derived from all new exports during the next decade.

Some, indeed, have criticized these arrangements as being too generous, and criticism has in particular been directed at the special grants designed to encourage people to start industries in the western part of the country—but this is a matter more appropriately dealt with under the heading of ' decentralization '.

Mr Whitaker's chief criticism, however, relates to the multiplicity of State agencies concerned with this matter. He lists seven : the Department of Industry and Commerce, the Industrial Credit Company, the Industrial Development Authority, An Foras Tionscail (the Undeveloped Areas Board), Gaeltarra Eireann, Coras Trachtala, and the Institute for Industrial Research and Standards. To these he might have added the Shannon Free Airport Development Authority, which has recently been transformed into the Shannon Free Airport Development Company, and which is directly concerned with the promotion of industrial enterprise at Shannon Airport.

But although Mr Whitaker remarks that it would be unwise for a country such as ours, limited in capital resources, in industrial tradition and in executive and technical skills, to disperse over too many agencies the responsibility for the promotion of industry, he is unable to indicate how any of these agencies might usefully be amalgamated with each other, and confines himself to suggesting that certain functions should be transferred from the Department of Industry and Commerce to the Industrial Credit Company, and from the Industrial Development Authority to An Foras Tionscail. He recognizes that the danger of overlapping between these agencies is considerably reduced by inter-board representation, which he suggests could be extended still further.

The main positive proposal made by Mr Whitaker with respect to industrial promotion, was the suggestion that the resources made available to the Industrial Credit Company for financing industrial development should not merely be increased but should be multiplied—almost eightfold. The sum originally set aside to cover the Industrial Credit Company's needs for the four years 1959-60 to 1962-3 was £2 million ; Mr Whitaker suggested that this should be raised to £15½ million, and this proposal has in fact been adopted by the Government in its White Paper on Economic Expansion, with some minor adjustments related to the lapse of time between the preparation of *Economic Development* and the publication of the White Paper.

It is encouraging to note that the Industrial Credit Company does not foresee any difficulty in making good use of these additional resources. The demand for industrial capital has grown considerably within the past two years, and the lending facilities offered by the company—including hire purchase for industrial plant at very attractive rates, and direct investment in industrial companies by means of redeemable

preference shares (which have been legalized by a recent Act) —are expected to increase pressure on the company's resources in the months ahead.

DECENTRALIZATION

The policy of encouraging decentralization of industry by means of special grants finds little support in *Economic Development*. Mr Whitaker remarks that with virtually the whole country undeveloped it seems wasteful to subsidize remote areas especially, by providing more extensive grants for industrial development in these areas than in other better-favoured parts of the country.

Except in the special case of industries which make substantial use of raw materials available in the neighbourhood, the location of industries in towns or villages remote from the larger population centres and from ports clearly imposes some additional continuing cost burden upon the industries involved. In the case of industries producing high-value goods the additional transport costs entailed by a policy of decentralization may be of little or no significance : a diamond-cutting industry could probably be located in the most remote part of the country without seriously affecting the saleability of the finished product! But in most industries transport costs *are* important, and the imposition of two additional sets of such costs—bringing the materials to the remotely-sited factory, and bringing the finished product from the factory to the market—may in such cases have serious consequences for the industry concerned. In the case of goods intended for the home market this artificial distortion of the industry's cost-structure may impose a requirement for additional protection, raising the domestic price of the product concerned still further, while in the case of exports the success or failure of the industry in the face of world competition may well be determined by a relatively narrow margin of transport costs. With so many of our new industries geared primarily to export markets, a policy of locating them indiscriminately in ' undeveloped areas ' away from the main ports might prove disastrous.

There is, however, little evidence to suggest that this policy *is* being carried to such extreme lengths and, in fact, only two of the industries started in the western part of the country in recent years have failed. Nevertheless it is evident that in a country whose public representatives in parliament find it so difficult to rise above local loyalties and to contemplate the country's problems from a national view-point, undue pressure towards ill-considered decentralization of industry must always be a danger to be guarded against.

There is, of course, something to be said on economic as well as on social grounds for endeavouring to discourage an excessive concentration of industry in Dublin, and possibly also in Cork, and the continued

exclusion of these cities from the scope of legislation governing the disposal of special grants for new industries would be reasonable, in the event of the extension of this legislation to the middle and eastern parts of the country, which are at present excluded. Such a scheme would minimize the distortion created by the current system, which is designed to benefit only the western half of the country. It is encouraging to learn that some extension of the area to which special grants apply is at present under consideration by the Government.

Research

The need for a drastic increase in the resources devoted to industrial research in this country was recently stressed in a series of talks organized by the Engineers' Association under the title ' The Rational Application of Technical Knowledge to Industry in Ireland ', which was reviewed in a recent number of the *National Observer* by Professor Dooge. In one of these talks Professor Leahy estimated that a sum of about £1,000,000 per annum should be spent on industrial research in Ireland ' if we are to keep pace with modern development '. Current expenditure on research of this kind is estimated to be in the region of £150,000, at most, of which one third is spent by the State owned Institute for Industrial Research and Standards.

Mr Whitaker believes that the State must continue to play a major *rôle* in industrial research, if this research is to be of a fundamental character, designed to assist the exploitation of our natural resources. This would require, he suggests, a review of the organization and available resources of the Institute, in order to ascertain whether these are adequate to provide all the services which the nation requires in this sphere.

The inadequacy of current industrial research in Ireland is not, however, confined to the scientific or operational spheres. There has also been an almost complete dearth of *economic* research, as well as an evident lack of marketing research.

As will be suggested later on, in connection with the problems raised by our policies of quota and tariff protection, there has been virtually no economic research into some of the basic assumptions upon which past policies have been based, and it may well be that some of these policies have been founded on misconceptions or mis-understandings. Moreover quite apart from the *rôle* of economic research in studying the validity of past or existing policies, it has a major *rôle* to play in guiding the successful development of the economy along new channels in the years and decades ahead. At present neither the universities nor the Civil Service are geared to carry out research of this kind and this may well prove to be the biggest single bottle-neck in the process of planning and promoting the development of our economic resources in the period ahead. It is not just a question of money. Indeed

the financial resources involved in the promotion of such research would be small and it is in fact quite possible that nowhere else would the application of small sums of money help to achieve such substantial returns in the future.

At the same time the absence of adequate *market* research must surely be in large measure responsible for the failure to develop exports of Irish foodstuffs and liquor during the past thirty years. We have known all along that our economic future must inevitably be in large measure tied up with the promotion of industries processing the foodstuffs but we have not known in what form to produce them or for what markets, nor have we known how they should be packaged or publicized.

Marketing

The problem of marketing is briefly touched upon in *Economic Development,* which mentions that, at the time of writing, arrangements were in hand to broaden the activities of Coras Trachtala so as to include the British market within its scope. The special opportunities offered by this market are stressed, and it is suggested that C.T.T. should promote press, radio and television advertising of Irish goods, with reasonable contributions from the exporters. Attention is also drawn to the unexploited opportunities for the sale of Irish goods in the home market, where it is suggested that prejudices against Irish-made goods could perhaps be broken down by a ' widespread continuous publicity campaign'.

The efficacy of domestic promotional activities of this kind is questionable, however, especially in a country of cynics such as Ireland. One cannot help wondering whether the problem could not best be tackled more subtly by employing weapons more appropriate to the task to be performed. The problem, after all, is mistrust of *our own* goods, a mistrust which has no doubt been fostered by the national inferiority complex, the ' slave mind ', but one which could not have survived so long, if it were not founded on the bitter experience of many people with *some* Irish-made products.

The elimination of this mistrust where, as in so many cases, it is entirely unfounded, requires the establishment of some mechanism that will distinguish for the public benefit the good from the bad—a mechanism moreover that will command public confidence. Surely this problem is not insoluble ? Would it not, for example, be possible to induce, by financial aid if necessary, the British Good Housekeeping Institute to extend to this country its procedure for testing consumer goods, and certifying the quality of those which pass these tests ? Such a system would command the confidence of the occasionally-bitten cynics, who have shown themselves so notably impervious to the constant adjurations (which reach their climax inappropriately on St Patrick's day each year) to ' Buy Irish ' !

The establishment of some such service, designed not to convince the already convinced who buy Irish goods almost regardless of their quality, but rather those who refuse to buy them regardless of quality, and who would suspect any native testing system, would not merely encourage the purchase of the very many Irish goods which would undoubtedly pass such a test, but would also, as a direct result, stimulate quality competition among Irish manufacturers—for the firm which failed to achieve a Good Housekeeping Certificate would soon find its products losing ground to its more efficient competitors, and would hasten to improve its products to the requisite standard.

The problem of expanding foreign markets for our industrial goods is a more complex one, whose solution surely requires a more fundamental approach than any hitherto adopted. The most outstanding feature of our manufactured exports is the fact that something in the region of 97% of them are exported to English-speaking countries, counting countries like India as English-speaking for the purpose of trade. This cannot just be coincidence, nor can it be wholly attributed to Commonwealth Preference, although this factor undoubtedly plays a major *rôle* in this predominance of English-speaking markets.

It seems evident that one major factor holding back the expansion of Irish industrial exports to nearby markets in Continental Europe is the failure of our educational system to produce young people capable of speaking and writing fluent French, German, Spanish and Italian. This is not the occasion to expand this point, but it is surely evident that the wholesale decline in our ability to communicate with continental Europeans during the past half century must have seriously weakened our commercial efforts in the European market. No one who has ever been associated with an Irish undertaking which has tried to secure employees with some knowledge of a foreign language, will be in doubt as to the extent of the failure of our educational system in this respect.

Commonwealth Preference

One factor whose importance in the marketing of Irish goods is sometimes underestimated is Commonwealth Preference. About 80% of our industrial exports go to Britain and a high proportion of the remainder are sold to member states of the Commonwealth or British colonies and dependencies. Their successful marketing is considerably assisted by Commonwealth Preference arrangements which, for example, give to virtually all our exports to Britain a margin of advantage over goods produced on the continent of Europe. Of all the goods which are subject to tariffs on importation into Britain, only a handful do not benefit from some margin of advantage if made in Ireland, namely, agricultural tractors, motor bicycles and tricycles, certain types of beer, certain chemicals, playing cards, hydrocarbon oils, matches and mechanical lighters.

Of course to obtain the benefit of this preferential treatment at least 50% of the value of the goods must have originated in Ireland or in the Commonwealth. Where certain materials are not obtainable in Ireland, Irish manufacturers go to considerable trouble to ensure that they are obtained from some Commonwealth country.

The extent to which our manufactured exports are aided by these preferences can scarcely be over-estimated and the proposed withdrawal or watering down of these advantages is undoubtedly from our point of view one of the most serious aspects of British participation in any Free Trade Area, whether of seven or seventeen states. From a long term view-point it may indeed prove almost as serious for Irish industry as a loss of protection for the home market, for our unique advantage of free access to the British market has been one of the chief factors stimulating the recent significant flow of continental investment into this country.

Here is a fruitful field for study and research: what industries will be affected, and to what extent by the loss of preferential treatment for their goods in the British market? What alternative markets could most readily be found for these goods? Our present understanding of this problem merely enables us to note its existence and to suggest what questions might be asked in order to measure its scale and suggest its solution.

Export Tax Reliefs

Undoubtedly the biggest stimulus to the growth of exports during the last couple of years has been the introduction of the export tax reliefs scheme, under which all the profits accruing from new exports are free from taxation for a ten year period. Under new legislation at present in preparation the period of export tax relief will be extended to twenty-five years in the case of goods manufactured at Shannon Free Airport. The introduction of this tax relief was a bold move for which credit must be shared by the Coalition Government which first introduced it, and the present Government which has extended it.

Loss of Exports

This new emphasis on the importance of exports is certainly overdue. One of the most striking features of Irish economic 'progress' during the past three decades (to which Mr Whitaker does not refer in the course of his general survey, although he comments on it when he comes to deal with individual industries) is the loss of a very wide range of exports during this period—exports which in 1931 made a substantial contribution to the country's economy, but which to-day have either disappeared or have been sadly reduced in volume. Among the items

which have disappeared, or virtually disappeared, from our export lists are biscuits, margarine, condensed milk, flour, brewers' and distillers' grains, tractors and parts, linen, and candles, while exports of butter, edible fats, coke and cotton piece-goods are today very much below their 1931 level. If the volume of these goods alone (this list is by no means exhaustive—it derives merely from a glance at the summary list of exports contained in the Statistical Abstract) had been maintained at the level attained in 1931, then the value of our exports would to-day be about £5,000,000 greater than it is at present.

No doubt there are good reasons why each of these items has lost its former place among our exports but the extent of the loss is not perhaps sufficiently appreciated. If it *had* been appreciated during these past three decades, a greater effort might have been made to retain some at least of these exports, or to stimulate new exports to take their place.

Protection

The failure to concentrate on maintaining and developing exports has been a reflection of the undue emphasis placed on the importance of tariff and quota protection for Irish industry during the past three decades.

In Mr Whitaker's view it would not have been possible without protection to secure the establishment and development of many of our industries on the scale which has been achieved. Most people would share this view and it is certainly interesting to note the divergence between the development of industry in Northern Ireland and in the Republic during this period. Two great industries dominate the scene in Northern Ireland—engineering-shipbuilding and textile-clothing—but, apart from these, both the employment provided by industry and the output achieved by it in the North are notably inferior to the results attained in the Republic where a much more broadly based industrial structure has been built up during the past thirty years.

But in assessing the consequences of protection we must be careful to base our conclusions on comprehensive and reliable data, and this, unfortunately, Mr Whitaker has failed to do. Instead he has followed the authors of the Report on Emigration and Other Population Problems in relying on the results of the annual Census of Production over a period of more than thirty years, as a measure of the increase in employment and production in industry during this period. The Emigration Report drew from these figures the conclusion that ' during the past thirty years of self-government a remarkable expansion of industry and industrial employment has been achieved ', while Mr Whitaker, basing his remarks on the same data, refers to ' the extent of the success

of these measures', which he connects with the statement that employment in transportable goods industries rose almost two-and-a-half times during this period, while the volume of production by industry as a whole is said to have risen threefold in this period.

Unfortunately the coverage of the annual Census of Production has been considerably extended during these three decades, among other reasons because of the absorption of large numbers of self-employed skilled tradesmen into industrial employment as wage-earners, and a very large proportion of the apparent growth in industrial employment indicated by these statistics reflects merely the gradual extension of the coverage of the annual censuses and does *not* reflect any real increase in the number of people employed in industrial occupations.

The true position may be found by examining the Census of Population figures for 1926 and 1951, together with the continuation of these statistics in the official labour force estimates published annually. The Census of Population is of its very nature a comprehensive survey, and its results are directly comparable as between any two censuses, subject to such minor adjustments as may be required by small changes in occupational classifications.

These two sets of statistics are contrasted in the table below from which it will be seen that the coverage provided by the census of industrial production, namely the proportion of the total industrial labour force included in its scope, increased from just under 50% to almost 75% between 1926 and 1957. Thus employment in transportable goods industries, far from increasing two-and-a-half times, as the Census of Production statistics quoted by Mr Whitaker would appear to indicate, actually rose by only 60% in this period, and, if the mining, quarrying and turf production sector is excluded, confining the comparison to manufacturing industry proper, the increase during this thirty-one year period barely exceeded 50%, or 60,000 new jobs.

As no study of the effects of protection on industrial employment and production in Ireland has been made, or at any rate published, it is impossible to judge the extent of the advance achieved by means of this policy, but it seems clear that the number of new jobs *created* by protection must in fact have been considerably less than this figure of 60,000, for at least 10,000 of the 60,000 new industrial jobs which appeared during these years, were in industries which were not in fact protected at all, and one cannot but suspect that some at least of the remaining 50,000 jobs would have arisen in any event, even if protection had never been extended to these industries. These figures may be contrasted with the level of emigration in recent years which has averaged 50,000 per annum. It is clear, therefore, that the policy of protection which has now been in operation in varying degrees for

a period of about thirty-three years, has during the whole of this period at best absorbed the equivalent of *one* recent year's emigration!

Employment in Transportable Goods Industries

	Population Census	Census of Production	Percentage Coverage of Census of Production
1926 ...	123,400	61,000	49½%
1957 ...	196,000	149,000	74%
Increase 1926/1957	59%	144%	

Problems of Protection

One feature of protection calls for special study, the extent to which some Irish industries are handicapped by having to use more expensive or lower quality Irish materials. It is true that any industry seeking to compete in export markets *can* obtain licences to import any materials which cannot be obtained within the country, but this device does not fully meet the needs of the situation. In the first place the process of obtaining licences, while no doubt simply and efficiently administered, is itself a deterrent to the development of exports, for it discourages small experiments in the export market from which substantial sales might ultimately have emerged. No doubt in an ideal world all industrialists would take advantage of every opportunity for expansion regardless of the effort involved, but in practice the pressure of modern life is such that small obstacles can have disproportionately deterrent effects and there are undoubtedly many cases of export opportunities missed because the manufacturer involved does not feel that he has the time to spare to go through the necessary formalities in order to obtain permission to import materials required for a possible experimental export line.

The insistence upon the use of Irish materials is also a serious obstacle to efficient production of *consumer* goods for the home market, and any disabilities imposed on the production of consumer goods for the home market must ultimately have an effect upon our export potential, for it is the absence of an adequate home market for these types of goods that is the chief obstacle in the way of successful production for export. Moreover as the second major obstacle to the development of Irish exports is the cost of getting the goods to the export markets, it seems likely that we may achieve the greatest success in this field by concentrating on the production of high-value consumer goods which can stand high transport charges.

Finally, it is relevant to point out that with living standards in so many parts of the world now beginning to rise above subsistence level,

the greatest increases in effective world demand for goods during the next decade may be expected to take place in the consumer goods sector. This is the most rapidly expanding market, and the one, therefore, towards which we should be best advised to direct our energies.

The need for a closer study of the industrial sector is also evident from the fact that the revision of tariff and quota restrictions has lagged behind the development of some at least of our industries. In many cases tariffs are far higher than is necessary in order to protect the industry in question against major external competition, and considerable reductions could be achieved without any significant effect upon employment. In these cases protective and prohibitive tariffs are maintained either because no one has got around to changing them or because of the danger of dumping—an ever-present danger in a small state close to a major manufacturing country. The dumping could better be dealt with, however, on an *ad hoc* basis, rather than by maintaining tariffs at such levels that they undermine confidence in the efficiency of the Irish industry involved. When the consumer hears of a 50% tariff, he assumes that the Irish industry involved is totally inefficient, whereas in practice production costs, and prices, may be only fractionally higher than in Britain.

These rather extensive references to protection are by no means irrelevant to *Economic Development,* for while Mr Whitaker does not develop these themes, he does lay down the general principle that 'sooner or later protection will have to go and the challenge of free trade (be) accepted'. This thesis is endorsed by the Government White Paper, which warns that 'it must now be recognised that protection can no longer be relied upon as an automatic weapon of defence and it will be the policy in future *in the case of new industries* to confine the grant of tariff protection to cases in which it is clear that the industry will, after a short initial period, be able to survive without protection'. And it adds—having been written before the breakdown of the Free Trade Area negotiations last December—'The rules of the Free Trade Area will require a gradual and systematic reduction in *existing* tariffs'.

It would, however, be unfortunate if general acceptance of this proposition as a long-term policy aim should be felt to absolve us from the urgent need to examine in detail existing protective policies with a view to making such immediate adjustments as may be necessary in order to stimulate economic growth and the expansion of exports *now.*

RÔLE OF THE STATE

The *rôle* of the State in industrial development scarcely needs to be stressed. In the first place it has the task of making the climate for investment as favourable as possible by keeping taxation at a sufficiently

low level to attract foreign enterprise. This has been the stated policy of successive post-war governments, but the pressure of social requirements has inhibited tax reductions with the result that the Irish margin of tax advantage over Britain was gradually narrowed until with the recent British Budget it was, so far as personal taxation was concerned, actually reversed. This has now been partially remedied by our own recent Budget, but the differences between personal taxation here and in Britain, except for the very highest income groups, remain small, and in certain cases the amount of tax paid here is still slightly higher than in Britain.

There remain differences of opinion as to where we should go from here. On the one hand Mr Whitaker's study has been criticized for failing to propose drastic tax cuts, if necessary at the expense of temporary budget deficits. On the other hand his proposal to restrain further social advances until the tax base has been broadened so as to carry them more easily, has been criticized by, among others, Deputy Declan Costello. But the need to maintain *some* margin of tax advantage over more developed countries in north-western Europe seems evident, if we are to attract foreign investment and foreign enterprise, for even if it can be argued with some reason that the level of taxation may not, perhaps, have such a significant effect upon domestic investment as is sometimes suggested, it is clearly of paramount importance where foreign investors are concerned.

But the State has other responsibilities in this field in addition to the rather negative one of keeping taxation as low as possible. It must endeavour to stimulate investment and enterprise by offering incentives of various kinds to new undertakings, or to existing firms seeking to expand ; it must actively encourage the export trade ; and it must try to ensure the availability of capital for industry where owing to the special conditions of this country it might not readily be available from private sources. All this the State has done, and the effects of these policies are beginning to appear in the form of a new wave of industrial development, very largely inspired and financed from abroad, and mainly aimed at export markets.

It is difficult, indeed, to see how much more the State could do to stimulate private enterprise; it is possible, in fact, that so much has been done that a 'grant mentality' has been encouraged to develop in industry, just as it has been encouraged by past policies in the agricultural sector.

There remains the possibility of direct State action, where private enterprise is either unable or unwilling to undertake activities which would serve the national interest and which, possibly after an initial period of development, would be productive in character, in the sense of providing a reasonable return on the capital invested in them.

Fortunately the Socialist red herring has largely passed us by in this country, and despite efforts by extremists on both sides to introduce a doctrinaire approach, both government and public opinion have obstinately maintained a pragmatic approach to this problem. This common sense attitude no doubt finds part of its inspiration in an intelligent application to Irish conditions of the Catholic Church's teaching on this subject. It also reflects, no doubt, the impact upon Irish thought of British empiricism—now less prevalent in its native land than here, where it has taken strong root.

But whatever its origins, the Irish attitude to State intervention in industry is admirably summed up in the Third Report of the Capital Investment Advisory Committee, which recommends that

> the carrying out of productive capital projects should not be frustrated by prejudice either in favour of or against public enterprise. In other words we should welcome the setting up of new State enterprises in fields which private or cooperative enterprise is unable or unwilling to develop but we do not consider that development in any field should be reserved to State enterprise without special reason.

The contribution that this common sense approach has made to Irish economic development is, perhaps, not sufficiently appreciated within this country, but one has only to cross the Border or the Irish Sea to discover the kinds of futile and unnecessary obstacles to progress that can be raised by doctrinaire approaches to these matters. The morale, and therefore no doubt also the efficiency of public enterprises in the United Kingdom is notably lower than here, while on the other hand private enterprise in Great Britain dissipates much of its energies in defending itself against actual or potential doctrinaire threats to its integrity. In this matter at least our neighbours have something to learn from us.

What can One Expect of Philosophy?

by GABRIEL MARCEL

It is perhaps necessary to explain how I was induced, two years ago, to prepare this paper. I had been invited, in the first instance, by the University of Oslo to give a lecture there ; and they asked me to handle this very subject : what may we expect of philosophy ? This question came naturally to the mind of university professors in a country like Norway, where a certain shallow kind of neo-positivism is widespread. But, in fact, one may safely assert that in any western country—I leave aside the East where a kind of marxistic Koran is distributed to more or less acquiescent students—there is a growing number of people who, hypnotized by the development of science, mainly physical science, seem very much inclined to question the value of philosophy and to pass upon it a sentence of, so to say, ' superannuated-ness'.

It may be advisable to expatiate a little on the title of the paper. What does it really mean ? There is, of course, a distinction to be made between the questions : what can we expect *of*, and what can we expect *from* philosophy ? The first question means : What can we expect philosophy to be ? The second means : What fruits can we expect from it ? What is its possible worth ? I avoid the word ' use', for we must not put ourselves on a utilitarian level. I think it would be necessary to add ' at the present time', ' at the present moment of history'. The necessity of this addition will appear clearly at the end of the paper.

What I am going to say is, of course, the conclusion of half a century of reflection on philosophical problems. I should have spoken differently at the beginning of my career. I was inclined at that time to be rather dogmatic. Now I deeply distrust dogmatism of any kind—without, of course, being a sceptic.

* * *

I SHALL begin with a remark that to me seems very important. It would be quite fallacious to imagine that to the question : What can one or what ought one expect of philosophy ? an answer could be given which would be valid for any and every philosopher—such an answer would be possible in a scientific discipline and, *a fortiori,* in technology. The truth of the matter is that the words ' any philosopher ' probably have no more meaning than the words ' any artist ' or ' any poet'. In other words, I believe that we must acknowledge, in the most explicit way, that philosophy, like art or poetry, requires as its foundation what can be called a personal pledging (*engagement*)—one could even say, in a very profound sense, a vocation. I take this word vocation in its etymological sense. I do not see that philosophy, considered in its essential purpose, can be considered as other than a certain response to a call.

It goes without saying that, like all other human activities, this can be perverted, can degenerate into a kind of imitation, to a greater or less degree a self-caricature : all the more so as philosophy is increasingly treated as material for examination. In France, notably, there is the philosophy-class, the baccalaureate in philosophy. The teacher whose task it is to prepare pupils for this examination runs the risk of adopting the procedure of his colleagues in history, the natural sciences etc., confining his efforts to enabling his pupils to answer the questions, oral or written, that will be put them in the examinations they must face. The dreadful word *bachotage* describes very precisely this kind of cramming. It is not enough to say that it bears no relation to philosophy ; one can even affirm that it is exactly the opposite of philosophy. It is possible, of course, that those who have to undertake this business may, in the beginning, have understood the call that I have mentioned (and whose nature I shall have to try to determine). It is possible, but not certain. And there is no doubt that very often this increasingly tiresome task smothers the initial spark in the teacher, like a stifling ash. Yet that is by no means inevitable. I have been acquainted with teachers who have known how to retain intact in themselves that very special kind of ardour, for the want of which philosophy dries up, becomes devitalized, loses itself in words.

This should also be considered in another perspective, from the point of view, that is to say, of the student or disciple. The true philosophical relationship, as Plato not alone defined it but lived it for all time, is one flame enkindling another. But in this domain anything may happen. It may happen that, through a relatively desiccated teaching, a young man, in whom there is the potentiality for philosophy, may, nevertheless, discover the reality he aspires to and to which, I would even say, he already belongs unwittingly.

Here I can, up to a point, refer to my own personal experience. I had as a philosophical teacher a man of great learning whose teaching was distinguished by great clarity. But looking at that teaching now, from a distance and quite objectively, I am constrained to admit that it was devoid of that passion, of that inspired fervour without which, I should nowadays be tempted to say, philosophical teaching is not alive. But my appetite was such that, from the very first lecture, I announced to my family that I had found my path and that I should be a philosopher ; and that certitude has never been given the lie.

Under these conditions I cannot possibly say what are the conclusions bearing upon the original question to which an enquiry conducted upon a very broad basis should lead. I should scarcely be straining my thought in saying that the notion of an enquiry, as long as it does not coincide with that of a search, is doubtless strange enough to philosophers, as philosophers.

Truth to say, I run the risk of raising in the minds of my readers an interim objection. ' By insisting, as you do,' one might perhaps say, ' on the *rôle* of a personal pledging do you not risk depriving philosophical activity of all objective import, thus reducing it to a game left to the whims of the individual ? '

It is absolutely necessary to face this objection in order to dispel at the outset a confusion that would lead to the worst misunderstanding. The confusion concerns the very idea of subjectivity. It will, perhaps, appear more clearly if we fix our attention upon art which, in certain respects, is in a situation comparable with that of philosophy.

It is quite evident that, at the source of a work of art we find, or guess at the existence of, a personal reaction, an original way of responding to the calls, many and in a fashion inarticulate, that the object directs at the consciousness of the subject. But it is no less certain that that subjective reaction presents, in itself, no artistic value. This value appears only with the structures, constituted in what we call the creative process, which present themselves for the appreciation not alone of the subject—that is to say, of the artist—but of other possible viewers and hearers. Certainly it would be imprudent to speak here of universality in an extensive sense ; these structures certainly cannot be appreciated, or even recognized, by everybody. Here, too, ' everybody ' is a concept that is empty and inapplicable. I recall very well how, when Debussy's music was not yet accepted, many people declared that it was lacking in melody. This nowadays seems to us to be mistaken. In a work like *Pelléas et Mélisande*, on the contrary, the melody is continuous ; and it is precisely because it is everywhere present that inexperienced listeners were unable to recognize it. For them melody was a tune that you whistle or hum on the way home from a concert or a theatre. But, to be sure, it is not enough that the form—here the melody—be identified ; it is also necessary that it be greeted as meaningful, its meaning being, besides, immanent and incapable of expression in words. In any case, it is only on the basis of a structure, whatever it be, that there can be established that inter-subjective communication without which we cannot speak of value. Now it is a fact that I can have a conversation with someone else about the first movement of Beethoven's Fourteenth Quartet ; and that we shall not be confined to making the same observations about the tonality, about the way in which the instruments make their entry here or there, observations that could equally well be made by a deaf non-musician studying the score. If we are sensitive to the music we shall recognize, behind the defective words we are condemned to use—a certain quality made present to us through this structure, a certain sadness, and a certain remoteness ; and we shall agree that never, perhaps, has the feeling of infinity been rendered with such intimacy.

If I have dwelt at length upon such examples it is in order to show that, in art, subjectivity tends to be transmuted into an inter subjectivity which is quite different from the kind of objectivity that science conceives but, still, completely oversteps the limits of the individual consciousness left to itself.

Now somewhat analogous considerations can be put forward about, what we are entitled to call, the philosophical experience. Indeed I shall not hesitate to declare that there is not and there cannot be a philosophy worthy of the name without a specific experience, the nature of which I must now try to define. Likewise there cannot be authentic music where there is no ear to recognize it—and we must beware of the regrettable ambiguity of the word 'ear'. One cannot say merely—it would be a truism—that music presupposes the existence of a special acoustic organ. The word 'ear' in its esthetic sense designates something infinitely more subtle, a certain faculty for appreciating harmonies, or, perhaps, even a certain conscious attitude in the presence of what it is given to one to hear. For a person who lacks an ear in this sense there is no distinction for him between a noise and music ; and what we call a melody is for him merely a succession of noises.

The philosophical attitude is probably not entirely different from an 'ear' so understood.

I have just used the word 'attitude' ; and I have spoken of 'experience'. In reality there is no contradiction. For the attitude in question can only be revealed in a certain way in which consciousness reacts to what must be termed its fundamental situation.

It is appropriate to determine more precisely the nature of this reaction. One could, it seems to me, define it as an astonishment tending to become disquiet. Perhaps, as so often happens, it is by appealing to negations that we may best account for this disposition. It consists, above all, in not taking reality for granted. But what exactly does 'reality' mean here? It is certainly not a question of this or that particular phenomenon which one is trying to explain. What is at issue is reality as a whole or, more exactly, it is the whole, the totality, that is the problem. Here, perhaps, particular emphasis must be laid on the mysterious relationship between me, the questioner, and this world about which I ask myself questions. What am I the questioner, in this world or out of it? In this sense one must say that the philosophical spirit is that which, in the presence of the 'given', experiences a kind of impatience which can become an anxiety.

Here I shall take an example that seems to me one of the most significant. A philosophical spirit will not easily come to terms with the fact that reality, as we call it, is given to us according to an order of succession. This means that this order—which in some instances can

look like a disorder—will undoubtedly arouse a distrust ; he will have the feeling that he is not on sure ground. And, from that, he will, perhaps, come to ask himself if it is not merely one of the ways in which a thing can appear ; a further question, incidentally, being that of finding out if this something can exist in itself, that is apart from all the ways in which it might appear. Besides, one could easily show that these questions are bound up with other questions bearing upon this ' me ' that I am and to whom the appearance is given. Inasmuch as I am the occasion of these appearances do I not myself become an appearance and so on ?

Following the line of such reflections one would arrive at a philosophy like Bradley's. However, I should not care to say that a philosophical spirit, of whatever kind it may be, will put itself the questions in these terms. Let us recall what has been said above. One can no more speak of ' any philosopher ' than of ' any artist ' or ' any poet'. These words are only applicable to the realm of pure objectivity, as it reveals itself on the experimental plane. No matter what particles of this or that chemical substance (sodium, chlorine, etc.) we place in contact, such and such a reaction is inevitably produced and will be recorded by every observer. This is, indeed, the experience whose *a priori* conditions Kant proposed to determine. But the experience we are concerned with—whether that of the philosopher or that of the artist—is, of its essence, totally different ; one might even say that it is placed at a completely different level of reality.

But here something very remarkable happens, something to which we must turn out attention. It is that philosophical (or artistic) experiences can enter into communication with each other. And I should go so far as to say that one philosophical experience that is incapable of welcoming another, to understand or, if needs be, to surpass it, should be considered worthless.

One can, then, assert that it is essential to the philosophical experience, in the measure in which it is worked out, to be confronted with other experiences already fully elaborated and, in general, organized in systems. This is even to say too little ; this confrontation is really part of the experience in question, inasmuch as the latter tries to elucidate itself and to become crystallized in concepts. This is particularly clear in a thinker like Heidegger ; one can say that his thought is, as it were, engaged in a constant dialogue with the philosophers who have gone before—not all of them, of course, but those with whom he discovers affinities, the great pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle and, of the moderns, principally, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche. In this regard I shall mention a very significant fact.

Heidegger came to France for the first time in 1955 and stayed at the château of Cerisy-la-Salle where a certain number of philosophers and students had gathered to take advantage of his presence. It was

hoped that he would comment upon and clarify certain particularly obscure passages in his works. There was great disappointment when it was learnt that, after an introduction on philosophy in general, he would comment on certain texts, not of his own but of Kant and Hegel. To those who discreetly gave expression to their surprise and disappointment he answered that his method consisted precisely in clarifying his thought, beginning from that of the great philosophers of whom he had made a particular study.

It is, moreover, important to remember that this dialogue, in a mind of such originality, never fails to re-interpret, one may say creatively, the thinkers thus evoked. In the present case this is notably true for the pre-Socratics and for Kant.

Beginning from there, it would, furthermore, be in place to pose the general problems which preoccupy certain philosophers, particularly in France, and touch upon the very essence of the history of philosophy. One sees nowadays, more clearly doubtless than at any other period, the need, and at the same time the difficulty, of a philosophy of the history of philosophy.

But, in any event, it seems that the philosophical experience, if it necessarily begins as an instrumental solo, in its development tends to become a concerto ; it is already such in the measure in which it is opposed to other thought, for to be opposed is, in some way, to depend. It was so, for example in the relationship between Kant and David Hume or, nearer to us between Bergson and Spenser ; and, if I may be permitted to mention myself in this context, I can say that my thought has defined itself by way of opposition to contemporary neo-Hegelians, Bradley in particular, as well as to certain French exponents of neo-critical philosophy.

'But', some of my readers will perhaps say, ' it seems, if we understand your thought aright, that you gave a very strange and very disappointing answer to the question you posed at the beginning of your paper. You have said, on the one hand, that there is no philosophy except for one who has a personal experience in this matter or, at least, an ear for this mode of thought. Now you assert that the philosophical experience implies a living communication, a dialogue with other experiences already elaborated, that is to say, with other philosophies. But does not this amount to saying that everything in philosophy takes place within a kind of magic circle, among privileged people, or even in a sanctuary to which the uninitiated cannot have access ? Now our interest in asking you what can one expect of philosophy was in knowing just what the latter has to offer to the uninitiated or, if you will, to us, the profane, the outsiders. If it is merely a kind of game played between qualified persons we are no longer interested—exactly as a non-player

has no interest in a chess-match, played under his eyes, when he does not even know the rules.'

This objection has the great advantage of leading me to make here some necessary qualifications.

First of all there is this to be said in reply. Quite evidently it would be utterly false to imagine that between the philosopher and the non-philosopher there exists anything like a barrier. This barrier, which even in other periods did not exist, does so still less today when literature itself—what everyone reads or is presumed to read—is penetrated with philosophical thought to such an extent that it is really impossible to draw any line of demarcation between them. And this obtains not alone for the essay or the novel, but for the theatre and the cinema. In this matter an example like Sartre's is quite significant. One cannot trace genuine boundaries between the novels or plays of Sartre and his philosophical work. I will say exactly the same of myself with regard to my philosophical writings and my plays. One can also think of a writer like Paul Valéry who, to tell the truth, made a profession of despising philosophy but was himself, in reality, in some way a philosopher even in his purely poetical works ; so much so that a professional philosopher like Alain was found to give an exact commentary on his great collection of poems *Charmes*. But we must surely go further and say that in every thinking being, particularly in our time, there exists—not continuously, of course, but now and again—a rudimentary philosophical experience. I shall freely say that this experience shows itself as a sort of thrill (*frémissement*) in the presence of the great mysterious realities that are the concrete setting of every human life—love, death, the birth of a child, etc. We should not hesitate to say—this is my view—that every personally felt emotion in contact with those realities is something of an embryonic philosophical experience. It is only too evident that in the immense majority of cases this embryo not alone does not develop into an articulate experience but even appears not to feel the need of such development. And yet it is also true that almost every human being has, at a given privileged moment, felt this need for clarification, for having an answer to his own questioning.

It must be added, of course, that this becomes more and more true according as religion, properly so-called, declines or, at least, tends to change its nature, and as people are less and less satisfied with ready-made answers which, in another age, or so it seems, they would have accepted without demur.

It should also, perhaps, be added—and this seems to me to be very important—that there is a kind of waste-matter of philosophical thought that encumbers everyone more or less, the refuse carried in newspapers, in digests, even in conversation ; and that, most often, this rubbish could

with advantage be burnt like any other kind of industrial refuse or house-sweepings. Not the least important function of philosophical thought is to look after this kind of incineration.

However, a new question, more disturbing still than the previous one, must now be present to the mind of my readers.

'You admit', it is said, 'that a certain relationship can and should be established between the non-philosopher and the philosopher. But which philosopher? The uninitiated feel a kind of disquiet and distrust when faced with the variety of seemingly mutually-exclusive philosophies. Can the very fact that a choice must be made between them—how or according to what criterion it is not clear—be reconciled with their common claim to express a truth or truths? And, on the other hand, if a philosopher should ever renounce this claim, does not his activity degenerate into a mere game? The question could be formulated in yet another way. How, having regard to this irreducible plurality, can we still speak of philosophy in the sense in which we speak of science?'

It is quite certain that such an objection cannot be evaded; and that the answer to it bears directly upon that which must be made to the original question: What can one expect of philosophy?

I believe, first of all, that we must acknowledge once and for all the picture that is more or less consciously present to the minds of those who frame this objection. It is that of a shop-window or a stall where different philosophies are displayed side by side for the customer to choose among them. One of the surest benefits of a reflection supported by history consists precisely in showing that this comparison is absurd. For such juxtaposition is possible only with objects, with things; and a philosophy is just the sort of thing which cannot be treated in this way, for it is, in a manner, an experience. I should almost say that it is an adventure within a much vaster adventure, the adventure of human thought as a whole, or even in the heart of something that transcends that adventure, be it the manifestation of the Spirit and the Word, be it a theophany.

On the other hand, if what has been said in the first part of this paper has been grasped, one is in a position to understand that a philosophy can never be conceived as other than in function of a certain need. The history of philosophical doctrines is, in large measure, the still imperfectly-known history of the needs of the human mind. In reality those needs must be referred to concrete general situations that helped to give them birth. There is, besides, an extremely complex kind of relationship which it is the business of philosophy to elucidate. In fact it is meaningless to say that a situation can of itself *produce* a need. We are not here dealing with a causal relationship any more than in the admittedly much simpler case where we observe that, for example, a soil favours one given type of vegetation rather than another. The verb 'favours' covers an extremely complex knot of relationships.

In these conditions the misleading image of a choice between ideal objects must be replaced by a very different idea—that of the different levels at which the mind places itself according to the type of need that animates it. So it is that a philosophy that pivots upon the needs of the person, of personality as such, will attack marxism, not necessarily as a method (for it is certain that the method of marxism can be fruitful when applied in certain well-defined fields), but insofar as it claims to be a total and ultimate interpretation of life and history ; this by showing that marxism is incapable of furnishing anything like an answer to those needs and can not even be aware of them.

I should like, in this last part, to try to show what appears to me to be the type of philosophical experience which seems to arise in a particularly urgent manner in our time. Incidentally, I do not dream of concealing the fact that here I am speaking for myself ; but I ask you to call to mind what I have said in the beginning about the fact that there is not, nor can there be, philosophical thought without a certain personal pledging (*engagement*). Hence I shall address an appeal to those who, in a more or less articulate way, are disturbed by that same need that I want to define. As for the others, they must at least take sufficient cognizance to ask themselves if it is possible to set aside this appeal altogether or to abstract from it. This amounts to saying that the answer cannot be, nor ought it be, other than personal, while at the same time it bears upon questions that transcend mere subjectivity, if this latter be confined to simple ways of feeling, of desiring or not desiring.

First of all it is fitting to begin from a general, penetrating description of the situation in which humanity—or at least the western portion of humanity, which is the first to come under our inspection—finds itself. Here I quote a page from one of my books. It goes back to 1933, but I have today nothing to cut or change in it.

> The characteristic feature of our age seems to me to be what might be called the misplacement of the idea of function, taking function in its current sense which includes both the vital and the social functions.
>
> The individual tends to appear both to himself and to others as an agglomeration of functions. As a result of deep historical causes, which can as yet be understood only in part, he has been led to see himself more and more as a mere assemblage of functions, the hierarchical interrelations of which seems to him questionable or at least subject to conflicting interpretations.
>
> To take the vital functions first. It is hardly necessary to point out the *rôle* which historical materialism on the one hand, and Freudian doctrines on the other, have played in restricting the concept of man.
>
> Then there are the social functions—those of the consumer, the producer, the citizen, etc.
>
> Between these two there is, in theory, room for the psychological functions as well ; but it is easy to see how these will tend to be inter-

preted in relation either to the social or the vital functions, so that their independence will be threatened and their specific character put in doubt. In this sense, Comte, served by his total incomprehension of psychical reality, displayed an almost prophetic instinct when he excluded psychology from his classification of the sciences.

So far we are still dealing only with abstractions, but nothing is easier than to find concrete illustrations in this field.

Travelling on the Underground, I often wonder with a kind of dread what can be the inward reality of the life of this or that man employed on the railway—the man who opens the doors, for instance, or the one who punches the tickets. Surely everything both within him and outside him conspires to identify this man with his functions—meaning not only with his functions as worker, as trade union member or as voter, but with his vital functions as well. The rather horrible expression ' time table ' perfectly describes his life. So many hours for each function. Sleep too is a function which must be discharged so that other functions may be exercised in their turn. The same with pleasure, with relaxation ; it is logical that the weekly allowance of recreation should be determined by an expert on hygiene ; recreation is a psycho-organic function which must not be neglected any more than, for instance, the function of sex. We need go no further ; this sketch is sufficient to suggest the emergence of a kind of vital schedule ; the details will vary with the country, the climate, the profession, etc., but what matters is that there is a schedule.

It is true that certain disorderly elements—sickness, accidents of every sort—will break in on the smooth working of the system. It is therefore natural that the individual should be overhauled at regular intervals like a watch (this is often done in America). The hospital plays the part of the inspection bench or the repair shop. And it is from this same standpoint of function that such essential problems as birth control will be examined.

As for death, it becomes, objectively and functionally, the scrapping of what has ceased to be of use and must be written off as total loss. [1]

One cannot, I think, deny that this gloomy diagonosis becomes more and more accurate every day and that, as I wrote a little further on,

. . . besides the sadness felt by the onlooker, there is the dull, intolerable unease of the actor himself who is reduced to living as though he were in fact submerged by his functions . . . Life in a world centred on function is liable to despair because in reality this world is *empty,* it rings hollow ; and if it resists this temptation it is only to the extent that there come into play within it and in its favour certain hidden forces which are beyond its power to conceive or to recognise.[2]

From the point of view I have taken in this paper that last phrase is of the greatest importance ; from it as *point-de-départ* it is possible to suggest a definite answer to the original question.

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[1] Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existence* (English translation by Manya Harari) London: Harvill Press, 1948, pp. 1-3.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

One can expect of philosophy, at the point of history at which we stand, a diagnosis (of which I have just now given an element which I consider very important) of the risk of dehumanization which the intensive development of technology brings with it in this world of ours the clearest possible consciousness, of the deep and very often unexpressed trouble felt by man in his technological and bureaucratic surroundings, where what is deepest in him is not merely neglected but constantly trampled underfoot ; and, again, an extremely careful and delicate investigation of the secret powers that I mentioned a moment ago. What are these powers ? It is very difficult to put names on them ; first of all because we are here in a realm where words are only too often withered and sapped of their force. What I should say, in a quite general sense, is that these powers are like irradiations of being. Indeed, it is upon being as all the great philosophers of the past have seen it (and as Heidegger, in many ways the most profound thinker in Germany and perhaps in Western Europe, repeats today), it is upon being, I say, that philosophical reflection must be based.

'But', you will ask, not without anxiety, ' when you speak of being as such do you not take refuge in an abstraction, empty of all concrete meaning ? ' The answer must be, I believe, that being is really the exact opposite of abstraction, despite the fact that, at the level of language, being is almost inevitably ' denatured ' into abstraction. There precisely is the central difficulty and that is just the reason why, in the work from which I have borrowed my quotations (and which occupies a central place in my thought), I have insisted upon what I have called ' concrete approaches'. It comes down, I think, to saying that we cannot, as it were, install ourselves in being ; we cannot take possession of being any more than we can see the source of light—all that we can see are the areas illuminated by this light. This comparison of being with light is, I think, quite essential ; and there is scarcely need to remark that here one comes back to the text in the Gospel of St John about the ' Light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world'. In another of my books I have spoken of a light that would be Joy in being light, in which the human being as such would participate, for want of which it would fall back to, or even below, the animal level.

Here I may forestall a final objection, to which I should like to reply rapidly.

'This reply of philosophy', you will say to me, ' is it not indistinguishable from that of religion ? We find difficulty in seeing what frontier you can trace between philosophy and religion.'

The question is very important, and here is how I should answer it. I believe profoundly that there is and ought to be a secret convergence between philosophy and religion ; but I also think that, in each case, the instrument is quite different. Religion, in effect, can only be based

upon Faith. The method of philosophy, I think, is, on the contrary, reflection. And I ought to say that I shall always view with a certain distrust philosophical teachings that purport to rest upon intuition. I have tried to show that reflection can present itself under two different and complementary forms, the one being purely analytic and ' reducing ' (this is primary reflection) and the other, on the contrary, ' recuperative ' or, if you will, synthetic. It is precisely the latter that rests upon being —not upon an intuition but upon a certitude which blends with what we call our soul.

Now you may, perhaps, ask to what extent I consider philosophy as an introduction to religion. I should not willingly assume that it is such, for I want to safeguard the independence of philosophy. What I should assert is this : philosophy and religion can alone be the ground upon which the fundamental option must be made in refusal or invocation ; philosophy alone can make clear the full bearing of this option. And at no time was it more necessary to do so than now when mankind seems threatened with extinction, nay with suicide. Never, or so I believe, was what is at stake more obvious or more serious ; and where, this side of religion, shall we find a refuge if not in philosophy ?[1]

[1] This is the text of a paper read by M. Marcel to the Pax Romana Society, University College, Dublin, on 11 March 1959.

For the translation we are greatly indebted to the Reverend M. B. Crowe, University College, Dublin.

Ed.

Faith and Reason in Graham Greene

by T. A. WASSMER

PLATO has some interesting words to say about agnosticism concerning the gods. In *Timaeus* he tells Socrates :

> Do not be surprised, Socrates, if over a wide range of topics connected with God and the creation of the universe we are not able to make statements that are entirely consistent with themselves or at all precise. But if we produce what is as probable as anything else, we must be content, remembering that I who speak and you who judge are only human beings and must accept the probable story about these things and not go in search of anything beyond.

Graham Greene in ' A Visit to Morin ' (*Harper's Bazaar,* January 1957) might have consoled the author of *Le Diable au Ciel* and *Le Bien Pensant* if he had placed these words of Timaeus on the lips of Dunlop, the visitor. They might not have satisfied the mind of Morin whom some had accused of Jansenism, and others insisted upon calling an Augustinian. Still, they might have made less difficult the speculation on faith and rational belief between Dunlop, the buyer and seller of wine, and this novelist who could tantalize his readers with such diverse characters, some of whom ' accepted a dogma so whole-heartedly that they drew out its implications to the verge of absurdity, while others examined a dogma as though they were constitutional lawyers, determined on confining it to a legal minimum.'

The encounter on Christmas Eve between these two men was bound to be stimulating. Dunlop, a non-Catholic, had been driven to ask a Catholic chaplain during the war to teach him just what Catholics *did* believe but the answer he received was a loan of two books—' one a penny catechism with its catalogue of preposterous questions and answers, smug and explanatory : mystery like a butterfly killed by cyanide, stiffened and laid out with pins and paper strips.' The chaplain suggested that he read Chesterton rather than Morin's novels although Dunlop surprised the priest by telling him that his first interest in the faith was stirred by the books with which the chaplain would not waste his time. The wine merchant had found Morin's work fresh and exciting ever since he had been taught by a Roman Catholic master who had been

close to Morin's generation. Perhaps the pleasure and offense that Morin had provoked in that generation were the real reasons why Dunlop discovered increasing fascination for this intense writer. Dunlop soon became one of those ' enthusiastic readers among the non-Christians who, when once they had accepted imaginatively Morin's premises, perhaps detected in his work the freedom of speculation which put his fellow Catholics on their guard.' Little wonder that he looked upon him as a revolutionary writer even though some of the excitement and fire had gone from those pages.

The first encounter with Morin was at the midnight Mass in a village outside Colmar while he was kneeling at the crib with several others—an old man with a round head ' like a peasant's, the skin wrinkled like a stale apple, the hair gone from the crown'. It was Morin's eyes that gave him away : ' they seemed to know too much and to have seen further than the seasons and the fields : of a very clear, pale blue, they continually shifted focus looking close and looking away, observant, sad and curious like those of a man caught in some great catastrophe which it is his duty to record, but which he cannot bear to contemplate without a break for any great length of time.' At Communion time Dunlop found himself alone with Morin among the empty chairs and began to enumerate in his mind the possible reasons for his remaining away from the holy table : inadvertent breaking of his fast, some slight act of uncharity or greed, some scruple about his lack of preparation. Had not Morin been the very one to prove to him the existence of this malady in religious people and, after all, was it not likely that he had projected his own scrupulosity upon his literary character, Durobier ? Dunlop was reluctant to approach Morin on this subject ; in fact, he wondered whether he could ever explain the reasons for the ' vulgarity ' of his curiosity in approaching him at all. He was convinced that writing is the most private of all arts and yet there are few of us who hesitate one moment to invade the writer's privacy.

When Morin invited the wine merchant to his home on the grounds that he always found it difficult to sleep after midnight Mass and that he would like to offer his visitor some rare wine, the real encounter began. Morin expressed his satisfaction that Dunlop was not a Catholic because he could cast away any fears of offending him. What Morin said in the course of this speculative discussion on faith and rational belief might possibly offend some Catholics but it will undoubtedly arouse many more questions than the theologically naive Dunlop could raise. There were many books on the shelves of the novelist which ' had the appearance of bankrupt stock : small tears and dust and the discolouration of sunlight'. There were many volumes on theology but Morin would recommend none of them to Dunlop, because ' if a man wants to believe he must avoid theology'. Is this another of Greene's paradoxes—that

faith is undermined by theology and that there is an antimony between faith and rational belief? Surely Dunlop understood that Morin intended this paradox when he remarked :

> A man can accept anything to do with God until scholars begin to go into details and the implications. A man can accept the Trinity, but the arguments that follow . . . Can you find anything more inadequate than the scholastic arguments for the existence of God . . . I used to get letters saying how I had converted them by this book or that. Long after I had ceased to believe myself I was a carrier of belief, like a man can be a carrier of disease without being sick.

The tension between faith and rational belief that Morin considered to be so sharp is not impossible to accept if Morin is understood to have meant by faith the theological virtue, supernatural and gratuitous, whereby, in the words of the Vatican Council, ' inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things which he had revealed are true ; not because the intrinsic truth of the things is plainly perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself who reveals them, and who can neither be deceived nor deceive.' In other words there *is* most certainly a tension between the theological virtue of faith and rational belief, and, paradoxically, theological faith might be consummate in someone who has little sympathy with the scholastic arguments from natural theology. We might even accentuate the paradox for Morin and his visitor by illustrating the tension existing in the mind of a professional theologian who has at his finger tips all the rational arguments and theological *loci* for the propositions of the faith and yet has lost the theological virtue of faith by his public articulation of an heretical doctrine. In other words, there is a compatibility between exhaustive speculative theological knowledge and the absence of the virtue of theological faith. This tension *has* to exist if *faith* is entitatively supernatural and sheerly gratuitous. Conversely, the tension is manifest in the absence of all speculative theological knowledge and the presence of the virtue of faith. Who has not met the Catholic whose faith is accompanied by an extraordinary ignorance of philosophical and theological proofs and by an almost equal disinterest in their acquisition ?

We are not surprised then by Morin's recognition of this patent truth even if he is made to say it in a very startling manner. The paradoxes Greene places on his lips can be made all the more striking by the professional theologian. Ignorance and some dissatisfaction with rational arguments are compatible with supernatural faith ; and who is going to emphasize this truth more than the Church does in demanding infant baptism, which produces sanctifying grace and brings the theological virtue of faith in its train ? How many infants have ever found satisfac-

tion with the natural theology of St Thomas ? Is Morin equivalently telling us to remain infants in theology and philosophy ?

> 'They tell you that in all change there are two elements, that which is changed and that which changes it. Each agent of change is itself determined by some higher agent. Can this go on *ad infinitum* ? Oh no, they say, that would not give the finality that thought demands. But does thought demand it ? Why shouldn't the chain go on forever ?
>
> Man has invented the idea of infinity. In any case how trivial any argument based on what human thought demands must be. The thoughts of you and me and Monsieur Dupont. I would prefer the thought of an ape. Its instincts are less corrupted. Show me a gorilla praying and I might believe again.'
>
> 'But surely there are other arguments ? '
>
> 'Four. Each more inadequate than the other. *It only needs a child to say to these theologians, why ?—why not?* Why *not* an infinite series of causes ? Why should the existence of a good and a better imply the existence of a best ? This is playing with words. We invent the words and make arguments from them. The better is not a fact : it is only a word and a human judgment.'

These formulations of the cosmological and henological arguments will annoy the philosopher-theologian but they cannot annoy him as much as the statement by Morin that only confounds the problem. The speculation indulged in by Morin and Dunlop thus far has been intelligible and reasonable except for the following observation : 'I used to believe in Revelation but *I never believed in the capacity of the human mind.*' Does it not seem that Morin has pushed his disbelief too far and that the acid of scepticism has been applied not only to rational arguments in philosophy and theology but even to the very aptitude of the mind to attain truth ? Morin appears to have been influenced by the anti-intellectualism or fideism and the traditionalism of the nineteenth century. Instigated by the German agnostics who disparaged the rational powers in man, the fideists denied that the foundations of religious belief and practice, such as the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul could any longer be demonstrated by an appeal to reason.

The valid tension postulated by Morin between the theological faith and rational disbelief (in the sense of dissatisfaction with rational arguments) can be found in the precocious young lady in a short story by Mary McCarthy. She had caused a great deal of bewilderment and consternation in the convent school of the Religious of the Sacred Heart by her insistence that she was sure that she had lost her faith because she found none of the arguments from St Thomas for the existence of God cogently and demonstrably valid. Reverend Mother should have made short shrift of her protests by a simple explanation of the

compatibility between theological faith and a refusal to accept certain rational arguments. This young lady (Miss McCarthy ?) had not necessarily lost her faith simply because theodicy had lost its appeal.

Admittedly, the position that questions the radical capacity of the human mind to know God is temerarious. The teaching of the Catholic Church is stated clearly by the Vatican Council : ' Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be certainly known by the natural light of human reason by means of created things ' (*Constitutio de Fide Catholica,* Chapter 2). The Church's vindication of the capacity of human reason to know God is a reaffirmation of the Pauline text in the Epistle to the Romans : ' The invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.' The Church has little sympathy on the one hand, with those who disparage human reason (the fideists and traditionalists) nor, on the other hand, with the olympian pretensions of the rationalists that reason is ' the sole judge of the true and the false . . . that it is a law to itself and sufficient by its natural powers to procure the good of men and peoples ' (Syllabus of Pius IX, n. 3).

Pierre Morin is indeed no exaggerated rationalist and if he had not made the bold statement that is suggestive of fideism he would have proposed the problem which torments the philosopher-theologian. Just how far can we conceive this tension to operate between faith and rational doubt? Just how far *can* and *should* an intelligent man exercise his prudent scepticism and realize within himself the dual obligation to doubt and to believe ? It would appear to me, as a moral philosopher, that the distance is wide between a healthy, consistent scepticism with rational arguments and a categorical negation of the aptitude of the mind to know God.

We are always indebted to Greene for making us re-examine our philosophical and theological positions. We expect him to place both literary shoulders against these polarities of faith and reason and to separate them as far as reality will allow. There is no complaint in his doing this with Morin's speculation on faith and rational belief. In fact this is one of the most admitted artistic devices of Greene. We can only wish that he had not delivered Morin so soon into the hands of the fideists.

Nine Centuries of Schism

by PATRICK O'CONNELL

THE ORIGINS OF THE SCHISM[1]

IN these days of preparation for the Oecumenical Council summoned by His Holiness Pope John XXIII it seems worth while to attempt an outline of some of the important factors which resulted in the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches. It is understanding that is of prime importance in any attempt at reunion. Pope Pius XI, in his allocution of the 10 January 1927, points this out clearly : ' For reunion, it is before all else necessary to understand and to love one another. To understand one another, because if the work of reunion has failed so many times, these failures are in great part due to the fact that, on one side and the other, there was lack of understanding. If there were reciprocal prejudices, these would necessarily wither away . . . The eastern Christians have preserved a holiness so venerable that they merit not merely all our respect but also our sympathy.'

Faults there were on both sides, but the origins of the schism are so deeply rooted and the development so gradual that it is hard to point to a person or an event, which will bear all the blame, and few of the protagonists seem to have been aware of the tragic consequences of their activity. For example, the year 1054 is generally given as the year which marked the beginning of the long centuries of formal schism. But as Father Jugie pointed out : ' Instead of speaking of definite schism, it would be doubtless more exact to say that we are in the presence of the first abortive attempt at reunion.'[2]

It seems better to omit all treatment of the various Nestorian and Monophysite Churches, and to concentrate on the schism between the Greco-Slav Church bodies and the Latin Church. This will involve an examination of the relations between Constantinople and Rome.

As early as the year 381, at the First Oecumenical Council of Constantinople, the Bishop of Constantinople attempted to assert a prerogative of honour, second only to that of Rome. This was resisted by Rome, not from motives of jealousy, but because the prerogatives of Alexandria and the other patriarchal Sees of Antioch and Jerusalem were seen to be

[1] In a later article we hope to describe the various attempts at reunion, notably at the Second Council of Lyons and the Council of Florence.

[2] Jugie : *Le Schisme Byzantine,* Paris, 1941, p. 230.

set aside. At Chalcedon (451) the claims of Constantinople were again made, and this time, in the absence of the deposed and excommunicated Dioscoros of Alexandria, the Eastern bishops were willing to sanction canonically a primacy which already existed in fact. But Rome again refused her approval. We should be clear that there was no question of disputing the primacy of Rome, although the argument inserted in the relevant canons of Constantinople and Chalcedon, ' because this city is the New Rome', constituted a threat for the future.

The title ' Oecumenical (Universal) Patriarch', which in past times had been sometimes applied to the Pope, sometimes to the Patriarch of Alexandria, was adopted by the Patriarch of Constantinople from the time of Acacius (484-519) while he was in schism from Rome.[1] It was claimed as a regular title by successive Patriarchs of Constantinople, and confirmed by the usage of Justinian in his enactments. Various attempts have been made to soften the interpretation of this title, but there is no doubt but that Gregory the Great was right in seeing that in this matter the prestige of the papacy in the East was at stake. In the end, the title passed into current usage, although Rome continued to protest, and the meaning of the title was accepted as purely honorific. But the danger implied by this assumption of even a verbal title of independence was real.

As the Western Empire became barbarian territory and the Eastern Empire was more and more hemmed in by its enemies, a break-down in communications between the East and Rome became inevitable, and the ecclesiastical business of the East, including Greece and the areas south of the Danube, centered on Constantinople. The Acacian Schism (484-519) established Byzantine ecclesiastical autonomy and set the pattern for the future. Justinian, by his treatment of Pope Vigilus (537-555), and Emperer Constans II, at the height of the Monothelite controversy, by his brutal and insulting treatment of Pope St Martin I in 655, contributed in no small measure to the lowering of Rome's prestige in the East. It is curiously illogical that both these Emperors wanted these Popes' approval for their religious policies. By the eighth century, the period of the Iconoclastic Schism, the division had become serious. Already Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem had been submerged under the Mohammedan invasion. Constantinople remained alone and unchallenged.

It was at this period, the end of the eighth century, that the Popes, nominally subjects of the Byzantine Emperor but actually independent, appealed to Constantinople for help against the Lombards. No help

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[1] The Patriarch Acacius, who had earlier resisted any compromise with the Monophysites, later endorsed, if he was not actually responsible for, Emperor Zeno's *Henotikon*. This document ignored the work of Chalcedon, and was a deliberate attempt to conciliate the Monophysites.

was forthcoming, so the Pope turned to the Franks, and in the year 800 Charlemagne was crowned Imperator Romanorum by Pope Leo III. This transference of allegiance from East to West was bitterly resented in Constantinople.

About the same time a theological dispute with mutual charges of heresy arose between Greek and Latin theologians. It concerned the insertion of the word 'Filioque' into the Creed.[1] Pope Leo III very prudently refused to allow the matter to come to a head. But before the end of the ninth century it was reintroduced by the Patriarch Photius.

The affair of the Patriarch Photius has an importance quite out of proportion to the events of the time. Elected Patriarch, while head of the Civil Service, to replace the Patriarch Ignatius, who had proved unsatisfactory to the Emperor, he was soon the target of an intrigue directed by the Ignatian faction. Pope Nicholas decided to intervene. Legates were sent to Constantinople to investigate the reasons for Ignatius's forced resignation. It seems that the Legates were involved in anti-Ignatian intrigues while they were in Constantinople, and when they returned to Rome, Pope Nicholas disowned them and annulled the condemnation of Ignatius. Photius was treated as an intruder in the See of Constantinople and letters to this effect were addressed to the other Patriarchs.

Photius reacted violently : he held a Council which excommunicated the Pope, and issued a long encyclical addressed to the other Sees of the East. In this document, and in his other writings, Photius listed in minute detail all the differences between Latins and Greeks in liturgy, ecclesiastical discipline, and in dogma, stressing the 'Filioque'. He maintained that the Latin Church had fallen into heresy, that all sorts of abuses had crept in, and that the condemnation of these abuses would soon find support in the West, where men were tired of the tyranny of him who occupied the chair of Peter.[2]

Finally, under Nicholas's successor, Photius was condemned in the Oecumenical Council of 869, the Fourth Council of Constantinople, and Ignatius was restored. On the death of Ignatius, Photius was restored to the Patriarchate and accepted by Rome. He now showed himself most moderate, a man of peace. It has been shown by Francis Dvornik and

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[1] The Nicene Creed ends with the words : 'And [I believe] in the Holy Ghost . . .' To this the First Council of Constantinople added : 'who proceedeth from the Father.' In course of time there grew up in the West a practice of adding to this : 'and from the Son' (*filioque*). The Greeks objected on the grounds that this confused the parts played by the Father and Son in the processions of the Trinity and that the Council of Ephesus had forbidden any Creed other than the Nicene to be used. The first objection arises out of a difference of terminology in East and West and a reading of patristic statements out of context; the second, from a too rigorous interpretation of the Ephesian prescription.

[2] The distinction so delicately suggested, amounting almost to that between the Sedes and the Sedens of later times, was lost on the men of Photius's generation.

other scholars of our own day that Photius kept faith with Rome. There was no second schism. The importance of this episode is due mainly to the writings of Photius during his few years of schism: they crystallized the anti-Roman sentiment of Constantinople, and became an arsenal of anti-Latin propaganda, which was used unsparingly in the future at all moments of tension between the two Romes. And later, when the break between Rome and Constantinople had become quasi-definite, Photius became, as it were, the eponymous hero of the Byzantine Church. For this reason Latin polemicists, in their turn, singled him out for their bitterest attacks.

Once again, ' normal relations ' were resumed between the two Romes, but the friends of Rome in the East were becoming fewer, and in the ordinary life of the Church in the East the influence of Rome was not discernible. Prejudices, which had been latent on both sides, had been given expression at the highest level. The developments of the next two centuries were not going to make it easy to return to the unity of earlier days.

Relations between East and West were again disturbed in 906 by the affair of the fourth marriage of the Emperor Leo VI. The Byzantine Church, which disapproved of second and third marriages, declared fourth marriages invalid. Leo, after the death of his third wife, wished to marry a fourth time in order to regularize a union which had produced a son and heir. The Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos refused to sanction the marriage but agreed to write to Rome and the other Patriarchal Sees. The Pope sent Legates and, they, following Western canon law, saw no difficulty in allowing a fourth marriage. It is curious that while the Patriarch could appeal to Rome for her opinion, and could write letters full of respect for the Roman See—' To despise the authority of the Pope is to do injury to the Prince of the Apostles '[1]—his tone during this period was truculent and markedly anti-Roman. Peace was restored only when the Papal Legates ' anathematized ' (a vague phrase which Nicholas takes as the fullest possible retractation by Rome) any scandal caused in the question of a fourth marriage. Nicholas claimed that the Roman Legates, by condemning (as he alleged) fourth marriages, recognized the right of his Church to its own autonomous legislation. Thus the affair of the fourth marriage, small enough in itself, was given an important significance in the history of the relations of the two Romes.

From the mid-tenth century to the second third of the eleventh century the Byzantine Empire was directed by great military rulers—Nicephorus Phocas (963-969), John Tzimisces (969-976), and above all Basil II (' Bulgaroktonos ' 976-1025). The prestige of the Byzantine Empire was immense, with its reconquest of Syria, Crete and Bulgaria.

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[6] Migne : P. G. CXI 176-181

It needed little for Jerusalem to fall once more into Christian hands. Armenia became again a vassal of Constantinople, the Euphrates was crossed often, and far-off Edessa was reached. Serbia and Croatia acknowledged the overlordship of Constantinople, and in the north, where the future Russian state was developing around Kiev, Byzantine influence was dominant. Southern Italy was strongly held. Much of this prestige reflected on the Patriarch of Constantinople. Although still very much under the control of the Emperor, his ecclesiastical control and influence expanded with the Byzantine territory, and, beyond the frontiers, Russia was drawn into his orbit. With the reconquest of Antioch in 968, the Patriarch of Constantinople was asked to nominate a Patriarch for this See, which he did.

The religious history of the relations between Rome and Constantinople in the tenth century is very obscure. It was a turbulent period in the West, and for Italy in particular. The prestige of the Papacy was at its lowest ebb, and the scandalous lives of some of the Popes did nothing to help matters. In the Byzantine literature of the period the relations of the Emperor with his Patriarch and bishops are treated of, but there is no interest in the universal Church. There is nothing but scorn and contempt for the barbarian Church of the West. The significance of Rome is already lost for this enclosed Byzantine world. Already, before it takes place, schism is a fact in literature.

There seems to have been some sporadic contact between Rome and Constantinople in the early part of the tenth century, but it amounted to little more than an exchange of polite formalities. A somewhat different trend is discernible in the Patriarchate of Antony Studites (974-8). In spite of the pro-Roman tradition of the Studion monastery from which he came, the Patriarch was not allowed to enter into friendly relations with Rome, for the German Emperor Otto I had been threatening Byzantine possessions in Italy. In 974 the anti-Pope Boniface VII was given asylum at Constantinople, so we may be sure that Pope Benedict VII (974-83) was not recognized in the East.

We know that the name of Pope John XVIII appeared on the diptychs[1] in Constantinople in the year 1008-9, but there is a strong tradition that the Patriarch of the time, Sergius II, broke off relations with Rome. This tradition must be accepted cautiously, for Patriarch Sergius II was related to the famous Photius, and later Greek writers are concerned to build up a tradition of revolt. In any event, from another consideration, it does seem that relations between the two Churches were broken off at this period, because in Southern Italy a series of revolts against Byzantine rule were encouraged by Pope Benedict VIII.

[1] The diptychs were two-leaved tablets containing the names of those who were to be prayed for or commemmorated in the liturgy. Only persons in communion with the Church could have their names on the diptychs, so, to have one's name struck from the diptychs implied that one was excommunicated.

The favour shown by this Pope to the Normans was bound to strain good relations with the Eastern Emperor, so that it is probable that the Patriarch was given no choice in the matter.

We know that Patriarch Eustathius (1019-25) was engaged in correspondence with Rome, and it seems that on the accession of Pope John XIX, less devoted to the Germans than some of his predecessors, the Byzantines were willing to resume relations with Rome. The Patriarch, however, appears to have made the recognition of his title ' Oecumenical Patriarch '—in the sense of jurisdictional primacy of the East, balancing the Pope in the West—the condition of good relationship. The negotiations, not unnaturally, failed, and the Pope was ignored in the East up to the accession of Michael Cerularius as Patriarch in the year 1043.

At this time there was certainly not full union between Rome and Constantinople, nor yet a state of open war. We may take it as certain that the name of the ruling Pope, Benedict IX, did not appear on the diptychs in Constantinople. It is certain that Michael did not send his Synodical letter to Rome on taking possession of his See. And it is most likely that the Patriarch of Antioch, and the Melkite Patriarchs of Alexandria and Jerusalem followed the example of Constantinople. The East had become accustomed to this state of affairs and the new Patriarch planned to keep it so. We find evidence of his wish to be for the East what the Pope was for the West.

But about the year 1050, his position was threatened by a political development. The Byzantine commander against the Normans in Southern Italy, Argyros, had succeeded in winning over the Emperor Constantine Monomachos to his scheme of an alliance with Pope Leo IX and the German Emperor against the Norman menace. Should this alliance be concluded, Michael Cerularius would naturally be expected to make his peace with Rome, on terms acceptable to Rome. With political unity achieved, the days of his autokephaly would be numbered. Further, the Emperor in 1052 appointed to the See of Antioch a man who was openly favourable to Rome, Peter of Antioch. On taking possession of his See, he at once sent his Synodical letter to Rome. It was obvious that the Patriarch of Constantinople would soon be expected to follow this example.

At his inspiration, therefore, a most offensive letter was sent by Bishop Leo of Ochrida to the Bishop of Trani, a personal friend of Argyros and dependent ecclesiastically on Rome, asserting that it was Rome and her practices which were the real obstacles to reunion. The use of unleavened bread at Mass, the Saturday fast, the omission of the ' Alleluja ' in Lent, and similar abuses were the errors which set Rome against the doctrine of the Seven Oecumenical Councils and the traditions of the Apostles.

But since Argyros had by now persuaded the Emperor that his projected alliance was essential if Byzantine territory in Southern Italy was to be saved from the Normans, Cerularius had to write to the Pope to say that he wished to make an end to the dissensions which had for so long separated the two Churches and that he was willing to restore the Pope's name to the diptychs in Constantinople, on condition that the Patriarch's name was also mentioned during Mass in Rome. Leo IX sent Legates to Constantinople. One of the Legates, Cardinal Humbert, drew up the official letters which they brought to the Eastern Emperor and the Patriarch. The letter to the Patriarch was a most offensive document. Cerularius not unnaturally refused to recognize the Legates and when news reached Constantinople that Pope Leo had died, they were in an awkward predicament. After some time spent in sterile polemics, it was obvious that nothing was going to be achieved. Accordingly, the Legates determined to signalize their departure with a *coup d'éclat*. On 16 July 1054, they entered Hagia Sophia at the hour of the Solemn Function, and protesting against the Patriarch's obstinacy they laid on the altar a bull excommunicating him. Then they left the Church, and shook the dust of the place from their shoes. The Bull of Excommunication is a curious document, vehement, violent, injurious, of poor historical quality, with some false accusations that can scarcely have the excuse of good faith. It is unfortunately by this document that the Eastern Churches in times to come judged the claims of Rome.

Cerularius had the terms of the Bull widely published and sedition was stirred up in the city. The Emperor was forced to yield and abandon his projected alliance ; and Argyros was disgraced. It was a complete triumph for Cerularius ; a copy of the Bull of Excommunication was publicly burnt, but the original was preserved in the Patriarchal Archives ' to the eternal dishonour and the permanent condemnation of those who have so blasphemed the Saviour '.

When the emotions aroused by this event had died away, the state of affairs remained what had been normal for some time already : Constantinople continued to be isolated from Rome. And a large section of the Greek clergy, men like Peter of Antioch, who remained well disposed to union with Rome, continued in practice to follow the example of Constantinople. Succeeding Popes tried to establish better relations, but even the Crusades, which would seem to have offered a chance of improving the situation on account of a common interest, helped in many ways to deepen the schism.[1] The massacre of the Latins in Con-

[1] Runciman : *The Eastern Schism*. Of the Crusaders in general Runciman notes : ' There are idealists who fondly believe that if only the peoples of the world could get to know each other there would be peace and good-will for ever. This is a tragic delusion. It is indeed possible for men and women of education to enjoy the company and customs of foreigners and to feel sympathy for them. But simpler folk who find themselves in a country whose language and habits are unintelligible to them are apt to feel at a loss and resentful.' *The Eastern Schism*, pp. 79-80.

stantinople in 1182, and the sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, with the subsequent setting up of the short-lived Latin Empire, and the rival lines of Latin Patriarchs in the East—all this deepened the antipathy between Rome and Constantinople, and gradually the gap between the two Churches widened. By the thirteenth century, the Schism between East and West was a fact.

How much was done in those past centuries which we would gladly undo. There is no doubt but that Cerularius precipitated the present state of permanent schism, but it had been latent from early centuries. Rome never excommunicated the Byzantine Church as such, only its recalcitrant leaders. But surely much could have been done to guard against the schism, had the danger been foreseen in time.

In the last analysis, the control exercised by the Eastern Emperors over their Patriarch, a control which was not sufficiently resisted, laid the foundations of the separation of East and West. The Eastern Church, in the mind of the Emperors, was an Eastern thing, a department of the Empire. And the Patriarchs, unfortunately, followed this line of thought.

We may conclude with a remark of E. Amann, formerly Professor of the Catholic Faculty of Theology in Strasburg : ' Unfortunately at two significent moments, in the ninth century under Photius, and in the eleventh century under Cerularius, the control of the relations between the two Churches was entrusted to subordinates: Anastasius and Humbert, vain, ambitious men, deficient in self-control, who sought in everything opportunities for personal triumph '.[1]

[1] ' Est-il interdit de regretter qu'à deux moments particulièrement graves, au IX[e] siècle, sous Photius, au XI[e] siècle, sous Cérulaire, les rapports entre les deux Églises aient été réglés, presque sans contrôle, ou même sans contrôle du tout, par des subalternes: Anastase, Humbert, dont la maîtrise de soi n'était pas la vertu dominante et dont la très ostentatoire vanité cherchait avant tout l'occasion de triomphes personnels ?'[1]

[2] Fliche-Martin : *Histoire de L'Eglise*: Vol. 7. p. 146, note (1).

Progress of the Oecumenical Movement

by STEPHEN J. BROWN

THE attitude of Catholics to the problem of the reunion of Christendom varies very greatly from indifference to active interest and hope. The great majority, I fear, fail to realize the scandal, in face of the non-Christian world, of a disunited Christendom. Those who do realize it see no hope of a remedy, are even convinced that no remedy is possible. In Ireland this impression goes so far with many as to render them sceptical about the possibility of even individual conversions to Catholicism from the various non-Catholic communities.

The Oecumenical Movement is not concerned with individual conversions. Confusion may be caused at the outset by the use of the adjective 'oecumenical' in describing this movement, especially in view of the announcement of Pope John XXIII that he has decided to summon an Oecumenical Council.[1] In this article I use the term in its current sense of a world movement among Christians with a view to the reunion of Christendom. The ultimate aim of the Oecumenical Movement is to remedy the disunion of Christendom, to unite all Christians. Its immediate aim is to create a psychological atmosphere favourable to union by friendliness and by prayer. However far off the ultimate goal may appear, however seemingly impossible its attainment, those engaged in the movement are convinced that a beginning must be made. I think it is true to say that the vast majority of Catholics are unaware of what has been and is being done by the Oecumenical Movement among Christian communions outside the Catholic Church. Hence the importance and timeliness of *A Catholic Primer on the Ecumenical Movement,* written by an American Jesuit, Fr Gustave Weigel, S.J., (*Newman Press Maryland,* 1958). He writes:

> It is very easy for Catholics, even theologians, to be very hazy concerning what is undoubtedly the most striking ecclesiological event since the sixteenth century Reformation. The older generation of Catholic theology professors in America did not feel it urgent to keep in touch with the movements fermenting in the Christianity beyond the Church, and something of their innocent unawareness still darkens the halls of our theology centres.

[1] The spelling of the word 'oecumenical' seems to be passing through a transition. For consistency we follow the older spelling throughout. Usage tends to favour the spelling 'ecumenical' when the adjective refers to this movement.

In this Primer the author deals separately with non-Catholic and Catholic Oecumenism. The former came to a head by the formation in 1948 of the World Council of Churches. At its first Assembly in Amsterdam 147 churches from 44 countries were represented by 351 delegates and 248 alternates. This culmination was reached through a long series of meetings and assemblies, notably the International Missionary Conference, the Conference on Life and Work, the Conference on Faith and Order (1927), and the World's Student Christian Federation. The beginnings of the movement may be traced back to the eve of the first World War when there was founded the World Alliance of Churches for Promoting International Peace (later International Friendship). The great inspirer of the Peace Movement and also of 'Life and Work' was the Swedish Archbishop Söderblom.

Fr Weigel goes on to describe in some detail the constitution and powers of the World Council of Churches. It is 'a fellowship of Churches which accept our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour'. Its *rôle* is 'to offer counsel and provide opportunity of united action in matters of common interest'. It is in no sense a super-Church. It has no authority to define doctrine or policy. It cannot legislate. It simply provides opportunity for discussion and common contribution to the solution of such problems as may be brought before it.

Fr Weigel notes the incompleteness of the membership, many Protestant bodies holding aloof, and the divergent tendencies of the bodies which actually form its membership. But the Council nevertheless hopes 'to promote the growth of ecumenical consciousness in the members of *all* Churches'. It is very important to remember that membership of the Council is open to *all* Christian 'Churches' and has actually been accepted by many of the oriental bodies whether dissident or 'Orthodox', Copts, Ethiopians, Nestorians, Jacobites, Greeks. But, it would appear, the strongest influence in the Council is Anglican and American Episcopalian. 'The extreme rightist and leftist churches of Protestantism have not yet joined the Council'. 'One thing', says Fr Weigel, 'is evident . . . there is zeal, fervour, and great hope bubbling in World Council activities . . . Hope is the great emotion dynamizing the movement'. As to the future he thinks that for some time to come coexistence and compromise will be the mood prevailing in Council meetings. In their haste to unite, one tendency inside the movement would be to sink all differences, even grave theological differences, and agree to differ. This is only partially counteracted by the 'Faith and Order' tendency which seeks unity of faith as a preliminary to union. The former tendency is apparent in what has happened first in South and then in North India as sanctioned by the Lambeth Conference, 1958. In the Lambeth 'Encyclical' the Anglican Bishops present, after emphasizing the concern of every Lambeth Conference

since 1878 'for the unity of the Body of Christ', proceed to thank God for 'the warmth of friendship between the Churches shown in the World Council of Churches'. They then go on to speak of 'the relations between our Churches and Provinces and the *newly-united Church of South India* . . . that Church on which the grace of God has been so abundantly and manifestly bestowed', and they note that several similar schemes are in contemplation, schemes which 'we believe to mark a great and significant step towards the recovery of the visible unity of the Church Universal'.

In the eyes of Catholics and, we may say, of Anglo-Catholics such mergers and amalgamations of Anglicans, Methodists, and Presbyterians, implying compromises on doctrine and worship, can hardly be described as genuine steps towards Christian unity.

In the second part of his book Fr Weigel considers Catholic Oecumenism. 'That the Catholic Church is ecumenical-minded', he says, 'needs no proof.' Perhaps. But what proportion of educated Catholics in any given country are in the least degree ecumenical-minded? How many for instance have any knowledge of the actually existing movements and organizations dedicated to the reunion of all Christians? And first, what is the Catholic attitude to the World Council of Churches? It has been an attitude of watchfulness and caution. But the instruction on the Oecumenical Movement (*Ecclesia Catholica*) issued by the Holy Office in 1949 gave carefully guarded permission to the bishops to allow theological discussions with non-Catholics and attendance at mixed gatherings which have as their purpose to take counsel together concerning joint action in the defence of the fundamental principles of Christianity and the natural law. This much is acknowledged with appreciation in the Report of the recent Lambeth Conference. On the other hand the Instruction states at the outset that the Catholic Church takes no actual part in oecumenical conventions and other assemblies of a similar character. This does not however exclude Catholics from attending such assemblies as observers. And in point of fact when in 1952 the Conference of Faith and Order met at Lund in Sweden, the Vicar Apostolic of Sweden authorized four Catholics to attend as Accredited Visitors.[2] The paragraph in the Report of the Lambeth Conference (2. 48) on relations with the Roman Catholic Church deserves to be studied by Catholics. The tone on the whole is friendly. It favours discussions with Catholics on theological questions and lays emphasis on the value of the Octave (Jan. 18-25) of prayer for Christian Unity inaugurated in America by Fr Paul of Graymoor and zealously promoted in France by the Abbé Couturier.

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[1] Weigel, *op. cit.* p. 44.

[2] One ventures to commend, as a model of the eirenic approach, the article by Fr Kevin Smyth, S.J., on Lambeth, which appeared in the Winter 1958 number of *Studies*.

As for the Catholic organizations and groups whose main, if not specific, purpose is the restoration of all Christians to that unity which is the Catholic Church, considerations of space forbid more than a cursory survey.

We do not include under the term 'oecumenical' Catholic orders and societies aiming at individual conversions, but only such as strive to pave or smooth the way for a general return to Catholic unity. Their aim is to remove obstacles, to allay prejudices, to make friendly contacts, so to state Catholic doctrine as to show how close the beliefs of Catholics and certain Protestant bodies are to agreement, to introduce non-Catholics to Catholic worship and Catholic ways in general. Thus their immediate aim is not to make converts but to prepare the way, fully aware as they are that conversion can be brought about only by the grace of God and in His good time. This is the oecumenical or eirenic (peace making) approach.

In the United States the Friars of the Atonement founded by Fr Paul of Graymoor have adopted this approach, though their founder's hopes of corporate reunion came to nothing. At Chèvetogne in Belgium there is the Benedictine Priory interested in the reunion of the Eastern Churches, and all the communions at present outside the Church. Its review *Irénikon* promotes the oecumenical movement. The Unitas Association, founded in 1945 with its headquarters in Rome under Fr Charles Boyer, S.J., publishes a quarterly *Unitas* in three languages. It has organized groups in several countries and co-operates with Graymoor. In Holland there is the Catholic Oecumenical Council founded in 1952 which holds annual meetings for the discussion of oecumenical questions. But it is in Germany that *rapprochement* between Catholics and Protestants finds most support. There is in the first place the *Una Sancta* movement which arose from the work for peace by Fr Josef Metzger, a work which under the Nazi régime cost him his life. His work has been continued by Dr Matthias Laros with the review *Una Sancta*. It does not seek to make converts of non-Catholics but to develop an atmosphere of friendliness and mutual understanding. Its activities were fully described by Dr Karl Adam in his book *One and Holy*.

I know of no Catholic society or organization in England specifically directed towards reunion. But a long correspondence in *The Times*, later published in pamphlet form,[1] throws interesting sidelights on the attitude of Englishmen, Catholic and Protestant, clerical and lay, towards reunion and incidentally towards conversion to the Catholic Faith. Besides oecumenical work of the groups mentioned above there is the work of writers both Catholic and non-Catholic. At this point the reader may, perhaps, be referred to an article by the present writer

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[1] *Catholicism To-day* (London: The Times Publishing Co. Price 6d.)

on the Oecumenical Movement which appeared in *Studies* in 1952 (pp. 341–354). As a preface to the remainder of the present article I shall quote this passage from the former article :

> In the first place those immediately concerned tend to think not so much of *union* as of a certain unity in charity. It is realized that, whereas the union of the 'Orthodox' Church to Rome is humanly possible, there is no conceivable human way for the Protestant churches to return to visible unity ; that problem is only divinely soluble. Feeling this, Catholics and Protestants will seek, not to get the better of one another in controversy but to *know* one another. Theology will on both sides be rethought from an oecumenical point of view. Each side will study the fifteen centuries which they may be said to have in common. Moreover, neither side thinks any longer of corporate reunion in a foreseeable future.

Since this was written numerous books and articles have been published. From the Catholic side have come books such as *Essays in Christian Unity* by Fr Henry St John, O.P. (Blackfriars, 1955), *The Christian Dilemma* by a Dutch convert, W. H. Van de Pol (Dent, 1952), *Christ, Our Lady and the Church.* A Study in Eirenic Theology by Fr Yves M. J. Congar, O.P. (Longman, 1957), *That They May be One,* A Study in Papal Doctrine by Fr Gregory Baum, O.S.A. (Bloomsbury, 1958), *Social Thought of the World Council of Churches* by Fr Edward Duff, S.J. (Longmans, 1957), *Towards Christian Unity in Canada* by Fr Irénée Beaubien, S.J. (Montreal, 1956). And from the other side have come *The Recovery of Unity* by E. L. Mascall (Longmans, 1958), and *Christian Theology* An Oecumenical Approach by Walter Horton (New York, Hunter, 1955).

I cannot hope to review all this oecumenical literature; I can but note here and there oecumenical attitudes and approaches. Such attitudes and approaches may, I think, be roughly classified under three heads—the theological (and philosophical), the historical, and the psychological. At least three of the books above listed come within the first class, Fr Congar's on the one side, Dr Mascall's and Mr Walter Horton's on the other. The aim of both sides should be and in fact is to show what a short distance separates the thought and tenets of one side from those of the other, provided both are fully understood. This latter proviso is all important and is often overlooked in controversy.

Take, for instance, the *rôle* of the Holy See in Catholic belief and theology. Dr Mascall states his position as follows :

> The acceptance of the Papal claims as they are now put forward by the Roman See involves consent to at least the four following propositions :
>
> (1) Christ conferred upon St. Peter a primacy over the Church and over his fellow apostles.

(2) This authority was transmissible to his successors.

(3) His successors are the Bishops of Rome.

(4) The primacy involves the absolute supremacy in governing and teaching the Church which is commonly claimed by Popes and expounded by Roman Catholic theologians at the present day.

Dr Mascall then goes on to say, 'Personally I find no difficulty in accepting the first three of our four propositions . . .' Reading that statement I think the average Catholic would be inclined to suppose that Dr Mascall accepts Catholic teaching in its essentials. But he adds, 'What I feel bound to question is the fourth (proposition)'. This is not the place in which to deal with Dr Mascall's difficulty. This was admirably done in an article by Fr Bernard Leeming, S.J., in *The Eastern Churches Quarterly* Vol. xii, n. 7-8. I quote this difficulty as an example of the narrowing down to a single point of the theological differences between Creeds. No doubt, even if they were reduced to vanishing point, psychological difficulties would still remain.

Père Congar believes that, before speaking about orders and jurisdiction, one must, in order to understand Protestantism in general, go deeper into the nature of revelation and the means by which it is mediated to the human mind. The translator and editor of his book, Fr Henry St John, O.P., believes that Père Congar 'goes to the very heart of the oecumenical dilemma'. That 'heart' would seem to be the Protestant assertion (after Luther and Calvin) that under God's grace human beings as utterly corrupt cannot co-operate in their own salvation. This, however, is not the main theme of Père Congar's book, which is rather to point out in Catholic devotional literature and occasionally even in theological works a tendency to monophysitism, i.e., to exalting Our Lord's divine nature at the expense of his humanity, a tendency which affects devotion to Our Lady and one's attitude to the Church.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in any theological approach from either side, Catholic or Protestant, is this: the scholastic theologian and the non-Catholic biblical theologian are talking, as Fr St John says, 'not merely different languages but different languages each with an idiom quite alien to the other'.

I have suggested above that even were the theological dialogue to reach a conclusion satisfactory to both parties, there might yet remain psychological difficulties not easily overcome. One might be disposed to sum them up as pride and prejudice—pride in and devotion to the particular form of religion in which they have hitherto lived, and prejudice against the form to which the arguments convincingly point. This prejudice might be powerfully reinforced by historical memories of oppression and persecution. Such memories might operate, for instance, on Jews and the descendants of Huguenots. They might

operate on Irish Catholics in rendering them averse to any eirenic approach to the descendants of their persecutors. Add to this deep-seated prejudices founded largely on legend and on biased history. But, quite apart from such considerations, there exist such psychological realities as a Catholic atmosphere, a Church of England or Methodist or Presbyterian atmosphere. The passage from one such atmosphere to another is no easy matter.

As for the historical approach, it is largely a matter for competent and conscientious historians, or rather for the conscientious or fair-minded use of their findings.

The true aim of Catholics who engage in the oecumenical movement is not to prove wrong any of our 'separated brethren', but rather to seek out all possible points of agreement, all the points of doctrine and devotion which they and we hold in common, to show ourselves not only tolerant but friendly, and again not with a feigned and calculating friendship, but with genuine charity. That on the natural side and prayer on the supernatural may be all that most of us can do towards healing the wounds of Christendom.

But from those who take part in the movement whether as exponents or as, in some sort, leader, something more is called for. This is set out in several chapters of the excellent *Essays in Christian Unity* by Fr Henry St John, O.P., notably in Ch VII, 'The Conditions of Eirenic Discussion,' and in Ch IX, 'The Aims of a Catholic Oecumenism'. One essential for fruitful oecumenic or eirenic approaches is that each side should study carefully the tenets of the other. How many Catholics are there who know just what are the beliefs and teachings of the Methodists or the Baptists, the Presbyterians or the Quakers?[1] But even that is, perhaps, hardly enough. Fr St John is of opinion that 'every opportunity of getting at the truth should be seized' and that 'the means to this end is personal discussion, at a deep theological level, between Catholic scholars (note the word) and those of the Church of England and the Free Churches.' The Instruction issued in 1949 by the Holy Office makes this permissible in certain circumstances for Catholics. Meanwhile, as the same writer observes, there is much preparatory work to be done in which all Christians can collaborate, to remove from men's minds prejudices and misunderstandings which are obstacles in the way of the oecumenical movement.

[1] An excellent aid to understanding the teachings and status of the various bodies not in communion with the Catholic Church is provided by *Our Separated Brethren* by the Rev David Woodward, published at 1s. by the Catholic Truth Society, London.

American Pegasus

by JOHN MONTAGUE

GRANTED the usual unsympathetic image of American culture, it is rather a shock to realize the extent of its achievement in contemporary poetry. For American verse has, finally, come of age, with an impressive terracing of generations, from living masters—like Frost, Williams, and Pound—to the newest, brightest recruit from Harvard, Iowa or San Francisco. The European pilgrimage is no longer a necessity, except as a brief, leisurely interlude, probably on a travelling fellowship. In a world dominated by American-type modernity, expatriation is the problem of the European artist ; influence, the prerogative of the American.

It is a pity, therefore, that our view of American poetry, this side of the Atlantic, is still radically incomplete. Criticism, of course, is partly to blame for this situation : it is almost impossible to get a book on a contemporary poet which is not based on a sort of elaborate *petitio principii*; assuming his author's ultimate importance, the critic creates a superstructure of interest only to fellow-Martians. The publishers are also to blame : there are no editions of Crane, Cummings, Williams, or John Peale Bishop available, to name only the obvious. Even Wallace Stevens, probably the finest American poet of the century, only received belated recognition in England with a *Selected Poems* (Faber & Faber, 1953), although he had been publishing steadily in America since *Harmonium* (1923). Only one British publishing house, Faber & Faber, has made a consistent effort to present American poetry, and even their lists show curious omissions and alterations. (Contributing to a Wallace Stevens special issue of the *Harvard Advocate* a few years ago, Eliot remarked with typical blandness that he had always taken for granted that Stevens had a British publisher : a marvellously politic oversight !)

Four recently published volumes [1] may be taken to illustrate the diversity of American poetry,its daring directness in pursuit of a language to accommodate modern experience. The American works closer to experience and natural speech than his British contemporary : he can tackle a subject frontally without that horror of naivety which forces

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[1] *Homage to Mistress Bradstreet,* by John Berryman. London : Faber and Faber, 1959. 18s.
Life Studies, by Robert Lowell. London : Faber and Faber, 1959. 10s. 6d.
Promises, by Robert Penn Warren. London : Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1959. 18s.
In Defence of the Earth, by Kenneth Rexroth. London : Hutchinson, 1959. 15s.

the average Oxbridge talent into defensive literary reflexes. He is also, generally, much more trained in the tradition, even if it is only to discard it ; witness William Carlos Williams. This double seriousness of craft and subject means that while American poets are not always automatically good, they are almost always readable. Between the polarities of Eliot's purified line and Williams's ' new measure ' based on the American vernacular, lies a variety of talents, a variety of solutions to the Wordsworthian problem of natural language.

John Berryman first (*Homage to Mistress Bradstreet*) since in many ways he is the most baffling, the most exclusive of the four ; a fiercely contemporary intelligence. Born in 1914, he came of age during that period when the Spanish Civil War gradually widened into world conflict. His early poetry represents a struggle towards a post-Auden rhetoric of endured despair, appropriate to the time :

> When we dream, paraphrase, analysis
> Exhaust the crannies of the night. We stare,
> Fresh sweat upon our foreheads, as they fade :
> The melancholy and terror of avenues
> Where long no single man has moved, but play
> Under the arc-light gangs of the grey dead
> Running directionless. That bright blank place
> Advances with us into fearful day,
> Heady and insuppressible.
>
> (' Desire is a World by Night ')

The dangers are obvious : a desire for full integrity can often end as a kind of compulsive chic, an induced pessimism. But a poem like ' World Telegram ' illuminates an aspect of modern experience in a way I have not seen elsewhere :

> All this on the front page. Inside, penguins.
> The approaching television of baseball.
> The King approaching Quebec. Cotton down.
> Skirts up. Four persons shot. Advertisements.
> Twenty six policemen are decorated.
> Mother's Day repercussions. A film star
> Hopes marriage will preserve him from his fans.
>
> News of one day, one afternoon, one time.
> If it were possible to take these things
> Quite seriously, I believe they might
> Curry disorders in the strangest brain,
> Immobilize the most resilient will,
> Stop trains, break up the city's food supply,
> And perfectly demoralize the nation.

Berryman's later work shows more variety, including a very beautiful Epithalamion, ' Canto Amor ', and a very intelligent extension of the

technique of Yeats's 'Crazy Jane' poems into a series of 'Nervous Songs'. His major work, however, is *Homage to Mistress Bradstreet*, a long poem first published in *Partisan Review* in 1953, and hailed by Edmund Wilson as 'the most distinguished long poem by an American since *The Waste Land*'. What is one to say of this mysterious dialogue between the author and the conjured ghost of a New England poetess? Ann Bradstreet crossed to New England on the 'Arbella' in 1630, under Governor Winthrop. She reared a large family in the New World and yet found time to publish a collection of 'abstract, didactic rime', imitations of Quarles and Sylvester's Du Bartas. Across the centuries, Berryman invokes her spirit as the first American poet, alienated, like him, from a negative, constricted culture:

> Outside the New World winters in grand dark
> white air lashing high thro' the virgin strands
> foxes down foxholes sigh,
> surely the English heart quails, stunned.
> I doubt if Simon than this blast, that sea,
> spares from his rigour for your poetry
> more. We are on each other's hands
> who care. Both of our worlds unhanded us . .

The privations of pioneer life, childbirth, harsh theological feuds which separate friend from friend, the sadness of maturity, the sicknesses of old age; the poem works closer to the root of living than any I have read for a long time. The spirits of the two poets touch, hers in feminine loneliness, his in modern despair; there is a suggestion of ghostly passion which savours slightly of demonology. It is the poet as medium: an impressive but rather frightening technique.

I doubt if *Homage to Mistress Bradstreet* will ever become widely popular; there is something antagonistic and posturing in Berryman's approach, a deliberate slurring of language through inversion, strained images, recherché words. In the childbed scene, these tricks of language succeed astoundingly; elsewhere, they annoy and detract. Nevertheless I am deeply impressed by the almost manic intensity of the poem, the relentless seriousness which drives it towards the limits of communication. One cannot, after all, penetrate the secret and total meaning of another's life, but this is a fierce and honourable attempt.

> Winter than summer worse, that first, like a file
> on a quick, or the poison suck of a thrilled tooth;
> and still we may unpack.
> Wolves and storms among, uncouth
> board-pieces, barrels vanish, grow
> houses, rise. Motes that hop in sunlight slow
> indoors, and I am Ruth
> away; open my mouth, my eyes wet: I would smile . .

Robert Lowell's new book of poems (*Life Studies*) is his first since his rather unsuccessful attempt at a long narrative poem, *The Mill of the Kavanaughs* (Harcourt & Brace, 1952—unpublished in England). It comes to us shorn of the long autobiographical essay which prefaced the American edition : was it considered too daring an innovation for the Faber series, or irrelevant for an English audience ? Nevertheless, despite this omission and the fact that the opening poems in the volume are substantially in Lowell's earlier manner, one senses all the drama of a change of style, of approach.

> These are the tranquillized *Fifties,*
> and I am forty. Ought I to regret my seedtime ?
> I was a fire-breathing Catholic C.O.
> and made my manic statement,
> telling off the state and president and then
> sat waiting sentence in the bull pen
> beside a Negro boy with curlicues
> of marijuana in his hair.
> (' Memories of West Street and Lepke ')

Lowell's problem has been to break the mould of his success in *Lord Weary's Castle* (Harcourt & Brace, 1946), the best book of poems since the war and the first to show a genuine post-modern sensibility, a return to traditional techniques with all the freshness of assimilated experimentation. Learned, savage, exhilarating, *Lord Weary's Castle* seemed more an end-product than a beginning.

> Christ walks on the black water. In Black Mud
> Darts the kingfisher. On Corpus Christi, heart,
> Over the drumbeat of St. Stephen's choir
> I hear him, Stupor Mundi, and the mud
> Flies from his hunching wings and beak—my heart
> The blue kingfisher dives on you in fire.
> (' Colloquy in Black Rock ')

In poem after poem, the militant Catholicism of the convert was used to batter the inertia of Boston, the Puritan constrictedness of his ancestors : ' in Boston serpents whistle at the cold '. With the generosity poets often show to portents in their own generation, John Berryman described Lowell as ' the most powerful poet who has appeared in England or America for some years, master of a freedom in the Catholic subject without peer since Hopkins . . a talent whose ceiling is invisible '.

Some critics had reservations, however : Blackmur and Marius Bewley, for example. There was the wilful and gritty obscurity of many

passages.[1] In a few very beautiful later poems, like ' Mother Marie Thérèse ' and ' Falling asleep over the Aeneid ', Lowell developed his talent for the dramatic monologue ; despite their clearer organization and logic, however, these successes were implicit in the earlier work ; and despite the bravery of the attempt, the long poem *The Mill of the Kavanaughs* seemed largely an anthology of favourite Lowell effects.

The first two sections of *Life Studies* bring no surprise. The approach is softer, perhaps :

> Your great nerve gone, Sire, sleep without a care.
> No Hapsburg galleon coasts off Finisterre
> with bars of bullion now to subsidize
> the pilfering pillaging democracies . .
>
> (' The Banker's Daughter ')

A series of poems in homage, ' Ford Madox Ford ', ' For George Santayana ', ' Words for Hart Crane ', show an unexpected humanity ; the Santayana poem, in particular, celebrates a *non-conversion,* a deliberately pagan death. And that is our first hint . .

> Lying outside the consecrated ground
> forever now, you smile
> like Ser Brunetto running for the green
> cloth at Verona—not like one
> who loses, but like one who'd won . .
> as if your long pursuit of Socrates'
> demon, man-slaying Alcibiades,
> the demon of philosophy at last had changed
> those fleeting virgins into friendly laurel trees
> at Santo Stefano Rotondo when you died
> near ninety,
> still unbelieving, unconfessed and unreceived,
> true to your boyish shyness of the Bride.

The final group of autobiographical poems, which constitute the bulk of the volume, present a new Lowell, quieter, more sympathetic, distinctly tender. The fiery objurgations of *Lord Weary's Castle* are gone, and with the change in tone and subject comes also a change in technique, from strict metres to free verse, with echoes of William Carlos Williams's dictates and practice. My impression is that the earlier poems in *Life Studies* represent scattered efforts, and that when Lowell began working on a prose autobiography, he suddenly found the material changing into a portrait gallery of poems. One can underline Lowells' luck in being born into a family both branches of which enshrine a culture, but cannot deny the jagged tenderness of these portraits, from Grandfather Winslow who found ' his grandchild's fogbound solitudes sweeter

[1] See ' Whom Seek Ye : a Note on Robert Lowell's Poetry ', by Will C. Jumper *The Hudson Review,* Spring 1956.

than human society ' to the poet's baby-daughter in her ' flame-flamingo infant's wear '. Quotation is difficult, since the poems depend on a seemingly casual build-up of detail ; on first reading, they seem clumsy, embarrassing, pointless ; then, suddenly, they seem exactly right, moving almost to the point of tears.

Although there are fewer quotable tours de force, *Life Studies* is as impressive, in its more subdued way, as *Lord Weary's Castle*. And, unlike the earlier book, the poems open out onto life with appreciation and a kind of perplexed humility and love. That this change has not been achieved without ' an expense of spirit ' is shown by certain poems on mental illness ; the sequence itself is a form of therapy, distilling something of the poised uneasiness of an ' adjustment ' to reality.

Robert Penn Warren (b. 1905), poet, novelist and critic, is one of the most formidably gifted writers on the American scene. The general reader will probably know one or two of his novels : *Night Rider, All the King's Men, World Enough and Time, Band of Angels.* His poetry is not so well known, although his long poem, *Brother to Dragons,* published in 1953, was as colourful and violent as an historical novel. Warren's technique, indeed, is often to take a popular form, like the historical romance, and recover it for orthodox literary purpose ; rather in the way Graham Greene employs the conventions of the modern thriller. This is easier to do with fiction, of course, although poems like *Brother to Dragons* and ' The Ballad of Billie Potts ' make use of the thump and clatter of the Kentucky mountain ballad :

> Big Billie Potts was big and stout
> In the land between the rivers.
> His shoulders were wide and his gut stuck out
> Like a croker of nubbins and his holler and shout
> Made the bob-cat shiver and the black-jack leaves shake
> In the section between the rivers.

The theme of this poem is the same as Camus's *Le Malentendu* (the returned son murdered by his parents), but the technique is that of a rural ballad describing a brawl or a football match.

This deliberate hill-billy roughness is represented in his new volume *Promises* by poems like the following, based on a local tragedy where a poor farmer massacred his entire family with an ice-pick :

> They weren't so bright, or clean, or clever,
> And their noses were sometimes imperfectly blown,
> But they always got to school the weather whatever,
> With old lard pail full of fried pie, smoked ham, and corn pone.
>
> It was good six miles to the Gillum place,
> Back where the cedar and hoot owl consorted
> And the snapping turtle snoozed in his carapace
> And the whang-doodle whooped and the dang-whoodle snorted.

The excuse for this titbit of rural sensationalism lies in the thematic structure of *Promises*. The long section in which such poems occur is dedicated to his son, Gabriel ; they represent Warren's honest attempt to retell, re-evaluate incidents from his own Kentucky mountain childhood. To pass on a felt heritage, however rudimentary, as he in the past had received his :

> Some were given to study, read Greek in the Forest, and these
> Longed for an epic to do their own deeds right honour :
> Were Nestor by pig-pen, in some tavern brawl played Achilles.
> In the ring of Sam Houston they found, when he died, one
> word engraved : Honor.
> (' Founding Fathers, Nineteenth Century Style, SouthEast U.S.A. ')

But Warren has another poetic mood, romantic, cosmopolitan, the great clauses swinging like hinges in the construction of an elaborate metaphysical conceit : ' Love's Parable ', for instance, in the *Selected Poems*. Here we have ' To a Little Girl, one Year old, In a Ruined Fortress ', the opening poem, dedicated to his daughter :

> To a place of ruined stone we brought you, and sea-reaches.
> *Rocca* : fortress, hawk-heel, lion-paw, clamped on a hill.
> A hill, no. Sea-cliff, and crag-cocked, the embrasures
> commanding the beaches,
> Range easy, with most fastidious mathematic and skill.
>
> Philipus me fecit : he of Spain, the black-browed, the anguished
> For whom nothing prospered, though he loved God.
> His arms, great scutcheon of stone, once at drawbridge, have
> now languished
> Long in the moat, under garbage ; moat-brink, rosemary with blue,
> thistle with gold bloom, nod.

The enigma of Warren's extraordinary talent remains. Some will be excited by the rough stoicism, the bathos, the preoccupation with images of sordid violence ; others repelled. If a man's life-work can be seen as a pattern, with individual works existing not so much in themselves but as part of a total elaboration and investigation of themes (Eliot's view of Shakespeare), then Warren may be as massive an artist as Melville (whose poetry so much resembles his own in purpose and manner). Conversely, it might be argued that Warren, with his great training (he is a Rhodes Scholar, and up to recently, a University Professor) has made less of his southern background than William Faulkner with his purely instinctive craftsman's intelligence ; the moral : stay at home, trust in God, and don't read too many books.

Warren's pursuit of the colloquial line, his Kentucky modernism, is paralleled by Kenneth Rexroth's casual Californian toughness :

> At sixteen I came west, riding
> Freights on the Chicago, Milwaukee
> And St. Paul, the great Northern,
> The Northern Pacific. I got
> A job as helper to a man
> Who gathered wild horses in the
> Mass drives in the Okanogan
> And Horse Heaven country . . . . ('A Living Pearl')

Despite all the recent Beat Generation publicity, Rexroth (b. 1906) is an interesting poet, learned and serious in his craft. His *The Dragon and the Unicorn* (New Directions, 1952) is an impressive solution to the problem of the long modern poem. The form is that of the Victorian travel poem (Samuel Rogers or Arthur Hugh Clough) but on the thread of a year's travel in Europe he hangs meditations on politics, on art, on the nature of love.

> Chaumont, brilliant in the sun,
> The working of a consistent
> Principle, the best of the
> Big Chateaux. Amboise dull and
> Hot in August midafternoon,
> And then a cool hand, over
> The chapel doorway the high
> Relief of St. Eustace and
> The cruciferous stag, almost
> As touching as Pisanello's.

The present collection, *In Defence of Life,* consists mainly of shorter pieces, apart from one gruesome mistake ('Thou Shalt Not Kill', a memorial poem for Dylan Thomas). Like most West Coast poetry it plays it cool, dispensing with the usual tensions and dialectic of verse and the corresponding complexities of structure (Rexroth always uses a simple syllabic prosody with a counterpoint of ideas tracing larger units of form ; rarely stanzas). The geographical analogy is obvious, for in California one experiences the discomforts of the garden of Eden ; perfect landscapes, perfect climate. The drama of the seasons is replaced by an extravagance of natural phenomena :

> . . . . the illimitable
> And inhuman waste places
> Of the Far West, where the mind finds
> Again the forms Pythagoras
> Sought, the organic relations
> Of stone and cloud and flower
> And moving planet and falling
> Water . . . . ('A Living Pearl')

Man, in a marvellous setting, achieves a kind of ecstasy of solitary contemplation, akin to the spiritual intuitions of the East towards which California faces.

> . . . . . The late
> Afternoon sun behind it
> Fills its leaves with light like
> A gem tree, like the wishing
> Tree of jewels in the Eastern
> Stories. Below it the cliff
> Falls sheer away five hundred
> Feet to a single burnt pine . . . .
>
> ('Time is the Mercy of Eternity')

* * *

These four talents, intelligent, energetic, various indicate the level of current American production in poetry. Of the four, only Lowell, perhaps, is of first rank, but how much better even the worst of the others is than the average British effort ! As we move towards the sixties, the achievments of the first half of our century become clearer ; already the received or textbook picture of modern verse, with its Eliot-Pound axis, is crumbling. The orthodoxy of the various pioneer anthologies and studies is dissolving in favour of a wider and more fluid view, hospitable to the idiosyncratic talent, like Stevens or Williams or Robert Graves. The full range of Anglo-American activity can no longer be interpreted in terms of one tradition, like a vast historical umbrella : the individual poet chooses, creates his tradition from the living elements in his background, whether Californian or Bostonian or Admass American. The integrity of his achievment lies in his ability, like a diviner, to find where, in darkness and noise, the living water flows.

All this is much better understood in America than here. It is why William Carlos William's brilliant book, *In the American Grain,* has become almost a Bible for younger American poets. The tradition it posits in its investigation of the American past, is, paradoxically, wider than Eliot's, because it acknowledges more than American Protestant experience : there is also, after all, pre-Columbian America, Indian America, Spanish America, even for a brief moment Russian America (their trading posts came as far south as Monterey). There are the traditions of the various emigrant groups. Similarly, Wallace Stevens's quiet refusal to appeal to any orthodoxy, whether High Church or Communism, his reliance on the creative imagination as a means of satisfaction and knowledge, is much admired by younger writers. A secular aesthetic may represent an almost religious honesty if the social context offers nothing more : look, no hands, no feet, no solid ground ! In the inevitable rewriting of recent literary history Eliot may yet be cast as the villain of the piece.

Groundwork for an Irish Theatre

by THOMAS KILROY

IN our search for a new Irish theatre we are probably looking for premises with a clear view from every window. Too often the view from our modern Irish windows is cluttered-up with distracting monuments to the dead and glorious past of politics and art. If we ever do come to house a creative theatre for a new generation, many of these idols will have to be demolished so that the interesting faces of modern Ireland may crowd at every window of the theatre.

It is useful to look upon the theatre as a community, at its best an exuberant, self-educating community with the individual members influencing one another and the group as a whole very responsive to the demands of the society about it. One cannot raise the standards of so complex an organization by merely dismissing one of its members. It must be a much more subtle process, involving in particular the work of the playwright, who provides a theatre with its roots, the fingers deep within the earth which anchor it to its society. Sō too, any attempt to create new standards, new plays, new productions must take the existing ones into consideration at the very outset.

We might also try to analyse the complex problems of our society which seem to demand a creative theatre. Perhaps this statement needs some definition. Let me put it this way. The theatre is the most social of the arts or rather the art which thrives most on social readjustments and reassessments. A theatre then which creates something permanent absorbs some of the conflicting, topical, social issues around it and gives a public interpretation of current values. In order to assess the value of our theatre one might well begin by listening to its audience and the various motives for its applause. It may be a dangerous, misleading form of observation, but audience-reaction is the quickest indication of the strength and nature of the bond between a theatre and the society which supports it.

When we have some reasonably accurate idea of the function which our theatre fulfils, I think we shall find at least one great deficiency: it excludes the writer and keeps him at a distance. Theatrical history reveals a number of clearly defined cycles and seems to show that results are more satisfactory when the communal spirit of the theatre is most active. The writer is just as much part of this community as the actor,

director and designer. His plays cannot be written in a vacuum, in some place remote from the theatre where it is impossible to judge the demands of the public. A play in short is matured, not on a typewriter like a novel or a short-story, but in the theatre itself.

It seems to me that we should experiment with a theatre deliberately geared to attract back the writer and provide a workshop for him. The idea of a Playwright's Theatre Group, a club theatre in the proper sense of the word, is not a very original one. All these ideas, like the theatre itself, are as old as the Parthenon. You just watch the cycle revolve and wonder what was lost in its revolution. We have now reached a point in our theatre where before the cycle spins again we must check its mechanism and replace some parts that have outlived their usefulness.

One man's opinion may give us something definite to talk about. Some time ago the English dramatic critic, Mr Kenneth Tynan wrote in a review :

> Inchoate and naive as it often is, this is a prophetic and joyously exciting evening. It seems to be Ireland's function every twenty years or so, to provide a playwright who will kick English drama from the past into the present.

Now if Mr Tynan was referring to established figures like Synge or O'Casey or even Shaw, Wilde or Sheridan, his eulogy would have little relevance to the present state of the Irish theatre. In actual fact, however, he was talking about a new Irish play by a comparatively new Irish dramatist called Brendan Behan. We had better recognize at once, I think, that certain English dramatic critics, and many who take things seriously in the English theatre to-day look towards Ireland for inspiration rather as Dark Rosaleen herself once looked to the Continent for Papal wine and Spanish ale.

Perhaps this note of hopeful expectation in much of Mr Tynan's effusion is an indication, not of the dramatic wealth which may presently enrich the Dublin stage but of the poverty of the West End's. Now this is not being in any way unfair to Mr Behan. Whatever his talents, and they are many and colourful, Brendan Behan could, under no circumstances, be considered representative of a whole new movement in Irish dramatic writing. He stands almost alone in the Irish theatre to-day, that is, if he has anything at all to do with it. His two successful plays *The Quare Fellow* and *The Hostage* received the attention they deserved only when sponsored by Joan Littlewood and the London Theatre Workshop, and that even after previous Dublin productions. The point I am trying to make is that in spite of Mr Tynan's kind tribute and Mr Behan's present hour of glory, the Irish theatre is badly in need of new worthwhile Irish plays. Let us look at it this way. Dublin has four public theatres : The Gate, The Olympia, The Abbey and

The Gaiety, and each in its own way tries to cater for what is known as 'straight drama'. In addition to these you have small theatre clubs like the 37 Theatre Club, and companies led by distinguished actors like Miceál MacLiammoir, Cyril Cusack and Godfrey Quigley who function at an extraordinarily high level in spite of appalling difficulties.

Yet none of these theatres (here one must reserve the Abbey for special mention) are ever likely to produce a new movement of Irish playwriting. Thanks to them, Dublin audiences, if they are in any way receptive, can become familiar with the most significant foreign drama of to-day: Miller, Williams, Betti, Brecht, Ionesco and Osborne. They provide exquisite revivals of classical drama, or, as the Olympia has done, put on West End productions complete down to the smallest detail. All this is valuable, entertaining and instructive, but the very fact that new plays are not forthcoming shows up the shortcomings of this kind of theatre. Nowhere in Ireland to-day has the writer been brought back into the theatre to work side by side with the director and the actors. The quality of our amateur productions, and in particular that of the Listowel Group with its original play *Sive* by J. B. Keane, seems to suggest that workshop theatre could exist outside the capital and the professional field.

Our theatre to-day can boast of great direction and acting (due no doubt to the prestige of the Abbey school of acting) but there is little of the communal endeavour which is necessary to raise theatrical ventures to greater heights. It is a theatre which *provides for* the community, but it is very seldom, in any significant way, *of* it.

The call for new work goes out and theatre managements have striven frantically to find original scripts, but they have never tried to create an atmosphere within the theatre itself which would attract writers. Plays like Padraic Fallon's *The Seventh Step* or Donagh McDonagh's *Step in the Hollow* have appeared but were soon forgotten. Now the explanation for this state of affairs appears to me to be a dangerously simple one. The policies of our theatres, almost without exception, are determined by talented directors or actors with a keen eye for material which will exploit their talents to the fullest. Naturally the best source of good acting parts and scope for imaginative direction lies in the ready-made successes of the West End and Broadway.

This has imposed a pattern on the Irish theatre for the past ten or fifteen years. It has not been a very inspiring period in our theatre and the Irish writer, except in one or two instances, has been as remote from it as a member of any ordinary trade or profession. It has not been a creative theatre, not rooted in the society which supports it. We have reached a position where the aspiring dramatist is deprived of a testing-ground, and of the technical training which can only be acquired within the theatre itself.

Might I digress for a moment to talk about the relationship between the playwright, his work and his theatre? The play, if we might borrow from Hamlet, is the thing. Its importance may be temporarily hidden by attractive sets or compelling interpretation, its defects or power may be quite distorted by the ingenuity or ineptitude of the players, but in the long run it asserts its influence on every element, every individual on the stage. A succession of bad plays, of empty, characterless comedies for example, will lower the standards of the actors and encourage mediocre or merely adequate productions. If, on the other hand, it is of any importance the play will demand a new style of acting or direction, a new theatre. The quality of great dramatic writing, great language or ingenious plots, will leave its imprint on the close-knit community of the theatre and inspire a dozen, other plays.

Let us apply all this to the present work of the Abbey Theatre. Why the Abbey? Primarily I think because we are more concerned about its development than that of any other theatre, and partly because we are inclined to use its activities as a yardstick in our theatrical matters. From tradition alone, the Abbey attracts most of the new Irish plays worth producing (in fact according to Mr Blythe, the Managing Director, on an average 200 plays a year are submitted). Most Irish dramatists dream of seeing their plays presented on the boards of the Abbey, performed by the Abbey Company. There is a further point. With an annual grant of £800 a year, and a further £3,000 for productions in Irish, the Abbey is the only theatre in Ireland in a position to encourage undeveloped, inexperienced but potentially good play-writing. Yet three new plays like *The Quare Fellow, Decision at Easter* and *Sive* were rejected by The Abbey and were subsequently produced successfully elsewhere. If at an early stage the directors of The Abbey had seen the possibilities which lay in these three plays, they would surely have ensured that the rewritten versions would be performed in their theatre. Belated protests or gestures when the plays have proved successful are unworthy of a National Theatre.

The fault lies partly with the playwrights. During the last twenty years few Irish dramatists have been in any way exciting technically. More often however our dramatists to-day are guilty of a worse defect than mere lack of technical proficiency. They are inclined to shirk the painful, sometimes tragic problems of a modern Ireland which is undergoing considerable social and ideological stress.

It is always easy to criticize. Yet anyone who feels genuinely concerned for the health of the Irish theatre, must agree that the dearth of original native drama is responsible for much of its ills. Ours is a mateless, incomplete theatre and fulfilling only part of its function in society. The serious dramatist should fulfil the role of commentator on current values, practising espionage for everyman.

To create an environment which will help to inspire new Irish plays and keep playwrights alive to the experiments and advances of modern stage-craft : this seems to be the major problem. To balance this harsh criticism of a theatre whose achievements I readily acknowledge, here are some ideas, not original ideas and ridiculously oversimplified, but at least someone may violently disagree with them.

The Workshop

Deliberate attempts to teach theatrecraft, especially the craft of the dramatist, are notoriously suspect. They are associated in most people's minds with certain esoteric faculties in American Universities. They are deservedly suspect if they are completely divorced from the nightly grind, the struggle against failure in the professional theatre. Yet within the confines of the theatre itself it is possible to offer a workshop atmosphere where apprenticeship and practical demonstration is offered to an aspiring playwright. It is the one school which a dramatic genius might attend with profit. The great dramatist should be familiar with every aspect of stagecraft, not as a specialist but as a skilled worker who knows precisely how the tools of his trade are used.

This communal atmosphere is created when the dramatist and actor depend upon one another, even to a slight extent, for inspiration. The dramatist can create particular parts for an actor with whose capabilities he is familiar. This was surely true of Shakespeare and his Burbages, of O'Casey and his Fitzgeralds. In the modern theatre with plays of almost every language and every society available at the local bookshop any attempt to establish this inter-dependence of the dramatist and the actor must be a deliberate one. And even if such deliberate attempts eventually become too studied, too specialized like the American Studio which grew into an Actor's Studio under Lee Stasberg, inundating American theatre and cinema with ' Method ' acting, it will leave its permanent mark on a nation's drama. It will also have produced its Clifford Odets.

The two most interesting examples of workshop theatre to-day are to be found in England, since with the death of Brecht, the creative spirit seems to have gone out of the Berliner Ensembler.

Joan Littlewood's Theatre Workshop literally travelled the roads of Britain before finally settling in the East End of London. It grew out of a more exacting, insecure tradition than the West End and to-day the company still retains some of the original fire and sense of improvization of the strolling player. The word improvization is important as it is the key to Miss Littlewood's conception of theatre. Rehearsals in Stratford East are noisy, crowded, and exciting, with the actors enjoying an exceptional freedom. The doorman is quite likely to be called

upon to deliver a line for comparison. Indeed Miss Littlewood would quite happily go outside and collect a crowd of passers-by to ask them to improvize upon her stage.

As a director Miss Littlewood may be inclined to usurp some of a dramatist's rights, she is often criticized for interfering with a script, but her respectable heresies are based upon a truth :

> I really do believe in the community, I really do believe in the genius in every person. I have lived on that belief . . . . . I've been down coal-mines, day after day for a fortnight. Stayed with miners and their wives. And I've heard that greatness come out of them, that great thing which is in people.

This stocky, uninhibited woman with the frankness of one of her coal-miners, is continually looking for this greatness in people, particularly in new, young playwrights. In return she offers the prospective writer a workshop theatre where a play may undergo many changes, and a writer may find new inspiration from the group of players who are infected with some of her own dynamism. Her successes will hardly end with Brendan Behan and Shelagh Delaney.

In 1956 the English Stage Company wrote proudly in a programme note of 'the group of writers we are gradually collecting around our theatre '. To receive these writers and, what is more important, to hold them, the Company (under George Devine at the Royal Court in Sloane Square) provide a novel playwright's workshop. There are experimental Sunday night productions, usually without decor, play readings and open forum discussions in public where the playwright, actor and director appear on the stage together. More important, perhaps, the members of the Company do not look upon themselves as merely working actors and directors, but as partners with creative writers in a movement towards a new native drama. It must be admitted that the Company is frequently in financial trouble, but then one could find fault with many of its judgments and choice of productions. Even Mr Tynan who is, as you might imagine, one of its most ardent supporters, has to admit that :

> Once or twice, quite spectacularly, the Court has fallen on its face, but this you must expect if you set out to climb mountains. For the most part it has given my mind a whetstone, and my job a meaning, that the English theatre of five years ago showed few signs of providing. If (and the if is crucial) it can hold its present nucleus of talent together, it may very well change the whole course of English Drama.

Certainly some of the dramatists who have come from this school—John Osborne, F. N. Simpson and Ann Jellicoe—seem quite likely to lead English drama out of its rut of sophisticated triviality.

If we were to start a theatre on these lines would we have an audience to support it? It has been suggested that the average Dublin audience is not interested in serious drama because good productions of serious foreign plays get little support. It seems to me that the less literate the audience, the more it depends upon emotional indentification, on strong feelings of sympathy or antipathy. This I believe is only satisfactorily supplied by native plays—the intellectuals can more easily overcome the geographical and ethnological barriers presented by foreign plays since their interest does not depend upon raw emotions alone.

If the young generation wants a theatre which will express their re-evaluations of old beliefs, and their vision of modern Ireland, then surely they should be interested in this theatre founded on the idea of community workshop, a club theatre which tries to bring back the writer to the stage without embarrassment to, and in perfect harmony with the players. One might profit by the experience of others in the field—the experimental Sunday night productions, and the schools of play-writing, play-readings, public discussions.

But why go on? To convert ideas into action has never been one of the Irish virtues. Very shortly a building will rise from the rubble in Marlborough Street. Is it fanciful to imagine that in this building there will be found two, three, or five years hence, a group of young Irish dramatists forging in splendid co-operation with their fellow artists the uncreated conscience of their race?

The Master and the Dean

by JOHN B. MORRALL

TWO recent biographies[1] have brought to light a great deal of new information on the lives of two eminent participants in the intellectual drama of nineteenth century England. The problem which both Benjamin Jowett and Richard Church had to face was that basic problem of their age — the loss of belief in organized religion.

The Victorian age was not, as is popularly supposed, a period characterized by rigid acceptance of traditional beliefs and patterns of life. The Industrial Revolution and its effects at home, the shattering impact of violent political changes in Europe since 1789, above all the steady advance of scientific knowledge, had created in some quarters a desire to question or at least to restate the form of Protestant Christianity which the country had taken for granted since the Reformation. In the eighteenth century the Latitudinarians, for the purposes of their running dog-fight with the old High Church orthodoxy, not to mention the distant menace of Rome, had made open war on tradition, and had jettisoned the Fathers as propagators of semi-pagan superstition. In this attack they had had the tacit support of the Evangelical wing of the Anglican Church, which viewed High Church doctrines with suspicion and had abandoned any real belief in the Apostolic Succession, still upheld by the High Church party. The Evangelical wing of Church opinion, the ruling force in University government at Oxford since the turn of the century, was largely responsible for defeating the struggle of Newman (during his Anglican period) and his followers to reassert the ' Catholic ' traditions of the Established Church in the teeth of political and theological opposition.

The Evangelicals were able in effect to run Newman out of Oxford and Anglicanism by institutional *force majeure,* aided by Newman's own final realization that, in struggling to assert the ' Catholicity ' of the post-Reformation Anglican Church, he was fighting against both logic and history. What they did not realize, however, was that by eliminating Newman, they were removing in advance the most formidable champion of Christian tradition (in its most general sense) which nineteenth century Anglicanism could produce. Newman's campaign had not been against the Evangelical tradition as such ; in fact, as a child of it himself, he

[1] *Jowett : a portrait with background.* By Geoffrey Faber. London : Faber & Faber Ltd. 1957. pp. 456. 30s.
Dean Church : the Anglican response to Newman. By B. A. Smith. Oxford University Press. 1958. pp. 334, xiii. 30s.

was in sympathy with its firm emphasis on individual righteousness and loyalty to the Biblical basis of the Christian Faith. The chief enemy, in his opinion, had been rather the infiltration of doctrinal indifference and even doubt into the Church, the substitution of Erastian and materialistic values for the age-long truths of Christian tradition — everything, in short, which was summed up under the heading ' liberalism ' in religion. By concentrating their fire on the new ' Anglo-Catholic ' version of High Anglicanism the Evangelicals ended any prospect of a common front of both High and Low Church to safeguard the values threatened by the liberal outlook.

Benjamin Jowett, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, from 1870 to 1893, and Richard Church, Dean of St Paul's Cathedral, London, from 1871 to 1890, typify differing answers within the same generation[1] to the problems presented by religious liberalism to thought and education. Church's answer was the more traditional. A disciple and intimate of Newman during the latter's Anglican days,[2] Church had been a courageous defender of Newman against University censure and had as Proctor been responsible for vetoing a motion in Convocation in February 1845 to condemn Tract 90. Newman's departure from the Church of England was not however long postponed ; he made his submission to the Catholic Church the following October. Church, whose loyalty to Anglicanism was never in the balance, received the news sadly but with an understanding which refrained from condemning It is a pity that his recent biographer, Mr B. A. Smith, did not follow his example in this respect ; as it is, he does less than justice to Newman, whose conversion was based on more solid conviction than mere ' Roman fever'.

Church found it possible to remain within the Anglican Establishment. He was not unaware of the dilemmas for which a close ecclesiastical connection with the State was responsible. In his famous essays on St Anselm (1843) Church had already tried to supply an historical background to the problem which, he maintained, had existed in mediaeval England. He was well aware of the debt owed by the English mediaeval Church to the Papacy as guardian and protector, and his Mediterranean tour of 1847 brought him to Italy at the climax of the ' liberal ' political period of Pius IX's early years. Europe on the eve of 1848 seems to have opened Church's eyes to the need for Christianity to take account of the social and economic factors of the age, and he felt that so far organized Christianity had failed to meet Socialism's challenge to accept ' the great commandment of charity as the scientific and practicable basis of civilised legislation'. Doubtless Church was incorrect in supposing, at

[1] Church was born in 1815, Jowett in 1817.

[2] Church and Newman lived on the same college staircase as Fellows of Oriel.

the very time when Marx and Engels were drafting the *Communist Manifesto,* that Socialism was the social fulfilment of Christianity ; but at least he drew the attention of Christians to the social problems of the age earlier than did most other contemporary English Churchmen. This is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that to the end of his days Church felt a temperamental inability to enter into real intimacy with the lower orders. During his years of comparative obscurity as Rector of the village of Whatley in Somerset (1853-1871), years which Mr Smith describes so well, Church complained of the very real mental gulf which divided the average country parson from the majority of his poorly-educated parishioners : ' The difference is between what one class *sees,* and the other *cannot see,* and, what is more, *never can see* ' (Church's italics). He could even share the snobbery which had misgivings about the proposed appointment of the famous historian Stubbs to the bishopric of Chester in 1883 merely because Stubbs's wife was ' not of gentle birth ' and had even been a schoolmistress, though ' always of high character ' (letter of January 13, 1883, from Church to Gladstone).

As Dean of St Paul's in the last and most publicly prominent period of his life (1871-1890) Church was able to find scope for his sense of mission to place Anglicanism *au courant* with the changing circumstances of the age. His collaboration with Gladstone, who shared his High Churchmanship, was particularly close and it seems that Church, as the Liberal Prime Minister's *eminence grise,* played a far greater part in the arrangement of ecclesiastical appointments than has usually been supposed. The partnership dissolved over the question of Gladstone's policy towards Ireland. As early as 1882 Church was drifting away from Gladstone over the Land Act. ' I have tried hard to believe,' he wrote to another friend, Edward Talbot, ' that he (Gladstone) has been right. But it seems to me he is blind to Irish insolence and Irish keen sense of their winning game.' The Phoenix Park murders only hardened this view and in 1886 Home Rule caused the final breach. Here, as in the case of Newman, Church's biographer hardly does justice to Gladstone : ' when it came to an absolute version either of Catholicism or of Liberalism he (Church) refused to join genius in going over the precipice '. (p.224) Yet in the light of subsequent events it might be contended that it was not the acceptance but the initial rejection of Gladstone's solution which led British policy in Ireland up to and over the precipice. For all Mr Smith's praise of Church's far-sighted awareness of the trends of the time, it seems that in the Irish problem at least national and political prejudice clouded his better judgment.

' As a result of Newman's abdication,' writes Mr Smith, ' there devolved upon him (Church) the task of effecting certain reconciliations of a more vital and delicate nature than some persons in authority were quite able to appreciate '. (p.viii) Mr Smith means that Church set

himself nothing less than the task of making Anglicanism sufficiently inclusive for Broad, Low and High Church alike to feel happy within it. This was the motive of his defence of ' Ritualists ' against episcopal and juridical persecution in the 1870s and 1880s (the alliance with Gladstone was invaluable here) and equally of his refusal to join the orthodox hunting pack against the critical liberalism of *Essays and Reviews*. Viewed solely from the standpoint of human statesmanship, Church's ideal of comprehensiveness merits the highest praise ; but was it a coherent theology ? He himself seems aware of this drawback to his position when, lecturing on the Anglican Reformation, he tells us : ' The English Reformation ventured on its undertaking — the attempt to make the Church theologically, politically, socially different, while keeping it historically and essentially the same —'. Here Church seems to make a merely historical, formal continuity take the place of theological witness as the touchstone of orthodox Christianity. Perhaps in refusing to follow Newman, Church had lost more than he realized.

Though Jowett was a young don at Oxford while the Tractarian controversy was at its height, he was never in any sense a disciple of Newman in religious matters. Indeed at the best of times Jowett's idea of religion seems to have been limited to a dogged fulfilment of moral duty. His mind was certainly more classical than Christian, and German Hegelianism may have induced him to think of restating traditional Christian doctrine in the rationalist terms which German Protestant theologians were already pioneering. In collaboration with Arthur Stanley (Dr Arnold's favourite pupil at Rugby, Jowett's bosom friend at Balliol and Church's predecessor as Dean of St Paul's) Jowett embarked upon a critical edition of St Paul's Epistles. In the course of his treatment of *Romans* he betrayed so unorthodox an attitude to the doctrine of the Atonement that a storm of protest was aroused. Jowett was branded as a heretic and, though from the standpoint of Christian orthodoxy, the verdict was correct, no defence can be made for the way in which Jowett was irrelevantly penalized by being deprived of an adequate salary for his Regius Chair of Greek at Christ Church, to which he had been elected in 1854. At the same time Jowett was defeated in his cherished hope of obtaining the Mastership of Balliol by Scott (of ' Liddell and Scott ' fame) and it is not surprising that he laboured for the rest of the 1850s under the obsession that every man's hand was against him. As he drifted into resentful middle age, no one could have foreseen in him the imperturbably efficient Master of future years.

Jowett may have decided to contribute to *Essays and Reviews* (published 1860) on the assumption that ' he who is down need fear no fall '. Or perhaps he did not foresee the *furore* which that notorious volume was to unloose. It is hard in the present age to recreate in the mind an atmosphere in which the whole of intellectual England could be torn asunder

by seven theological essays. Even Lewis Carroll, if we are to believe a recent theory, was allegorizing the *Essays and Reviews* controversy in *Alice in Wonderland.*

The aim of the volume was to bring modern critical methods to bear on Christian doctrine as well as on Biblical study. Jowett's own one hundred page contribution, *On the interpretation of Scripture,* contended that the Bible was ' to be interpreted like other books, with attention to the character of its authors, and the prevailing state of civilisation and knowledge, with allowance for peculiarities of style and language, and modes of thought and figures of speech.' The apparently moderate statement of his case did not prevent an attempt to prosecute Jowett in the Vice-Chancellor's court at Oxford, but the proceedings were quashed under outside pressure. Jowett was luckier than two of his fellow-essayists, Williams and Wilson, who suffered several years of harassing legal proceedings in the Court of Arches and whose ecclesiastical careers were ruined. But Jowett had learnt his lesson. He never again wrote on theology and his Biblical studies were at an end.

It was not that his convictions were altered. Indeed the controversy had only too bitterly confirmed them. From this time we may date the resentment against organized Christianity which led him to regret his own clerical status. In his private notebook in 1867 he lets fall a revealing remark : the best chance ' for a great man in a high ecclesiastical station would be to drop all dogmatic theology — and to fill his mind with great schemes for the regeneration of mankind which he used the Church as the instrument of effecting.' This was in fact what Jowett was to try to do by turning his attention exclusively to the practical implementing of an educational ideal. He did not rise to ' a high ecclesiastical station ', but he did become Master of Balliol.

When Jowett abandoned theology he turned back to the classics to find his norm of education — in particular to Plato. It seems to have been in the middle of the 1860s that Jowett first thought of translating the whole of Plato's dialogues, beginning significantly with the *Republic,* that most brilliant of all educational treatises. There was much in Plato's conviction that public affairs must be ordered according to a strict blueprint of moral duty which would appeal to Jowett, and there is much to be said for the view that it was Plato more than any other single influence which turned Jowett's Balliol into a nursery for public men.

In October 1869 Jowett first met Gladstone at a private house party in Scotland. The student of Plato took a liking to the Prime Minister, though he thought him ' unsound ' on the Irish question, on which the two men argued at length, Jowett maintaining that ' the moral excuses for political crime ought not to make a statesman less firm in repressing it.' Jowett's views on Ireland seem to have been as far from Gladstone's as those of Church, but this did not prevent Gladstone from becoming

the instrument of promotion for both men. In 1870 he removed the one obstacle in Jowett's path to the Mastership by making Scott Dean of Rochester. The resulting election was a foregone conclusion. In September 1870, while the Second Empire was collapsing in France and Pius IX was losing the last shreds of temporal power in Rome, Jowett's Republic was inaugurated at Balliol. It was to last for nearly a quarter of a century.

The story of Jowett's tenure of the Mastership is the least satisfying part of Sir Geoffrey Faber's biography. One would like to know a great deal more about how Jowett created that peculiar *ethos* which gave to Balliol an intellectual *cachet* which was unrivalled in its time. As a training-ground for the famous, Jowett's Balliol proved more successful than its Platonic prototype because Jowett's terms of reference were more flexible. Milner and Curzon might well have been accepted as pupils by Plato, Asquith and Grey might have got into the Academy at a pinch ; but Plato would certainly not have tolerated Swinburne. The Master had many critics, some of them eminent (Mallock, Pater, Freeman, Arthur Evans), all of whom felt that there was something bogus about Jowett's *régime* and sought to lay their finger on it, but they were baffled by its comprehensiveness and the most telling argument of all — the loyalty of those who had submitted themselves to it. Anonymous rhymesters might caricature the assurance of intellectual superiority which they claimed to find in Jowett's Balliol and in Jowett himself :

> Here am I, my name is Jowett,
> There's no knowledge but I know it ;
> I am the Master of this College,
> What I don't know isn't knowledge.

But behind the gibe there was more than half belief.

After his death Jowett's reputation slumped, even in Balliol itself. Sir Geoffrey Faber is right to redress the balance. And yet — were Jowett's critics entirely unjust ? Sir Geoffrey does not give us his opinion on the possibility that Thomas Hardy in *Jude the Obscure* may have made the most searching criticism in a few lines of Jowett's educational system. If Hardy did intend ' T. Tutuphenny ' in that novel to be a portrait of Jowett, it must certainly be treated as an unfriendly caricature ; but is it altogether untrue to Jowett's emphasis on the gospel of success by means of the self-cultivation of a comparatively small, though varied, *élite* ? This is not to say that Jowett was indifferent to the educational fate of the bulk of the nation ; indeed he showed a far-sighted interest in such projects as adult education in its pioneering stages. But it seems not unfair to say that for him the choicest educational fruits were to remain as the prerogatives of an *élite*, on whom alone must rest the chief

responsibilities of public citizenship. This belief may or may not be right, but at any rate it would hold little appeal for the twentieth century world.

* * *

Jowett and Church were both first-class scholars, but neither wrote an original *magnum opus*. May we guess that they did not do so because, for different reasons, each was prevented from treating in perfect fullness the problem which each felt to be basic for his time — that of the foundations of Christian belief? Church's attempt to preserve an Anglicanism which by now possessed no real unity beyond the external historical bond of the Establishment commands respect ; but, *pace* Mr Smith, it was hardly a ' response to Newman '. It lacked both an *Essay on Development* and a *Grammar of Assent* and proved in the end to be little more than an eloquent appeal to all passengers not to rock the Anglican boat. Jowett had been one of the rockers, though he had desisted in time but he too had failed, even more strikingly than Church, to make an adequate contribution to the answer of the real problem of English religion in the nineteenth century : In what sense if at all could traditional Christianity still be believed ? Instead he evaded it by founding an academy for the training of a chosen intellectual few in habits of hard work and public responsibility. Neither the Master nor the Dean provided a permanent solution for the underlying spiritual anxiety of Victorian England.

Western Europe in the Summer of 1959

FURTHER REFLECTIONS UPON UNION AND UNITY IN WESTERN EUROPE

by JOHN MURRAY,

Five Years in Retrospect

FIVE years ago, I wrote an article for *Studies* with the same title and sub-title which preface this contribution except for two variants. Then, it was 'spring' instead of 'summer' and the year, naturally, was 1954, not 1959. The editor, passing on to me the comment of a reader, suggested that it might be worth while to review the Western European situation once again after this interval of five years.

The previous article dealt, in the first place, with the European idea itself and some of the reasons why it was making so forcible an appeal and then, with various attempts, whether at government level or that of private initiative, to give it some structural expression. There was the line of government action and interaction that led from the Brussels Treaty between Britain, France and the Benelux countries, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg, to the setting up of N.A.T.O. in 1949 which brought in further European countries along with the United States and Canada and, on the economic plane, to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C). At the same time, there was a sequence of smaller conferences which culminated in the great congress at the Hague, out of which emerged the Council of Europe, meeting twice a year at Strasbourg and, in embryo, a European Parliament.

I further analyzed three lines of effort that had been or were being made to create Western European institutions. The first began as the Schuman Plan, to integrate the coal and steel resources of Western Germany and France, and with which Italy and the Benelux States associated themselves. M. Schuman, its protagonist, spoke of the project as a 'first step in the federation of Europe', as building the 'first concrete foundations of the European federation' and as ensuring that 'any war between France and Germany becomes, not merely unthinkable but actually impossible'. The plan has been put into effect and it has now functioned for six years as the European Coal and Steel Community. It has proved a most successful experiment in supra-national collaboration.

The second also started as the project of a French Prime Minister, M. Pleven, and it was even more ambitious than the Coal and Steel community. Had it succeeded, it would have brought into existence a West European army under a supra-national leadership, closely associated, of course, with N.A.T.O. French fears in the end defeated the plan that had been initiated by French imagination. The French *Chambre* refused finally to ratify it in August 1954. This might have spelt disaster to the growing European movement. How, for instance, would Germans react after their sincere attempt for *rapprochment* with France? Would it prove a fatal set-back for the Western policy of Dr Adenauer? Happily, the situation was rectified, though at the expense of the European idea, by the admission of Western Germany to N.A.T.O. The remarkable successes of Dr Adenauer and the C.D.U. in the 1957 elections showed that his policy of *rapprochement* was still largely approved.

The third line of effort was stifled by the failure of the second. This was the attempt to frame a political constitution on a federal basis for the six countries ; it was drawn up by a commission from the *Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community,* and actually studied by a meeting of Foreign Ministers in November, 1953.

Between 1954 and 1959 the most notable advances have been in the economic sphere. In January 1959 the Common Market was inaugurated which immediately liberalized and eased mutual trade and intercourse and will eventually create a 'common market', a common economic area for close on 200,000,000 persons—among the most highly gifted and intelligent people of the world. In a more specialized way, these Powers have also created a common institute for the study of Atomic Energy, namely Euratom.

Finally, in the previous article, I analyzed a debate of the Council of Europe of September 1953 on the theme, *A Policy for Europe To-day.* From it I select a number of points in which the delegates showed general agreement, in view of their significance for the European issues which are now at stake and for the proposed international meetings that are to take place this summer. They agreed that the Western Powers should hold a conference with Russia, but some insisted upon a definite agenda and programme, and all suggested that the Western representatives must have a common mind and purpose and know the line behind which they would under no circumstances retreat. They recognized—this was nearly six years ago—the changed position and status of Western Germany and the adhesion to the European idea in German policy. Germany, they declared, should be reunified. A reunited Germany should not be neutralized or left a disarmed vacuum. Finally, several speakers insisted upon the European character of the peoples of Eastern Europe who must not be abandoned or forgotten for any convenient settlement. I should like to reproduce this passage which I quoted from M. Godehart, a Dutch

delegate, for it emphasizes a point of view of which no honest European must lose sight—in the difficult and chequered relations of East and West to-day :

> Europe can never accept it as a *fait accompli* that these unhappy countries shall remain occupied by the Soviet Union. They are part of the body of Europe and, so long as this reality is not recognized *de facto* and *de jure* by the Soviet Union, an abiding peace in the world will be an impossibility. If, in effect, it be the desire of the Soviet Union to establish a long period of co-existence with the West, as their spokesmen have on many an occasion declared, it must bring to an end its colonization in Eastern and Central Europe and restore to those lands and to their peoples that liberty which Hitler took from them and which Stalin and Malenkov have refused them to this present day. The Council of Europe would have a very poor sense of its own responsibility if it failed to express itself upon this matter very frankly and without any reserve.

Stalin and Malenkov have passed from the scene, the one to political disgrace, the other into temporary eclipse, but Russia still maintains her Iron Curtain across Europe. The one positive achievement since 1954 has been the peace settlement with Austria ; and the one major crime, the brutal reconquest of Hungary.

The French Transformation

The last five years have seen a rapid industrial progress in Western Germany and a rising prosperity throughout Western Europe. Western Germany has remained politically stable with a coalition but largely C.D.U. government under its remarkable Chancellor, Dr Adenauer. In Italy, the *democristiani*, though short of an absolute majority, have continued to govern. The great transformation has occurred in France. The transition from Fourth to Fifth Republic was peaceful enough despite a few muttered threats but it was in every sense a genuine transition. The majority vote given to the new constitution and the new president was almost without parallel in free elections. It revealed only too evidently the low esteem in which the mass of Frenchmen held politicians and political parties and their wish for an administration that would be stable, honest and morally responsible. France has its very serious and exhausting problems in North Africa which could easily deflect its interest from European matters and it was not, perhaps, at first obvious what would be the new president's attitude towards closer European integration. He had been an opponent of the European Defence Community and he has an exalted view of the mission and destiny of France. One recalled that during the French debates on this question prominent Gaullists, who are even more prominent under the new system, had penned distinctly anti-German opinions. Michel Debré, for

example, wrote signed articles in *Combat* denouncing the European plan as a dangerous rebirth of the *Wehrmacht ;* Jacques Soustelle contributed an article to *L'Humanité,* declaring that ' German rearmament, with or without the European Defence Community, is war—put off for a while but still near.'

However, General de Gaulle has continued the policy of friendship with Germany and his personal relations with Dr Adenauer go far beyond the demands of formal courtesy. Their meetings have been as intimate as they have been cordial and it is impossible to forget the firm Catholic convictions and feelings which they share. Both are great men, men of principle and conviction ; both are realists, their feet planted securely on the ground, but with a vision and an ideal in mind and heart against which they can study and solve political problems. Both are respected and trusted by their own peoples in a quite exceptional measure. Each has served and is serving his country with devotedness and real effect. If General de Gaulle personifies the Fifth Republic, Dr Adenauer is the personification of post-war German democracy,[1] and each is leaving the firm imprint of his personality and spirit upon the institution for which he is largely responsible. It is no accident that in Allied discussions this year the French and German points of view have so closely approximated.

It is sometimes taken for granted that the British and U.S. political systems are the same or at any rate very similar to one another. In point of fact, despite their common origin and much English influence on U.S. political development, they are not. The U.S.A. has a presidential democracy in which the emphasis remains on the executive rather than the legislature, whereas in Britain, Parliament—the legislature—is paramount. Each country no doubt achieves a reasonably similar result. It is worth noting that French and West German democracy has moved in opposite directions since the war. The Weimar constitution was presidential, that adopted in the Basic Law of the present Federal Republic is parliamentary. The French Fourth Republic was parliamentary, the Fifth Republic is presidential. In other words, power has been taken away from the executive in Germany and given to the legislature whereas in France the executive has been strengthened. Both changes were intended to supply a corrective for a national failing : the German tendency towards docility and even servility towards the *Obrigkeit,* authority, and in France, the opposite defect of political anarchy through individualism.

[1] In a valuable study of *Democracy in Western Germany,* published in 1957, in which he is at times sharply critical of Dr Adenauer, Richard Hiscocks had finally to pass a very appreciative judgment. ' Nothing has done more—he writes—than Dr Adenauer's stable and effective government to reconcile the German people to democracy . . . He has given them a strong lead which they like. He has pursued a clear policy which they can follow. In contrast to the Weimar leaders, he has proved that a democratic Germany could regain with astonishing rapidity economic strength and a respected place among the nations.' (p. 123)

Under the Weimar system the German president appointed his own chancellor who could and at times did govern without or against a parliamentary majority. The Bonn Basic Law has greatly circumscribed the president's powers. In the case of a parliamentary deadlock over a proposed government bill (that is, in the *Bundestag* or Lower House) the president can declare a state of emergency with regard to the bill. The bill may then become law without *Bundestag* approval. But this procedure requires the approval of the *Bundesrat* or Upper House and the state of emergency is limited to six months. The president can only appoint a chancellor who has been elected by the *Bundestag* and there are only two sets of circumstances in which he can dissolve the *Bundestag* : further, the *Bundestag* can escape dissolution in these cases by electing a chancellor with an absolute majority. Dr Heuss, president of the Federal Republic since 1949, has fitted admirably into his new position and exercised his office with rare tact and understanding. Further, a new voting mechanism which insists that all parties, to be represented in the *Bundestag,* must win one mandate outright or have at least five per cent. of the total poll, has greatly reduced the number of parties in Parliament. They are only four : the C.D.U., the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats or Liberals, and the small *deutsche Partei,* which is an ally of the C.D.U. The German post-war system has now shed its many parties and reached what is, for practical purposes, a three party parliament.

In France, on the other hand, many parties were represented. Governments were always coalitions, often coalitions of the moment rather than on some basis of principle or programme. Governments appeared and disappeared but the *Chambre* remained. *Plus ça change*—one might recast the old proverb—*plus c'est la même chambre.* Rarely could a government last or be strong : its strength was that of its weakest co-operating party. The new French constitution restricts the power of Parliament : its meetings are confined to a number of months during the year, and the executive will have a large measure of freedom from parliamentary control. Clearly, this is not without its dangers but there are two points which strongly recommend it : in the first place, it does correct the natural French tendency to political individualism and provide an effective administration, and secondly, it has the support of four fifths of the French people. I might have added a third point, the personality and capacity of the new president.

German Views on European Collaboration

Before passing to consider the main issues before this summer's meetings at the summit or lower down the international slope, I should like to make one or two remarks on the German attitude towards the idea of Europe. Two world wars have made us so aware of German

aggression and nationalism that we may be tempted to think of Germans as always wildly nationalistic. That is not true. Till well into the eighteenth century the Germans were rather the victims of other peoples' nationalism ; their own, in the narrow sense, was a nineteenth century growth, associated with the Prussian ascendancy amid the German States and the political successes of Bismarck. It is interesting to note how since 1945 some German historians are re-thinking German history since the beginning of the nineteenth century and passing upon it verdicts very different indeed from those glibly assumed prior to 1930. In a short work published in 1946, Friedrich Meinecke, the doyen of such historians, was asking himself whether what was buried in the ruins of Berlin was simply Nazism or the past which made Berlin the capital of Germany, Prussia its core and the Iron Chancellor its hero? And he continued :

> Would the centre of German life return from the North-Eastern semi-colonial marches to the old seats of civilization in the South and South-West and would Germany find the way back to the common Western tradition which had been opposed by so many German trends after 1812 ? [1]

Dr Franz Schnabel, assessing Bismarck's achievements in *Hochland,* declares that the solution which Bismarck adopted, of a German Empire, rendered impossible what ought even then to have been the appropriate European solution—a federation of Central and Eastern European States. Though it is a judgment passed in retrospect, it sounds prophetic in terms of Europe's present situation.

> The moment quickly passed—he writes—during which, as fate would have it, serious discussion of such a federation of Europe was possible. No one talked any more of union of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe or of a *Europe existing upon the basis of its own strength.* Only in Bismarck's time could this idea have been carried out and the self-laceration of the nations prevented. It was already obvious that the *appearance of Russia in Central Europe,* which anyone could see by 1848, was a world event of incalculable consequences. It necessarily opened up a new world epoch, with new methods in diplomacy and a *new European attitude.*

The Western policy of Dr Adenauer is seen therefore to be much more fundamental than an opportunist attitude with regard to Soviet Russia. It has its roots in history—in the actualities of earlier eras and the might-have-beens of the nineteenth century. In an interview Dr Adenauer has stated that he first ventilated his ideas on European integration

[1] Cf. *German History ; Some Recent German Views.* Edited by Hans Kohn. George Allen and Unwin. 1954. pp. 26-7.

and a conciliation between France and Germany in 1925 and that he put them before the cabinet of Dr Marx that was in office at the time. No one who has followed German politics since 1945 can doubt or ignore the chancellor's devotion to a policy that is at the same time an ideal and, in his mind, an absolute necessity for the survival of Western Europe. The pity is that the Social Democrats in Western Germany, blinded by the needs of opposition, have remained officially, if not always actually, hostile to this policy to which they can offer little practical alternative. Their representatives in Berlin, men of the calibre of the two *Burgermeister,* Ernst Reuter and Willy Brandt, have possessed a wider and more European outlook. 'Here in the East—said the former—we cannot agree that the West should continue in its present state. In our opinion, the political and economic consolidation of the West is a fundamental condition for putting right our relations to one another and for the return of the Russian zone to the common motherland.'[1]

THE PRESENT ISSUES

Since the seizure of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent establishment of N.A.T.O., Communism has made no further territorial advances in Europe. Western revival and prosperity have reduced its field for propaganda and manoeuvre. The contrast between Western and Eastern Germany, between West and East Berlin, is there for all Europe to study. Behind the Soviet curtain opposition to the Russians is only thinly veiled in Poland and Hungary. In the past decade the Communist initiative has been largely switched to other areas, in the Far East and South East Asia and more lately to the Near East. But late in 1958 and during 1959 it has returned to Central Europe.

What is behind this change of tactics? It is never possible to give detailed reasons for Russian attitudes. The main intention is of course obvious : to create as much disturbance as possible, to sow seeds of disunity and discord among opponents and to reap some advantage, if only as a sop of appeasement.

These issues have been raised by one side or the other after what seemed very like a Russian ultimatum about Berlin. The first is Berlin itself ; the second, the question of German reunification ; the third, Germany's future once it has been reunited.

It is understandable that the Russians do not like the situation in Berlin. West Berlin is a window through which the West can look into Soviet-administered territory and study an unattractive and unappealing sight. It is also the door through which large numbers have left East

[1] Reuter had long and close experience of Communism, both from outside and within the movement. He said in 1950 : 'Perhaps only men who once themselves succumbed to the Eastern will-of-the-wisp can know and prove with verse and chapter the magnitude of the threat which Communism means to the world.' (recorded in *The Return of Germany,* by Norbert Muhlen, John Lane, 1953, p. 310)

Berlin and Eastern Germany. The figure of more than two million escapees and refugees in ten years from a population less than twenty million is a grim commentary on the country they have abandoned. In the past year, the Russian and East German authorities have been particularly worried by the large scale exodus of professional and highly skilled men. West Berlin is a tower and a lighthouse reminding Eastern Germans that they are neither forsaken nor forgotten by their fellow Germans to the West or by other Western peoples. Its loss or its absorption in Eastern Germany would not only be a prestige gain for Communism ; it would spread despondency and despair throughout Eastern Europe.

Yet I imagine one could make out a debating case for the Russians along these lines. Berlin—they might urge—was once a symbol of four-Power collaboration and four Power control of Germany but to-day it is a complete anachronism. The Berliners themselves speak of it as the island in the Red Sea. There is in fact no longer any occupation of Germany. What foreign troops are on German soil are there by permission or at the request of the appropriate German governments. Berlin should therefore be reabsorbed into Eastern Germany of which it forms naturally part. It is absurd that it should be provisioned from the West and not from the country side just beyond its suburbs. The forces of the Western Powers should either retire from Berlin or at least make suitable arrangements with the East German authorities. Russia then declares her willingness to make a peace settlement with West and East Germany or, if the former prove impossible, with East Germany. She will then—officially—withdraw her forces and East Germany will be a sovereign and independent State. She would even show herself more accommodating and agree that West Berlin might have a special status —that of a Free City—or perhaps have contingents of United Nations troops. But whether you like it or not—so would the argument conclude —there are two Germanies, the East no less so than the West.

The Western reply would be that Allied troops are in Berlin because of a four-Power agreement which cannot be abrogated except by all four Powers, and further, that they hold a serious responsibility for the population of West Berlin. This responsibility they fulfilled during the air-lifts of 1948 and 1949 ; they must continue to fulfil it until the question of Germany as a whole has been dealt with. The Berlin problem presents no real difficulty. It could be settled in half an hour if all Powers concerned had honest good will. For that matter, it need not, and should not, have been raised. Berlin brings us at once to the problem of Germany or, as Russia would term it, the two Germanies. The West has never recognized East Germany. It is the former Russian zone, run by a handful of German Communists under Soviet supervision where the government has not been freely elected and where, if free elections could be

held, it would be rejected ignominiously. To pretend for a moment that any considerable proportion of the East Germans have been converted or even reconciled to Communism is totally unrealistic. The Russians have not the slightest doubt what would be the results of any free elections. One condition the Western Powers have laid down regularly for German reunification is that of free elections throughout Germany and the establishment of an all-German administration. They would not accept any confederation between West and East Germany, between a state, obviously sovereign and independent, with an elected government and all the instruments of statehood and an artificial construct like East Germany, which is only a state in name and by courtesy of Soviet Russia.

Now, if the Berlin problem could be easily resolved, that of the ' two Germanies ' has become far more difficult. The Russians do not want Germany to be reunified ; they feel safer while it is divided. Secondly, they would consider reunification only within their own special context. This would involve an equality between West and East Germany, despite the fact that the population of the Western Republic is three times as large and it would also involve an acceptance of the economic and even the political system existing within East Germany. In other words, Russia will either not let East Germany go or would do so only on terms which the Western Powers could not even contemplate. Russia would envisage any reunification of Germany as offering her the opportunity of getting hold of Germany through the Communist party, still effectively in control of the Eastern half. Whether this could be brought about or not is another matter. In all these issues I fancy that the Germans themselves will have a great deal more to say than the Russians and perhaps also the Western Powers imagine. And what they say will not be friendly to Communism or Russia.

For a long time, the German Social Democrats opposed Dr Adenauer's programme of friendship and integration with the West on the grounds that it would prejudice the reunification of Germany. Reunification, they insisted, must come first, but it is a matter that must be settled by Russia and the Western Allies. But already in 1955 the Russians were declaring that reunification was a matter for the Germans, for the two Germanies. At the sixth anniversary celebrations of the East German State, Suslov who led the Soviet delegation, spoke as follows :

> The Soviet Union has always proceeded from the belief that the question of re-establishing German reunity was primarily the business of the Germans themselves. This task would be considerably facilitated by extensive co-operation between the German Democratic Republic (Eastern Germany) and the Federal German Republic in all spheres of international life and *in conditions of complete equality*. (He added that without this co-operation the question might not be settled at all) . . . . But (he continued) it goes without saying that the Federal German

> Republic's claims to represent all Germany cannot be of any significance. In the course of the Moscow talks (September, 1955) the representatives of the Federal German Republic were told definitely and clearly : the Federal German Republic is only one part of Germany and exercises jurisdiction over the territory under its sovereignty. The other part of Germany is the German Democratic Republic which is by no means some sort of geographical conception. It is an objective and quite weighty reality which firmly exists, develops, prospers and has a great future.

To these political factors an economic element has to be added. To begin with, Russia denuded East Germany of a large proportion of her resources and products. It has been computed that between 1946 and 1950 Eastern Germany supplied more than eleven billion dollars in reparation and occupation costs to Russia and her satellite States—more than twice the amount provided by Marshall Aid to Western Germany. Thirty per cent. of the more important industrial undertakings were organized as Soviet companies and given very favoured treatment. In 1951 they had to deliver a profit of more than 1,000,000,000 East German marks as part of the Five year plan. Since then, the economy of this territory has been adapted and geared to that of Russia and the other countries under Communist control. For this reason alone, it is difficult to picture any Russian release of East Germany except for a price that the West could and would not entertain.

I do not think, therefore, that German reunification will be brought about this year after any Summit meeting. The positions are too far apart. The detailed statement made on 28 April by M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, shows that the French—and presumably also the West German—attitude is firmer on this matter than that of Britain. And so we pass to the third of these three issues, that of Germany's future. In one sense, the question does not arise, for it supposes a German reunification and all we are likely to be left with is the present *status quo*. Have the plans for some disengagement in Central Europe any relevance to this ? Now, if we are to believe—as certain journals and individuals try to make us believe, Field Marshal Montgomery is the latest of them—that the Russians are desperately afraid of Germany, then the Russians have been remarkably silly. Had Russia co-operated with the Western Powers after 1945, it would have been possible to frame a peace settlement, leaving a disarmed or a neutral Germany. Together, the four Powers could have imposed such a peace and the majority of West Germans would then have welcomed a disarmed status. It is too late now to impose a peace settlement. West Germany is a sovereign State, an ally of the Western Powers and, in effect, one of the Big Four in the Western world. Whatever the West Germans might have welcomed in 1947 or 1948, it is certain that they

would not accept that status now, nor would any Western country make that suggestion. Once again, it is the Germans who will have the principal say : time has made that inevitable.

German Opinions

Is there any other advantage which the Russians imagine might accrue to them in the event of German reunification apart from the general hope that they will secure control of Germany with the assistance of German Communists ? I think there could be some thought of the kind in their minds. It would spring from the ambivalent position of Western Germany. There, foreign policy since 1949 has had two principal aims : reunification and a closer association with the West even to the point of an eventual federation with other West European countries. What would be the likely consequence of reunification for this pro-Western policy ? I am putting forward a string of *possibilities*—I can give them no more definite name. It is possible that twenty million Germans from the East would not be as interested in collaboration with Frenchmen, Italians and members of Benelux States as are the sixty million West Germans. It is equally possible that in a reunited Germany the Social Democrats would form the government. They have never favoured Dr Adenauer's policy ; they opposed the Schuman plan, even though the German Trades Unions supported it ; they are lukewarm on the whole to N.A.T.O. It is possible that the remaining members of ' little Europe ' might find a Germany of close on eighty millions too dominant and awkward a partner and that, in consequence, 'little Europe' would disintegrate into its component parts and the whole movement towards European federation be halted.

But this is still supposing a reunited Germany, free to direct her own policies and under no special conditions of limitation. Neutral status would further worsen the position, for a neutralized Germany would be unable to enter into alliances and associations. It could not continue to belong to N.A.T.O. and I do not see how it could continue to be a member of 'little Europe'. Further, apart from the matter of neutrality, a disarmed Germany could scarcely fulfil the obligations incumbent upon a member State in 'little Europe'. Russia obviously dislikes the European idea and its recent developments. We are back at the arguments so often urged and pleaded on its behalf by the German Chancellor in 1952 and 1953. ' The barriers must fall between the countries of Europe, and Europe must be united so that European civilization can survive. It will be a long road calling for unending patience and the conquest of a world of prejudice . . . My policy is and remains directed towards the United States of Europe.' From this point of view as from the different but kindred standpoint of N.A.T.O. there is little chance of any disengagement agreement except within

the framework of a wider disarmament, though it might always be possible to frame useful agreements on a smaller scale that did not alter the present status of West Germany or impose special limiting conditions upon a reunified Germany.

Finally, it must be asked how keen actually is the German desire for reunity. There could be some disadvantages for the West. Reunification would for a period lower existing Western standards of livelihood. Differences between Rhinelanders and Bavarians, on one side, and East Prussians, on the other, may have been accentuated during the period of division. The C.D.U. are sometimes accused of lack of enthusiasm for reunity for fear lest it bring a Socialist all-German government and slant the trend of German policy away from the direction in which Dr Adenauer has tilted it. This last suggestion seems to me bad psychology, for what men most want after long experience of repression and servitude is sheer freedom, the right and opportunity to lead their own lives. And I do not think they will in large numbers want to exchange one society planned on a major scale for another planned society in a minor key. The reactions in Western Germany against the Nazi system in 1945 are a valuable pointer to this.

The East Germans wish for reunification with the exception of their Communist leaders and for those who now have a vested interest in the East German régime: this means in practice members of the Communist party and a number of fellow-travellers and technicians. In West Germany everyone calls for it officially, though there are, no doubt, degrees in the warmth of the demand. A certain proportion of the West Germans could get on happily without reunion, provided conditions were better and more humane for their fellows in the East. It has been noticed that with the decline in nationalist feeling in West Germany after 1945 the reason why many in the West insisted upon reunification was not so much to be united again with their fellow nationals but to ensure them proper rights and liberties: they were thinking in terms of humanity rather than nationalism. A considerable proportion, if challenged, might prefer to wait till Western Germany had been more closely integrated into a Western framework, especially within the structure of 'little Europe'. It would then, they consider, be easier to carry the Eastern Germans with them into the same Western world. Obviously, in the long term, the vast majority of Germans want and will insist upon reunification, and obviously one day it will come.

Book Reviews

AN IRISH HARPER

CAROLAN: The Life, Times and Music of an Irish Harper, by Donal O'Sullivan. Vol. I, The Life and Times and the Music. Vol. II, The Notes to the Tunes and The Memoirs of Arthur O'Neill. London : Routledge and Keegan Paul 1958. 84s., the set.

'THE issue of this work' says Mr O'Sullivan in his Preface 'represents the realisation of a long-cherished project.' Well do I know it, for it is forty years since I first met Donal O'Sullivan and even then he was an enthusiast for Irish folk-song, well acquainted with most of the published collections.

Some years later he undertook, for the Irish Folk Song Society (London) a recension, with notes, of Edward Bunting's first collection of *Ancient Irish Music* 1796. This book was the fruit of Bunting's first musical assignment in 1792 to record the music of the harpers assembled in Belfast in July of that year.

There had been three notable festivals or Assemblies of Harpers held at Granard in the years 1781, 82 and 85 at the expense of a wealthy merchant, Mr James Dungan, at that time engaged in business in Copenhagen.[1] Dr McDonnell of Belfast and some others conceived the idea of reviving these festivals, and in 1792 a number of harpers gathered at Belfast. Among them was a very old man, Denis Hampson from Co. Derry, and Arthur O'Neill, who afterwards became Bunting's protégé and instructor to the Belfast Harp Society. His memoirs form the latter half of Mr O'Sullivan's second volume. At the 1792 meeting Bunting recorded many tunes, but seems only to have attempted to write down the single line of melody, with time and key signature. These latter are not always correct. Time signature, as any recorder of folk songs knows, is hard to set down accurately, as often the rhythm of the words obscures that of the melody, while key signatures, in music for the undeveloped harp show little variation.

So, in his first collection, issued in 1796 without any attempt at harmony, there are many such errors. Bunting was very young, twenty at most ; he was born in 1773 in Armagh and died in Dublin 1843.

In the 1796 collection are a good many tunes ascribed to Carolan who lived from 1670—1738. Already the Carolan legend had had well over 60 years to grow ; and there is little doubt that any tune the least bit like one of Carolan's would be ascribed to him. The itinerant harpers who followed him kept alive the names and memory of his tunes in order to be made welcome at the homes of his patrons.

[1] Arthur O'Neill gives a good account of these festivals (Vol. ii pp 162, 3) but this reference is not given in Mr O'Sullivan's Index.

Mr O'Sullivan's great book really forms a social history of Ireland beginning in 1670, Carolan's birth date, and ending with his death in 1738. It was an uneasy Ireland. By 1670 the Cromwellian Planters had hardly taken possession of their grants or built their houses when came the invasion of Ireland by Dutch William in pursuit of the pusillanimous James. With the Irish Army—for a hundred years from O'Neill to Sarsfield, a well-armed disciplined force—safely dispersed on the continent, there was no longer the slightest need to keep faith with Papist traitors and, by the time Carolan started his wanderings about 1700, the Williamite planter had made peace with his Cromwellian rival and ' a short way with Papists ' was the rule of the day.

Here and there, as had been happening since Henry's and Elizabeth's day, the old Catholic families retained a precarious hold on some fraction of their property and wealth, by the expedient of having a foot in either camp, a son educated in England and brought up Protestant ; a daughter married to a Protestant landowner ; a complete change of surname ; a perfunctory attendance at the local Established Church, or a pretence of driving away some miles to attend church somewhere else.

Mr O'Sullivan's book divides naturally into four sections :—

Vol. I. Part 1. Carolan and his times.
„ 2. The melodies composed or ascribed to Carolan (213 in all, but 32 are of doubtful ascription).

Vol. II. „ 3. Notes on the tunes and the Patrons.
„ 4. The memoirs of Arthur O'Neill—one of the Harpers who gained prizes at the Harp Festival, lived in Belfast at Bunting's expense, and at his suggestion wrote these (unfinished) memoirs.

Now let me state at once that Carolan was no bard, in spite of the title ' the last Irish Bard ' bestowed on him by Oliver Goldsmith in 1760. He had no training in bardic verse, as had every professional poet until the break-up of the bardic schools after Kinsale. He was not even a good rhymester in the newer metres. He cannot be compared with Eoghan Rua O Sullivan, Tadhg Gaelach O Sullivan, Donncha Rua Macnamara, or Liam Dall O Hearnáin. Even Micheál MacSuibhne and Antoine Raftery wrote better verse than he did. All his songs are trite, full of repetition and echoes of other men's songs. He seems never to have attempted an Aisling or a descriptive piece. The late Professor Tomás Ó Máille published all that could be gleaned from MS sources and oral tradition of Carolan's songs, and those of many of his contemporaries for the Irish Texts Society, Vol. xvii (1916).

His music, with the exception of a few conscious and obvious imitations of the prevailing Italian style, fails to hold continued interest. Much of it is in 6/8, i.e., quick march or jig time and, as for florid melody, there was little one could do with a harp of 30—36 strings, one half of which would be reserved for the bass.

Now, what about the bass ? It was almost always extemporized; though now and then one set of treble notes, resembling another, would naturally

suggest a similar left-hand treatment and rhythm. The truth is that we know as little of the harpers' lower register work, unison, harmony or counterpoint, as we do of ' what songs the sirens sang '.

No matter what Bunting says—and remember he and Arthur O'Neill were writing from 60 to 100 years after Carolan's death—about the way he strung his harp for special effects ; the way the brim of a hat could be used to sharpen a note, the way the harpers grew their nails long like talons the better to get a strident sound from the wire strings—with all this I refuse to be beguiled. The MacFaul harp I learnt on had gut strings, each of which had a thumb ring just below the tuning pin. With this ring the note could be sharpened half a tone or, if the tuning for some special reason should be reduced to a flat, it could be made natural once more by means of the ring. This expedient was introduced mechanically late in the eighteenth century. The Erard pedal harp now used as an orchestral instrument effects the change, let us say from C to G, by sharpening simultaneously every F on the harp, and so on with the other keys. No harp can flatten the tone, either by hand or by pedal, as there is no device for lengthening (flattening) the string, only for shortening the string, thereby raising the pitch one half-tone. In Carolan's time all harps were fixed-scale instruments, and as well as tunes in the tonic Doh, modal tunes and harmonies could be played as in plain chant. In fact all modulations were from mode to mode.

Bunting's second book, published in 1809, was obviously meant to rival Thomas Moore, who had filched many of Bunting's best melodies from the 1796 volume, and made a lot of money. It had words by poets of distinction including Thomas Campbell and Miss Janet Balfour, and the melodies here and there were altered to suit the words. He arranged the songs to be accompanied on the pianoforte, which by that time had almost completely superseded harp and harpsichord, although the spinet still remained a graceful Sheraton piece in many a drawing room. He prefaced this book with an elaborate dissertation on the Irish harp.

I have a nicely written oblong book of MS. music titled on the back *Mr Bunting's Book,* bearing his signature (Belfast 1791) and that of Clementi also. Bunting's third and last book appeared only three years before his death. Here again he has harmonized the melodies, and produced a long dissertation on Harps and Harpers.

In this 1840 book, more than in that of 1809 (when many of the itinerant harpers were still alive) he makes the most extravagant claims, as who should say : ' I am the only living man who has met and spoken with the harpers, and all I say must be taken as gospel.' In fact a great deal of what he had to say is arrant nonsense and although Donal O'Sullivan (who succeeded me as lecturer in Irish Folk Music in University College some years ago) knows it well, no whisper of this appears in this book, nor in Mr O'Sullivan's recension of Bunting's 1796 volume which formed the volumes of the Irish Folk Song Society for 1927-1939.

These numbers—they can hardly be called volumes as the whole of them bound together only make two books little more than an inch thick—form the ground-work of Mr O'Sullivan's work on Carolan. For Bunting had noted in his first collection many tunes by or ascribed to Carolan, and these set Mr

O'Sullivan off a-questing for all that might be known, mainly of Carolan's patrons for whose entertainment and in whose honour the pieces had been composed. There is a statement somewhere in these volumes that Carolan composed his tunes by fingering the buttons on his coat ! This quest brought him into many by-roads of history—ancient Irish names like O Conor (the great Charles of Belanagare), McDermott Roe (his first patrons), and McDonagh (Terence the great counsellor) rubbed shoulders, when Carolan came their way, with Hewletts, Peytons, Wrixons, Sudleys, Jones's, and many others.

Planter stock, all the latter, monied adventurers, who were making haste to fix firmly their tenure on forfeited land, and to found the roystering, hard-drinking legend of ' Fun and Frivolity, Bumpers Squire Jones ' which died out only after the Land League.

Harpers there have been before and after Carolan ; Arthur O'Neill mentions some of his contemporaries and many of his predecessors. O'Neill seems to have been a notable performer, far superior, if we are to take the evidence of those who met and heard Carolan. Indeed Carolan's fame seems to rest on his compositions rather than his competence as an executant. His tunes lived on for almost a hundred years, primarily because of the well-known names of the titled and wealthy patrons attached to them. There are many better Irish melodies, either nameless or known by such titles as ' The Lark in the Morn', ' The Boyne Hunt', or ' The Bush in Bloom '.

Carolan was, however, a popular figure, a jovial companion and a welcome guest for almost 40 years in the best houses of the land—mostly in the houses of the Planter stock.

Though in the 213 melodies here printed there is throughout ' a family likeness', yet there is ample material for a competent musician to work over and elaborate into Sonata or Concerto, while preserving the Irish character of the music.

The late Owen Lloyd who was the greatest Irish harper of my youth would be well over a hundred if alive now. I do not know who taught him (the name suggests Welsh connections). He taught Mrs Loton, Miss Corless, Mother Attracta (Coll), Sister Attracta (Andrews), my schoolmate Willie O'Reilly, and myself (though but an indifferent performer, or as Arthur O'Neill would say *Tol-lol*). That was in the days before Miss Townsend revived the harp, with the O'Shea children and others still living as pupils. I do not know who taught Treasa Ni Chormaic, though her style and performance—e.g. Brian Boru's march—reminded me much of Owen Lloyd.

Lloyd arranged a few of Carolan's tunes in *An Cruitire,* published by the Gaelic League in 1903. One of these was the absurdly named ' Carolan's Concerto'. It is a simple tune in the florid Italian manner popular in his day. But it is not, in the accepted sense of the word, a concerto at all. Compare it with the concertos of Bach, Handel, Hayden, Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms, Tchaikovsky, Grieg ; and where does poor old Carolan come in with his one-line tune of 32 bars in common time.

Mr O'Sullivan's interest in his subject is amazing and his industry incomparable. Can we imagine any musician of any age being granted a full-length two-volume biography ? Has Verdi, the prolific, been given this tribute or Dvorak or Smetana or Greig (that master of melody) or Delius or Sibelius,

to mention only a few who have given to music greater gifts and a greater heritage than can ever be claimed for Carolan?

Here are three references which might well have been made:

(*a*) Joseph Campbell's song 'The Festival of Tears'—*Songs of Uladh* (1904) arranged by Herbert Hughes. It begins:

When Carolan died in the house of MacDiarmuid . . . . . ,

the tune is that of a country ballad, and it claims no connection with Carolan.

(*b*) M. J. (Joe) McManus's satiric verse apparently written at the graveyard of Kilronan:

Here Lady Louisa lies
Under a cross that sweeps the skies;
While over there, amid nameless throngs,
Lies Turlogh O Carolan, maker of songs.

(*c*) In a Western folk-song Dónall Ó Dálaigh (Éamonn Magáine) occur the lines:—

An Cearbhallán Caoch thú nó ar chaill tú do léargus
Ni taobh leat tá Eire, tá do mhalrait le fáil.

I recorded it, words and music, from Seán O Gaora, Aill na Brón, Carna. A version is printed in Timony's *Abhráin Ghaedhilge an Iarthair,* beginning 'Ni ar a'mbaile seo atá an chuilfhionn,' p. 44.

(Timony: also prints a version of the song about the 'Two William Davises').

There are some omissions, e.g. The Granard Festivals, II, 162, 3.

Here is a wonderful book; beautiful type (caslon) elegantly set; perfect paper, colour and half-tone blocks and music engraving. The two volumes are tastefully bound in dark blue buckram with gold titling on spine and a neat gold harp on front cover.

This lavish production has been made possible, as Mr O'Sullivan acknowledges, by a generous grant from the Higgins Fund in the Royal Irish Academy, further grants from University College and from Trinity College, Dublin, while 'The generosity of an anonymous Dublin patron of the Arts has made it possible for the music to be engraved.' When so much Irish money was voted it seems sad that all the printing and binding was done in England. For distribution, perhaps, an English publisher was needed, but there are at least four firms in Dublin, any one of which could have undertaken the production.

Colm Ó Lochlainn

ART AND LETTERS

THE ARTS, ARTISTS AND THINKERS. A symposium edited by John M. Todd. ix+345 pp. London: Longmans, 1958. 35s.

It is significant that the title of this book is *The Arts, Artists and Thinkers* and not 'The Place of the Arts in Human Life'. That was the subject which a group of artists, critics, historians, a neurologist, a psychotherapist, philosophers and theologians were called on to discuss when they met at Downside

in 1957. Needless to say no very useful or precise discussion could result from so vague a subject and most of the contributors squandered the limited time allotted to them by roaming over a wide range of topics without ever penetrating below the commonplace. The reviewer's task is thus made all the easier. He must select, and his choice will inevitably fall on the longest paper, 'The Desolation of the Arts' by Fr Vincent Turner, S.J., and on a few kindred papers which submit the present state of the arts to intelligent, if negative, criticism.

Desolation in the arts there may be, but it is nothing to the ruin which Fr Turner leaves behind him when he has finished his work of demolition. With brisk gestures he sweeps aside most modern criticism and all modern aesthetics (in the sense of an all-embracing philosophy of the arts), and denies the possibility of any aesthetics whatever. 'All aesthetics historically is the offspring of metaphysical idealism. Does it follow that it is all unsound? It does . . . Am I then suggesting that aesthetics in this manner is impossible? I certainly am. Empirically it is impossible to talk sense about the arts at the high altitude at which a man must cruise if he is to embrace them all.' This is all very stimulating and, indeed, nothing that is said about the metaphysics of art in other parts of the book seriously threatens Fr Turner's position. But, in fact, it is not quite so radical as these quotations suggest. He does not deny that some general statements about the arts may be made, provided they are limited to a branch of the arts. 'To reflect on our experience is an inveterate endowment that does no harm so long as it does not get in the way of our experiencing.' He might have added that his own criticism implies some general theory of the arts, however negative, and that it is rooted in a metaphysics, sounder, no doubt, than idealism.

What Fr Turner wishes to expose and denounce is the idea that works of art need not be taken into consideration in a theory of the arts. This idea, remarkable as it may seem, is fundamental to modern aesthetics. It is to be found explicitly at the philosophical level in writers like Croce and Collingwood and implicitly at the level of criticism. How, it may be asked, can a theory of art dispense with works of art? This, Fr Turner answers, can, and indeed must, be done only within the philosophical system of absolute idealism. If, as this system has it, all activity and all reality is the self-expression of the spirit as it evolves, then the only artistic activity which is of value is that which goes on within the spirit, that is, within the artist's head; the work is an irrelevant by-product.

We can see at once, thanks to Fr Turner's astute observation, whence such theorists as Sir Herbert Read and M. Jacques Maritain get their ideas and attitudes, however unconscious they may be of the source. Once you have risen above actual works of art it is possible to adopt a lofty tone, to speak about the pure essence of art (which, in so far as it is found in works of art, means abstract art, pure poetry, etc.) and about the pure creativity of the spirit. It enables you to welcome everything new as a fresh self-expression of the spirit and dismiss subject-matter as unreal, a superficial mental construction which distorts reality, the pure activity of the spirit. It renders your theories irrefutable because whatever does not fit in with them is not an expression of the spirit and therefore not art. Not all these ideas derive

in their entirety from idealism : the precise relationship is too complicated for even Fr Turner to unravel. In some cases idealism merely gives intellectual respectability to what many people think and feel anyway. For example, the decline of patronage set the painter adrift in search of a subject ; he was free to paint as he liked, to express his own personal vision. When his work met with opposition from reactionary elements and he asserted his right to free expression all the more fiercely, he was aided by the philosopher with the theory of the free creativity of the spirit. When opposition collapsed, the principle of free creativity persisted : it was an absolute and necessary principle. ' It takes a philosopher to elevate contingent historical facts into a mode of necessary self-expression of the human spirit . . . and a neo-scholastic to make out that they follow from the first principles of a metaphysics of man.' It is this ' monstrous inflation of contemporary talk about the visual arts' which the author deplores. It obstructs the vision not only of the public but also—what is worse—of the artist. Of the disasterous effect on the artist he is not inclined to speak, and hints rather sinisterly that ' it would be invidious and perhaps libellous to give illustrations '.

Some of the points raised by Fr Turner are discussed by Alan Pryce-Jones in ' The Freedom of the Imagination ' and by John Coulson in ' The Retreat from Meaning '. Neither of these papers has the sparkle and the penetration of ' The Desolation of Aesthetics ' but with a few more like them this might have been a valuable symposium and some of the artists, critics and other experts could have been dispensed with. As it is we have one outstanding paper and we can be thankful for that.

CYRIL BARRETT

MAINIE JELLETT. The Artists Vision. Lectures and essays on art edited by Eileen MacCarvill. 120 pp. Illus. Dundalk : Dundalgan Press, 1958. 52s. 6d.

THE STORY OF MODERN ART. By Sheldon Cheney. viii + 723 pp. Illus. London : Methuen, 1958. 45s.

MAINIE JELLETT will be remembered as the person who introduced the modern movement in art into Ireland. She came back to this country from the studios of Lhote and Gleize in Paris with a sense of mission. Already on the continent cubism had been in existence for over a decade and a half but it might never have happened for all the Irish art world knew of it. Mainie Jellett set out to shock her fellow-countrymen into awareness of what was happening all around them. She stirred up one of those storms which break periodically over the artistic life of Dublin, more often, it is true, over the world of the theatre than of the plastic arts. The addresses and essays with which the campaign was waged by Miss Jellett have been collected and published under the title *The Artist's Vision.* Taken out of their historical context, with the other side in the debate silenced, as it were, one might wonder how they could have stirred up the ' hostile criticism ' so criptically referred to in the chronological outline. We must wait for a biography before these writings can be put back into their setting and can be understood for what they were.

Beyond a few observations on colour and rhythm they do not contribute much to our knowledge of modern art, nor, directly, to our knowledge of Miss Jellett's art. They were artistic manifestos, full of over-simplifications and half truths, but they contained a simple message which had the merit of expressing the deep conviction of an artist and by its very simplicity effectively challenged the accepted notions of the day. Like all manifestos of this kind they are best understood by the artists who share the ideas to which they give expression. ('Since the Renaissance the tendency has been . . towards the immobile materialistic ideal of form . . . Now the movement is towards the mobile non-materialistic ideal'.) Mainie Jellett's manifestos avoid the philosophical jargon which bedevils the continental manifestos—this year we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of one of the worst of them, the Futurist Manifesto—but they are too brief and repetetive and their author too much involved personally for the ideas to be developed critically.

The editor, Dr Eileen MacCarvill, provides an introduction and has included in the book a valuable contribution by Gleize, 'Hominage à Mainie Jellett', (with an excellent translation by the editor). Gleize gives his own account of the now well-known story of his first meeting with Mainie Jellett and Evie Hone when they presented themselves at his studio and asked to be taken on as his pupils. 'What you are doing', they told him, 'corresponds exactly to what we are striving after.' Gleize at the time was searching for 'the laws appropriate to a painting which has no subject.' What he has to say about non-representational painting, about its problems and his efforts to solve them is more enlightening and more moderately phrased than the account of them given by his pupil. But Gleize, like Lhote, was more successful as a theoretician of the modern movement than as an exponent. It is not too much to say that the theoretician killed or at least hampered the artist. Gleize went further than the other cubists in eliminating subject from painting but he did so with a clarity of purpose which is not found in Gris or Braque or Picasso. These did not look beyond the immediate artistic problem they had set themselves. They were experimenting in the sense of exploring rather than of testing preconceived ideas, and each work had the freshness of a discovery. Gleize claims that he was doing the same ('I deduced the theory from practice instead of doing the contrary as has been imagined by many critics.') but his compositions have the appearance of contrived and carefully constructed geometrical designs, the products of intellect more than of imagination. As exercises in the use of colour and form for their own sake these compositions have a certain value, and the method of *translation and rotation* by which he hoped to infuse life and movement into abstract cubism is not without interest.

Looking at the sketches in which Mainie Jellett applied this method one cannot help feeling that, as with Gleize, spontaneity has been suppressed by method. It is generally held that she and Evie Hone benefitted by the discipline of abstract painting, but, while Evie worked herself free of the restrictions imposed by the method, Mainie's work for all its colour and rhythm—even the later, semi-naturalistic work—remains rather contrived and stylized : the underlying geometry is too much in evidence. Reading the essays, one can see that this must have been due, at least in part, to the

theorizing—Evie Hone had an almost morbid reluctance to theorize about her work.

These essays are source material for the biographer, historian or critic ; the common reader is better served perhaps by a book like *The Story of Modern Art* by Sheldon Cheney, a new edition of which has just appeared. Mr Cheney is an American, writing for Americans. His style is careless and turgid ; he uses jargon ; he is often meaningless and naive ; but he has the right approach. ' The only way to reach these people, the form-blind,' he writes, ' seemed to be to show how the artists who created modern art came to abandon the old art.' He takes the reader back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, to the art which he can more easily understand, and demonstrates, stage by stage, how the modern movement evolved. The survey ends with the present day : 1957 to be precise. In this Mr Cheney shows courage, not only because he is prepared to commit himself to judgments which are not yet ' accepted ', but also because the art of the post-war years has been dominated by abstract painters. His plea for this type of art is a modest one—' I have at the end suggested that painters and sculptors dealing with the abstract and semi-abstract are opening up to our enjoyment a wonderful new world, not that they are destined to take from us enjoyment of other art-worlds'—and he has come far nearer to substantiating this claim than the theorists.

The reader should remember that in spite of the historical method this is not a history of art in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Impressionism is treated as an ' interlude ' and there is no mention of the preRaphaelites (a rather surprising omission). Certain painters, however, notably Daumier, are given a prominence which they deserve (and are not always given) in any historical context.

It should be remembered, too, that Mr Cheney, being an American, gives more space than we would to American painters. This is no harm. We are inclined to err by neglect where such painters as Whistler and Ryder are concerned. He has also an unconscious tendancy to make modern art the property of America. Paris is in decline ; American painters are linked with German until the Germans too are eclipsed ; in the Americas there is new life ; the Sao Paolo Prize was won in 1957 by a ' little-known Italian painter, Giorgio Morandi ', etc. But these are only minor defects in a job otherwise well done.

CYRIL BARRETT

THE JOURNALS AND PAPERS OF GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS. Edited by Humphry House. Completed by Graham Storey. London : Oxford University Press, 1959. xxxiii and 579 pp. 63s.

THE SERMONS AND DEVOTIONAL WRITINGS OF GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS. Edited with an Introduction by Christopher Devlin, S.J. London : Oxford University Press, 1959. xiv and 369 pp. 42s.

This sort of thing should not altogether be encouraged. Even when a man is, as Hopkins was, a major poet, to publish every extant scrap he wrote must seem faintly ridiculous. The editors, however, have foreseen criticism

and forestalled it. ' It is thought ', we read (about the very copious annotation) in the Preface to the *Journals and Papers* ' that those who love him (Hopkins) and want to study him carefully will prefer to have many facts or clues to facts and sources presented here, together with his own Journals, rather than submit to the necessity of reading a biography to find them out.' (p. xxviii) At any rate, we cannot escape submitting ourselves to these two splendid volumes : read them we must.

Both volumes are obligatory reading for anyone who professes a serious interest in Hopkins's poetry and they will not be read quickly. Time is needed to assimilate the significance of all this new material and the bearing it has on the forty-odd poems that make Hopkins a great poet : the work beside which all the rest is marginal comment. I believe that these papers will help us considerably in reading the poems but the importance of the aid they bring will have to be worked out slowly and by many hands. Now, it seems best to confine oneself to little more than an account of some of the new material so magnificently edited and published for the first time.

The early diaries (1862—66) are here published virtually complete. Their main interest is the early verse they contain. Nothing tremendously exciting is revealed in the 500 or so lines of verse, now seen for the first time by the public, and yet little is beneath notice. An early version of *Heaven-Haven* (*Poems* 20), called here *Rest,* is entered sometime in 1864. There are a few curiously uncharacteristic, gallant and artificial poems in the cavalier manner that are quite successful. The body of the verse seems to be, in general, gifted and smooth, loose, wordy and conventional—in short—unimportant. The longest piece is a section of the *Floris in Italy* (pp. 40—43) which on a first reading strikes one as capable and bloodless mock-Elizabethan. The prose dialogue, or rather cross-talk, that follows is very bad.

In the year 1864 (p. 48) there is a trace of the inscape-device : the texture of the verse miming the peculiarity of the object.

> Her hue's a honied brown and creamy lakes
> Like a cupped chestnut damaskèd with breaks.

Hopkins is groping for his typical expression from now on.

> More white
> Than a skeinèd, than a skeinèd waterfall,
> And better veinèd than pea blossoms all
> And though she be so light
> As thin-spun whirling bats' wings in the air . . . (p. 50)

The achievement is not miraculous but it is very much above the conventional level to which the rest of the verse tends to sink. Hopkins was aware of his problem and wrote (p. 38) : ' The poetic language lowest. To use that, which poetasters, and indeed almost everyone can do, is no more necessarily to be uttering poetry than striking the keys of the piano is playing a tune.' Strangely enough it is a few phrases of prose that most resemble the Hopkins of the mature poems.

Right through the early diaries, but especially in the first notebook, Hopkins has written lists of words with notes on the probability of their relation to one another. These are important enough, coming from a poet whose vocabulary was rich and strange, to merit a separate appendix by Mr Alan Ward who writes as follows. ' Many of the word-lists and other similar entries throw interesting and sometimes valuable light on Hopkins's poetry. For example, a number of key-words in the Diary entries appear also in the poems ; and the words there associated with them clarify and particularize their poetic use . . . Similarly, the connexion of the words *meadow, mead, meat* and *maid* with the senses ' strengthening ', ' nourishing ', (on p 4), is reflected in many of Hopkins's lines on the Virgin Mary : in *The May Magnificat* (*Poem* 81), for example, and *The Blessed Virgin Compared to the Air We Breathe,* in which he writes of the air as

> This needful, never spent,
> And nursing element ;
> My more than meat and drink. (*Poems* 99, 11.117—8)

The word-lists, too, make us aware that in such lines as . . .

> Generations have trod, have trod, have trod ;
> And all is seared with trade. (Poems 70, 11.115—6)

the connexion . . . between *trod* and *trade*, is almost certainly more than the simple alliterative use . . . ' (p. 501) Mr Ward, of course, shows what could be derivative and what is likely to be original in Hopkins's associations of words. This could throw much light on Hopkins's method of composition.

Throughout the early Journal (1866—68), which was discovered by Fr Bischoff in 1947, we see a tendency to observe inscapes and describe them in prose. We see the minute observation of form and colour, the analytical eye for the construction of natural shapes : the eye of a draughtsman. Hopkins holds up his hand against the sky and writes in prose what he will later work into his poem on Our Lady. ' Putting my hand up against the sky whilst we lay on the grass I saw more richness and beauty in the blue than I had known of before, not brilliance but glow and colour. It was not transparent and sapphire-like but turquoise-like, swarming and blushing round the edge of the hand and in the pieces clipped in by the fingers, the flesh being sometimes sunlit, sometimes glassy with reflected light, sometimes lightly shadowed in that violet one makes with cobalt and Indian red.' (p. 154) The poem goes :

> Again, look overhead
> How air is azured ;
> O how ! nay do but stand
> Where you can lift your hand
> Skywards : rich, rich it laps
> Round the four fingergaps.
> Yet such a sapphire-shot,
> Charged, steeped sky will not
> Stain light . . . . . (*Poems* 60)

In July 1866 Hopkins decided he could no longer remain an Anglican. There is no sign in the Journal of excitement at this decision and we next see him at exhibitions of painting in London and Paris. On 23 August he makes a ' resolution ' in the chapel of the Poor Clares. On 31 August he is at Mass and again on 8 September. The entries here grow thin and we have no comment on his reception into the Church although he mentions the reception of some of his friends. In 1868, on 2 May, he resolved to destroy his poems should he become a priest. On 5 May he decided to become a religious but on 7 May he is undecided whether to be a Benedictine or a Jesuit. In the summer of 1868 Hopkins is off on an enthusiastic German journey and there the Journal merges with what has been already published.

Among the Jesuit papers there are notes of a lecture Hopkins gave while teaching English to young Jesuit students at Roehampton. It is called *Poetry and Verse* (pp. 289—90) and is full of suggestive ideas throwing light on what, for Hopkins, was essential in poetry. ' Poetry ', he writes, ' is speech framed for contemplation of the mind by the way of hearing or speech framed to be heard for its own sake and interest even over and above its interest of meaning. Some matter and meaning is essential to it but only as an element necessary to support and employ the shape which is contemplated for its own sake.' This calm putting of the cart before the horse must have been upsetting to those who loved what Bridges called ' a continuous literary decorum '. Perhaps, even, Mr Eliot would not agree : ' . . the music of verse is strongest in poetry which has a definite meaning expressed in the properest words.' (*On Poetry and Poets* p. 160) But Hopkins is not contrite. ' Poetry is in fact speech only employed to carry the inscape of speech for the inscape's sake—and therefore the inscape must be dwelt on.'

Fr Devlin's editing of Hopkins's spiritual writings is admirable. Indeed, his volume, is possibly, the more important of the two. Full appraisal of Hopkins's commentary on the *Spiritual Exercises* of St Ignatius in particular must await another time.

It is sad to think that Hopkins thought of his life as a failure along the three lines for which he deemed himself most fitted : failure as a scholar, as a preacher and as an important spiritual writer. Fr Devlin's interesting and sympathetic account of the circumstances surrounding the sermons cannot conceal the fact that Hopkins's preaching was, at least, faulty. ' In a different century ', writes Fr Devlin, ' or in a different place—say in a hypothetically Catholic Jacobean court—one could imagine solemn and sensitive faces, propped on long delicate fingers, watching him with grave intensity.' (p. 7) But the preacher more than anyone else perhaps is situated in time present.

Twenty hitherto unpublished sermons are printed here so that we can judge for ourselves. The Oxford and Bedford Leigh sermons are short and sketchy : sometimes no more than notes. Hopkins was very happy in the industrial parish of Bedford Leigh and his sermons there were judged, by the congregation as well as by his superiors, a success. He knew and liked these people and talked to them out of his notes and his heart. But the Liverpool sermons are impossible. A strong interest makes it possible, and perhaps edifying to read these sermons but they would never do for a congregation

that had to be wooed. Hopkins's sense of reality was at fault and the result of those sermons that were preached was soporific. One would say that the speaker was paralyzed by the dignity of the Liverpool pulpit. He was inevitably removed from Liverpool but not before he had been involved in some unnecessary and silly minor trouble about the use of the word ' sweetheart ' in a sermon. The famous ' Dominical ' (a practice sermon preached on Sundays to their colleagues by Jesuit students) was not, according to Hopkins's own good-tempered testimony, the kind of success it was meant to be. ' People laughed at it prodigiously, I saw some of them roll on their chairs with laughter.' (p. 233). Considering that a very long section, of a very long sermon, expatiates on the apostle Philip as a lover of horses, I do not think that the young men were quite inexcusably rude.

But, the instructions on Hell and Death (p. 241) are a different matter. These are real fire-and-brimstone mission sermons, in the orthodox tradition of thirty years ago, calculated to put the fear of God into the hearers. If Hopkins had preached like this at Liverpool there is little doubt that he would have been hailed as a great success. Probably, these terrifying talks were never delivered. Possibly, so gentle a person as Hopkins found that he could write like this but that he shrank from preaching what he had written. The instructions are written so as to inspire emotional terror rather than true religious conviction. It is this kind of sermon that makes neurotics of us all. ' One cannot without shrinking think of the very last moment when flesh and spirit are rent asunder and the soul goes out into the cold, leaving the body its companion dear behind. This will be to every one of you ; I see your corpses here before me.' (p. 246) It is the sermon from *The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* to a tee.

I have already written elsewhere about the page from Hopkins's Irish retreat notes (p. 261—62) and its close bearing on the composition of the ' terrible ' sonnets. Many of the numerous appendices seem worthy of close attention. Both of these volumes are splendidly indexed.

JOHN C. KELLY

FORMS OF EXILE. By John Montague. Dublin: The Dolmen Press, 1959. 7s. 6d.

MR MONTAGUE has produced a collection of interesting poems, in which the prevailing mood is one of unease. This is not to say that he lacks sureness of either style or approach : the mood is deftly caught and faithfully transmitted. It is the subjects of his compassionately ironic reflection that give the impression of being out of their context, in some subtle way at odds with their environment, strangers at home.

The lovers in his ' Irish Street Scene ' move in isolation through ' the marine light ' of the rain-deadened landscape, their world shrinking defensively

> To the soaked worn section of cloth,
> They silently parade beneath.

The ' Lonely Bachelor ' shrinks from the approach of uncompanioned old age, his sense of intrusion among young lovers succintly resumed in the contrasting textures of the image,

> In that velvet purring silence
> The noisy rubbing of his shoes.

' The Prodigal Son ' crystallizes the exile's rootless rootedness with the poignancy of the ritual return to the native scene remote in its unchanged familiarity from the raw strangeness of his exile ; its inevitable issue is the funeral moving

> With dignity, past closed shops
> Into the elm-walled churchyard.

In all these poems, the economy of acute observation is tempered with a quiet sympathy which never dissolves into complete identification, yet halts a withdrawal into complete aloofness. The effect is a subdued tension that accurately shapes the mood of so fine a poem as ' Nursery Story : Modern Version '. Here the friendly daylight world is transformed into the atomic wilderness of the child ' islanded in the night '. The sense of isolation is accurately defined by

> The slight edge of the curtain twitching and shifting
> And rubbing the dark, the murmur of walls
> Where dimensions are hidden.

and leads to the transmutation of familiar nursery heroes into grotesque, nightmarish figures.

Religious subjects are awkward material for an Irish poet to handle. The extremes of garish, conventional piety and its shallow rejection in an equally strident heterodoxy are avoided by Mr Montague's peculiar perspective. ' Dirge of the Mad Priest ' is a fine analysis of a mind disjointed from its vocation and whose symbols of salvation have become ciphers of irrational terror. The tired realization of unheroic crucifixion of the old priest in ' Soliloquy on a Southern Strand ' emerges quietly from the contrast of his nostalgic memories with the animal zest of his indifferent adopted countrymen. Again, in ' Rome, Anno Sancto ', the contrast between the warm sensuality of the Italian scene, the baroque splendour of its buildings and the austerity of the

> Georgian buildings above the slow canal
> Or stone-fenced fields beside the Atlantic's wrack

points the contrast between the flamboyant celebration of the other pilgrims and the stubborn spirituality of the Irish matrons who

> March towards their Godhead, with bead and book, relentlessly.

Asceticism, in ' A Footnote on Monasticism : Dingle Peninsula ', receives perceptive treatment. If the adjective in ' hands specialised in prayer ' seems too technical for the following simile of ' shone like uplifted chalices ', its meaning fits exactly. Likewise, the apparent slackness of the introductory description relaxes the mind from a too close identification with the subject.

Finally, mention must be made of ' The Sean Bhean Vocht ', where the ambivalence in attitude towards the ill-defined past, whose romantic

rags adorn the bony shoulders of the present, is skilfully evoked by the intermingling of folklore and superstitious backbiting with ironic comment. Although the well runs red ' Not with blood but ferrous rust ', you can't be sure that underneath the ogham stone no ' faery queen lay dust '.

It is in his reflections on the Irish scene that Mr Montague is most effective. Perhaps the American scene lacks the necessary sympathy of this reader to balance the irony and create the salutary tension. In those other poems, however, one tastes a savour that is authentic and of the land : if you have never tramped Hampstead Heath on a summer's day with your heart in Killiney, walk lonely on a bog and you will understand.

JOHN B. O'MALLEY.

SAMUEL JOHNSON. Diaries, Prayers and Annals. Edited by E. L. McAdam Jr. with Donald and Mary Hyde. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1958.

Dr Johnson was no friend of the American Colonies and wrote a pamphlet *Taxation No Tyranny* in which he tried to argue them out of their fundamental constitutional rights. The descendants of these colonists have taken a noble revenge on their churlish opponent; they have thrown themselves with immense ardour and inexhaustible resourses into the work of writing up the whole Johnson saga. Their scholars like Pottle and Tinker are the equal of the best English scholars in this well-worked field. The purchase for Yale by Colonel Isham of the Boswell papers, found in Malahide Castle, has made Yale the centre of Johnsonian and Boswellian studies and, as the Colonel said, has provided ' work for fifty scholars for fifty years '. The great objective to which this combined activity is directed is a new edition of Johnson's works which will contain every thing he wrote except the *Dictionary* and his letters. The reason for excluding the *Dictionary* is obvious ; the letters have been omitted because they have been recently published in a most satisfactory edition by Dr Chapman. But all the rest that Johnson wrote will appear in the new edition, Rasselas, the poems, the essays, the notes on Shakespeare. Even the anonomyous pieces, the reviews, and puffs and squibs, which were dashed off in haste, while the printer's boy dozed on the stairs, will be disinterred from the dead magazines in which they have been buried for two hundred years. The whole corpus will occupy twelve volumes which are meant to be a model of thorough scholarship and dignified book production.

This volume was undertaken long before the full edition was planned, but the Yale editorial board were glad to make it the first volume. It is a good omen of what we may expect from the completed enterprise, as it is the result of patient, thorough research and sound judgment. The personal papers of Johnson were disordered and discontinuous and often fragmentary and undated. To arrange them in chronological order was a task which demanded a careful and delicate weighing of evidence, intrinsic and extrinsic. On the lower half of each page is given a running commentary, biographical

and historical which forms an excellent setting to the papers and fits the disjointed journals and prayers into the authors known life.

The distinctive value of this book is that it gives us a new Johnson, Johnson from within, Johnson as seen by himself in his most sincere and responsible moments. The papers are for the most part strictly personal and private, not written for publication or meant to be seen by any other eyes. There is no sign of pose or posture ; no hint of self complacency or self consciousness. The prayers certainly were written in that mood of absolute sincerity in which Johnson felt himself when in the presence of God. Hence the book is a perfect complement to Boswell and reveals much that must inevitably have been hidden from that indefatigable seeker.

A constantly renewed-and-neglected-resolution of Johnson was to keep a diary because he was of opinion that ' a man loves to review his own mind.' The journals written during his tours at home and in France show what a wide interest and even curiosity he had in all he came across. As he grew older he got more and more interested in his health but this interest is in no way querulous or morbid.

But the chief interest of this book is the prayers, which were written on certain appropriate occasions, the end or the beginning of a year, his birthday, the anniversary of some death, on some religious feast, Good Friday or Easter Sunday. They are written in the well-known Johnsonian style with ponderous and balanced sentences ; but they are none the less sincere because that was the native utterance of his great mind. They reveal him as a deeply religious man, who believed strongly and practically the main truths of Christian Revelation, who had a truly Christian attitude of soul to the supreme things. He prays with fervour and humility for forgiveness of his sins, for grace to overcome his predominant faults of character, his indolence, his desire for food and drink, his neglect of religious duties, his waste of time. The hectoring loud voiced conversationalist who did not suffer fools gladly, nor even wise men, is not the only Johnson and not the truest one.

He was also a man of deep affection ; and the anniversaries of the death of those he loved, his father, his mother, and most of all his wife, are movingly recorded. His resolutions of amendment seldom got beyond the writing. His affection is well revealed in what is perhaps the most moving prayer of the whole collection, which was written for Catherine Chambers, a servant and friend of the family for many years. When she was dying he visited her and said this prayer with her ' Almighty and most merciful Father whose loving kindness is over all thy works, behold, visit, and relieve this thy Servant who is grieved with sickness. Grant that the sense of her weakness may add strength to her faith, and seriousness to her Repentance. And grant that by the help of thy Holy Spirit after the pains and labours of this short life, we may all obtain everlasting happiness through Jesus Christ, our Lord, for whose sake hear our Prayers. Amen.' And then he continued in his diary : ' She told me that to part was the greatest pain she had ever felt, and that she hoped we should meet again in a better place. I expressed with swelled eyes and great emotion of tenderness the same hopes. We kissed and parted, I humbly hope, to meet again, and to part no more.'

HUGH KELLY

NEWMAN STUDIES

NEWMANS IDEE EINER UNIVERSITÄT. Wolfgang Renz, O.S.B. Universitätsverlag Freiburg, Switzerland. 1958

CARDINAL NEWMAN—STUDIEN III. Edited by Heinrich Fries and Werner Becker. Nurnberg : Glock und Lutz. 1957.

NEVER a week goes by, said the late Fr Tristram, without a new book or important article on Newman appearing somewhere in the world. It is phenomenal, this spate of Newmanism. Seventy years after his death the Cardinal has become a figure of *actualité, Bedeutung,* and all the other qualities that mark an intellectual vogue on the Continent. There is no anniversary to explain it, beyond the centenary of the Catholic University, which was celebrated some years ago in Dublin. Nor can the magnificent state of the Newman archives in Birmingham, and the kindness of their Oratorian curators, quite explain the stream of books, though it must offer great attractions to writers of doctorate theses. It is Newman himself who has caught the ear of post-war thinkers. His seriousness, not to say anxiety, his ripe Christian humanism, his utter integrity have found our wave-length through his dated but beautiful prose. From the down-to-earth ranks of English-speaking Catholics, Newman stands out as an intellectual in the continental sense, yet a thoroughly Anglo-Saxon intellectual. The suspicion he aroused among right-wing ecclesiastics, the failure of his efforts in Dublin, the well-documented anguish of his own spiritual life, all commend him to the Age of Sincerity.

Here are two offerings from the stream of Newman literature, a scholarly treatise from Switzerland, and a symposium from Germany. Fr Renz's book on Newman's educational ideal is one of a series of large, paper-backed studies being published by the Catholic University of Freiburg. It is an enormously thorough piece of research into a carefully defined though well-explored theme. Father McGrath and Professor Culler have covered the same ground, and Fr Renz acknowledges his great debt to them. But his own work is original, critical and exhaustive. On the text of the Dublin Discourses, the inspiration drawn from Oxford, and Newman's theories on the sciences, theology, the aim of a university and its relations with the Church, Fr Renz says almost all that could be said, and with an authority for every half-statement. This incessant reference to other sources, though it can irritate and distract, provides some of the most interesting notes in the book. It is in these foot-notes that he comes to grips with Fr Corcoran, differs on occasion from Fr McGrath, and offers a score of anecdotal side-lights on the more pedestrian exposition in the text.

When treating of Newman's difficulties in Dublin, Fr Renz complains : ' In Dublin they were not intellectually prepared for Newman's message.' The remark crystallizes the slightly unhappy approach evident in this section of the book. What was at stake in Newman's efforts was not the realization of an educational ideal or the understanding of a ' message ', but meeting the educational needs of a great community. It is indeed doubtful if any man

could have succeeded where Newman failed, but Fr Renz is more than naive in accepting as a reason for that failure Irishmen's delight in destroying what Englishmen have built. Even Dr Cullen's opposition is not so easily explained, as Fr Renz admits. The large correspondence between Dr Cullen and Abbot Smith in Rome, now being prepared for publication, is said to reveal factors in the University struggle which were hidden even from Newman himself. It may help to redeem, or at least explain the character of the Archbishop who cuts such a sorry figure in the current account.

This last information comes from a delightful essay by Fr Aubrey Gwynn in the third series of *Newmanstudien.* Here are all the papers read at the International Newman Conference in 1956, under the general theme : ' Newman and the Modern Age.' Some of the shorter contributions can do no more than throw out an idea or a comparison : so the links are adumbrated between Newman and Augustine, Nicolaus of Cusa, Aquinas, Plato, Pascal, Hegel, Husserl, Kierkegaard and the Existentialists. Fr Gwynn's tribute from the National University of Ireland, and Fr Dessain's account of Newman's first conversions (*Studies*, Spring 1957), are more substantial than most. From a short piece by Fr Przywara one disentangles the suggestion that Newman will be the modern age's saint and Doctor of the Church. Fr Przywara sees him in a line with Augustine and Nicolaus of Cusa as the theologian of the ' Tension of Opposites.' If such a dignity is accorded the Cardinal, it will be a strange reversal of Rome's first reaction to him : M. Guitton, in a brilliant essay on Newman's ' Development of Dogma ', quotes an early criticism by Roman theologians : *Newman miscet et confundit omnia.* They accepted his conclusions but not his premisses.

Even if he is never accepted as a Doctor of the Church, this collection witnesses to his influence today as a teacher to those not of the Church. His reasoned respect for inductive science and his long journey through doubt and all the nuances of religious experience make him immediately accessible today even to non-believers.

PAUL ANDREWS

PHILOSOPHY

CONNAISSANCE ET AMOUR : Essai sur la Philosophie de Gabriel Marcel. Par Jean-Pierre Bagot. Paris : Beauchesne et ses fils. 1958. pp.247.

The visit of M. Marcel to this country must arouse fresh interest in this philosopher, well-known abroad as a ' Christian Existentialist '. This title is somewhat unfortunate : existentialist usually connotes atheist and, even with the addition of Christian, it still sounds suspect. M. Marcel himself has disclaimed the title and, if label there must be, would seem to prefer that of ' Christian Socratic '. In any case, he has observed that the doctrine of the priority of existence over essence is not necessary to an ' existentialist ' philosophy. All that such an approach refuses to admit is that existence is something tacked-on, in some inexplicable fashion, to an essence quite sufficient

unto itself.[1] Indeed, for M. Marcel, the crucial point in philosophy is the recognition that ' a being whose deepest originality consists, perhaps, not only in enquiring into the nature of things, but in questioning himself about his own essense is, by this very fact, situated beyond all the partial replies in which such an enquiry can issue.' [2] One might well say that M. Marcel's philosophical quest is concerned with the whole man, in his entirety, and that the question it continually poses—' Who am I ? I who ask questions about being ? '—is a total question involving a continual approach to an adequately total reply.

M. Marcel consistently refuses to rig his answers to fit a predetermined position that ignores the fundamental revelation of experience. In this, surely, he is more truly empirical than philosophers rejoicing in that name, whose thought is rigorously cast in a rationalist mould. In contrast with some contemporary linguistic analysts, he never loses sight of the reality being investigated in the snarl of statements about it. One feels that with him, what counts is not ' words, but the interior attitude of which words are the sign and symbol '. M. Bagot, at the close of his sympathetic account of M. Marcel's philosophical pilgrimage, remarks that it is a mutual miscomprehension of terms that bedevils the efforts of Thomists and other contemporary philosophers to understand their respective positions. He thinks this a pity, since he feels that Thomists have some ore to mine from these philosophies. M. Marcel's thought, he believes, presents one priveliged place of meeting whence, ' following new paths, can be found the central affirmations of Thomism '.[3] In his determination to look behind what are not so much ' oppositions ' as ' incomprehensions ', he traces the development of M. Marcel's thought, taking as axis of reference the relationship of love and knowledge in that philosophy.

There are, M. Bagot discovers, three main stages in this development. In the first stage, that of the early writings and of the first half of the *Metaphysical Journal,* he finds traces of Idealist influence. Rational knowledge, within this context and conceived in the Kantian mode, is found to be the source of ' irreducible dualisms and antimonies '. The second stage is that of the latter half of the *Journal* and the beginning of *Being and Having,* written between the end of the First World War and M. Marcel's conversion to Catholicism. The main themes of these writings are resumed in the essay on ' Existence and Objectivity ', reprinted as an appendix to the *Journal.* Here, there is evident a rediscovery of a certain immediacy in experience, a renewed conception of knowledge, and a marked evolution towards realism. Seen in this fresh perspective the relationship of love and knowledge is transformed : the obstacles to their compenetration are removed. Finally, there is the ' concrete philosophy '. This, M. Bagot finds, consists essentially of a phenomenology which unfolds the presence of the transcendent at the heart of our daily experience. Here, metaphysics and ethics meet : love and knowledge cease to oppose, but instead complete each other.

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[1] *L'Homme Problématique* p. 21
[2] *ibid.* p. 73
[3] *Connaissance et Amour* pp. 237-8

En Route, the main themes of M. Marcel's philosophy are disengaged : ' la métaphysique sensualiste ', embodiment and my existential situation as an embodied being ; the immediate and participative nature of sensation ; intersubjectivity ; the distinction between the problematic and mystery. One must congratulate M. Bagot on his perceptive understanding of the harmony of theme which, far from being a march from prepared positions to a predetermined objective, is more in the nature of a random stroll, though nonetheless *à la boussole* '. One cannot keep M. Marcel's company for long, without discovering that a compass has been provided, is part, in fact, of one's personal and native equipment. That compass is oneself, with one's ' exigency for being '.

However, it is when we approach the central and ontological question, that we feel the Thomist glass-slipper pinching. This is not surprising : one of the disconcerting features of M. Marcel's philosophy is his refusal to systematize ; his mistrust of the ' objective '. Once again, beware of miscomprehension. For Marcel, the objective is that which can be inspected by me, without my being involved in the subject of enquiry. My existential situation, on the other hand, does not admit of such reduction and analysis. No descriptive analysis, however exhaustive, can yield an answer to the ontological question. Being, in fact, is ' that which withstands all questioning.'[1]

M. Bagot, indeed, recognizes that, for Marcel, ' knowledge becomes participation above all when it becomes seizure of personal beings discovered in their intersubjectivity ' and that this knowledge is ' at once seizure of truth and of value ', while ' the submission of the mind to this truth and this value entails the immediate transformation of knowledge into love '. He sees that, while Marcel recognizes that language appears first of all as the means by which interpersonal communication is achieved, this operation carries with it the danger of degrading the initial experience into its own simulacrum. M. Marcel, indeed, does not wish to underestimate—he has said so himself—the role of the concept : ' in its heuristic usage the concept must be identified with idea, inasmuch as this latter is interpreted dynamically.' However M. Bayot thinks that, because M. Marcel only sees in the judgment the affirmation of a particular existent and finds this poor in meaning when compared with the fullness of meaning which Being should bear, he has missed his chance of disengaging the meaning of Being and so of constructing ' a veritable metaphysical doctrine '. M. Marcel, it seems, is a Thomist *manqué*.

It is possible that M. Marcel's difficulty has a slightly different origin, which may otherwise explain his animadversion to ' an universal being which the scholastic pretends to attain across his gross abstract denominations '. To know that one exists ; to intuit, even, the *fact* of one's existence ; is not quite the same thing as having an intuition of one's existing, of the *act* of existing. Neither existence nor being is, in Marcel's view, a logical predicate or a logical subject. And apart from the fact that being-as-such does not as such exist, might it not be true to say that this peculiar concept is, in fact, a formula which freezes a dynamic experience ? Marcel's insistence on love as ' the essential ontological datum ' derives, perhaps, from his dis-static

[1] cf. *The Philosophy of Existence* : On the Ontological Mystery p. 5.

view of the human person. This, perhaps, explains his derivation of the awareness of being from a recognition (which can be witheld) of a radical exigency for being—' not a simple desire nor a vague aspiration . . . (but) an inward thrust, arising from the depths and which can just as well be interpreted as an appeal.' This is why he says that ' being is anticipation made good, the experience of being is fulfilment.' Furthermore, love is not ' something which could be grafted onto being from without the affirmation of being.' We must cease to imagine love and knowledge as two disparate activities, and instead see them as twin aspects, whatever be their distinction, of one active principle, the whole man alive. Love fundamentally is something other and more positive than desire.

It is because the affirmation of being is not itself conceptualizable that Marcel refuses to conceptualize being. Being is not the content of affirmation, but the anticipated fulfilment of the very act of affirming itself. This does not mean that it is not experienced or that we cannot talk about it. It is not, however, like other aspects of our experience which can for most purposes be satisfactorily described.

What is important to understand is that, if Marcel and Thomists are at first sight felt to be mutually incomprehensible, they are perhaps talking about the same reality. If one feels that scholastic thinkers would benefit from a longer acquaintance with the themes of M. Marcel's ' concrete philosophy ' fidelity, hope and love than perhaps M. Bagot's study affords, one must be grateful for his having brought their differing perspectives into such sharp focus.

JOHN B. O'MALLEY

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By Frederick Copleston, S.J. Volume V : Hobbes to Hume. London : Burns, Oates. 1959. 440 pp. 30s.

WE have here another extremely readable instalment of Fr Copleston's history. It presents us with a group of philosophers who still have considerable influence in British Philosophy. We find in Locke the basic principle of classical empiricism, namely that our ideas are grounded in, and dependent on, experience. Berkeley lays stress on the importance of linguistic analysis in the elimination of what he describes as ' glib, coherent, methodical discourses which nevertheless amount to just nothing.' In ethics also, always popular among British thinkers, one finds in this period representatives of the two main views current in Britain today : the view which relegates ethical propositions to the ' emotive ' level, and that which tends towards a rational grounding of ethical principles. Indeed British moral and political theory owes much of its development to such men as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith.

To appreciate fully the content of this volume, it must be taken in the general context of Renaissance thought, in such a context as Fr Copleston provides in the introduction to Volume 4, or in the chapter on the scientific movement of the Renaissance in Volume 3. This being done the danger of seeing the evolution of empiricism either as a revolution in philosophy

or as an isolated stream of thought will be averted. In popular presentations of the various empiricists the revolutionary aspect is generally emphasized. Discontinuity indeed there was, but men like Locke and Hobbes were far more dependent on the decadent Aristotelianism and Nominalism of the Schools than they themselves perhaps were aware. However, the element of discontinuity is more obvious in many ways : a new spirit was present in the works of the empiricists, manifest in their dissatisfaction with the logical and terminological subtleties of the Schoolmen, in the new form of ' lay ' philosophy—freely written and for the most part in the vernacular—and perhaps above all in the application, conscious or otherwise, of scientific method to philosophical problems.

The background of scientific advancement, indeed, provides a broad distinction between continental and British philosophy of the period, the continentals being inclined towards a mathematical and therefore more *a priori* method, while the English philosophers laid stress on the aspect of observation of data. However, these are only general tendencies, and in fact we find in Hobbes, who was rather geometrical in his approach to philosophy, such a departure from ' data ' that Hume later wrote of such a procedure, ' but would these reasoners look abroad in the world, they would meet with nothing that in the least corresponds to their ideas or can warrant so refined and philosophical a system.'

Fr Copleston postpones his critique of the empiricists until the end of volume 6, when he will be in a position to view the period from Descartes to Kant as a whole. However, one might put forward the suggestion that the fundamental error of the empiricists in particular, was a confusion of the rationally known with the objective of animal extroversion. To grasp the nature of this confusion one might well ponder Tenessee Williams's quaint remark, ' we are all condemned to solitary confinement within our own skins ' : one has only to reflect on one's own consciousness to appreciate the profound truth of this remark, taken of course in a less restricted sense than Williams meant. On the animal level, this isolation is overcome primarily through sensitive integration of phenomena with a concomitant awareness of exteriority. Horses and dogs enjoy this ' contact ' with the real—and so also does the human animal. Now the human animal, while in a position to appreciate the nature of this biological extroversion, does so only with difficulty. ' The vulgar ', as Berkeley would call the non-philosophical, automatically take their sensitive integration of the real for the real itself : and to overcome this bias is difficult enough. But even when this bias is overcome there remains a propensity to identify the real with the objective ground of sensitive extroversion. In what measure the empiricists freed themselves from this propensity remains to be seen.

Other errors indeed may occur, but they are for the most part reducible to the inadequacy of an empiricism which passes lightly over the empirical datum of understanding, manifested primarily in the critical considerations themselves of the empiricists, secondarily in the conscious constructiveness of human understanding in the process of conception, and in the transphantasmic nature of these constructs, more apparent in these days of quantum theory, general relativity and topology than in the seventeenth century.

Hobbes, to whom is devoted the earlier chapters of the present work, reduced philosophy to a consideration of the causes and properties of bodies, where 'cause' for him, included only efficient and material causes. His rejection of the Aristotelian formal cause is understandable if the above general criticism is true, for in that case Aristotle's question 'why is this a man?' becomes tautological, whereas for Aristotle it meant 'why is this 'sensitively-integrated-data' an intelligible unity?' A contemporary of Descartes, with whom indeed he had some difference with regard to priority in ideas, Hobbes evolved a determinist system in which man, his mind and passions, became an unpriveleged instance of matter in motion. His political theory, with its necessary evolution from the state of 'selfish' nature to coercive government, to retain plausibility must be kept in the context of his whole system.

Locke, while he stated the empiricist programme, failed to carry it out himself. He is indeed attractive as a philosopher both because of the readable presentation of his thought, and because he is so common sense in his approach. His common sense, however, is suspect, and a consideration of his notion of space, infinity, and the qualities of objects would, I think, reveal that he was not free from the propensity mentioned above. His political philosophy, while more acceptable than Hobbes's, was far from novel: his contract-theory of the state, for example, was a diluted version of the medieval theory which came to him through Hooker.

While Locke may be attractive for his common sense, Berkeley is more attractive, not only because of his charming fanaticism for the curing powers of tar-water, or for his peculiar notion of founding a college in Bermuda for the education of the English and the Indians, but more precisely because of his departure from common sense. His theory of ideas, caricatured in the problem of the presence of the horse in the stable when no one is around, is familiar, as also is Dr Johnson's famous refutation, the kicking of a stone. But it seems to me that Berkeley's theory is neither so nonsensical, nor is Johnson's refutation so sound, as is commonly held. For Berkeley appears to have appreciated in some sense the error of empiricism. He appreciated that what is sensed is not being as opposed to the knower, and that the real could not be identified with the 'bodies' of Locke. Thus he arrived at his strange idealism. Yet further, if we consider Johnson's refutation of him in this light, we see that it was from Berkeley's point of view a *petitio principii*. It was in fact an irrational refutation of an irrational position.

Hume may be regarded as the first empiricist who tried to take his empiricism seriously. Fr Copleston—and this is true indeed of his treatment in general—presents him very fairly, and as far as possible reconciles apparent inconsistencies. He rightly considers that Hume did not deny the principle of causality. But we must remember that for Hume there was no question of a rational justification of the principle—he himself claimed that 'to explain the ultimate causes of our mental activities is impossible'—rather he was concerned with the meaning of saying that there are causal relations. If the question of the ground for certainty arose, for Hume it was a matter of 'feeling' or belief. Also it must be remembered that Hume considered only one kind of cause, the efficient cause, and even this was little related to its

Aristotelian counterpart. So the principle we are left with is so dehydrated as to be unworthy of salvage, and indeed it might be suggested that the principle of causality as generally stated and debated is of little genuine significance.

Finally, it might be claimed that if Hume had included in a broader empiricism his own very reasonable and intelligent criticisms, he might have identified knowledge with that activity rather than with what he was criticizing, and thus have come to an appreciation of the peculiar duality of human knowing and of the true source and criterion of meaningful statements.

PHILIP MCSHANE.

METAPHYSICS AND IDEOLOGY. The Aquinas Lecture, 1959, by Wm Oliver Martin, Ph.D. Milwaukee : Marquette University Press. 1959. 87 pp.

CRUCIAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By D. J. B. Hawkins. London : Sheed and Ward. 1957 150 pp. 10s. 6d.

HERE are two books from two very different sources in two continents. They are one, however, in that each treats of Philosophy in the context of a modern problem, and each comes ultimately to the same conclusion.

Dr Martin, professor of philosophy in Rhode Island University, has been for over twenty years active in what might be termed American Realist Philosophy. Recently he made a tour of universities on this side of the Atlantic. His interest in coming was the health of philosophy as an academic subject and, as he says, he found the patient unwell : the same was true of philosophy in the States. The beginnings of proper therapy he considers to be the distinction between metaphysics and ideology. By ideology he means that ' quest for reality ' referred to by Karl Mannheim, ' an instrument for dealing with life situations ' : a quest therefore relevant only for practice. Since ideology seems to deal with being, the problem of distinguishing it from metaphysics arises, and since the essence of ideological criticism is that metaphysics is not a science, the solution of the problem lies in considering the criteria of metaphysics as a science. The criteria are four in number, and their verification in a given metaphysic grounds its recognition not only as a science but also as true.

If metaphysics is a basic theoretical science then it must satisfy the criterion of *autonomy* in having its own data, its own kind of evidence, its own formal object, and in being experiential. The demand for permanence in change in the history of the development of the search for metaphysical truth is the basis of the criterion of *continuity*. The criterion of *system* in a rational science entails that it be open, coherent, enjoy essential stability and yet allow for non-essential modifications. Finally, the criterion of *adequacy* demands that metaphysics be able to account for other kinds of knowledge, and for itself as a kind of knowledge. It requires further that, while total truth is an ideal, some metaphysical truth must exist and be known if metaphysics is to exist at all : and indeed the metaphysical system must absorb all metaphysical truth known or yet to be known.

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These four distinguishing marks are admirably presented by Dr Martin, and in his analysis he both deals with possible criticism and points out the inevitable submergence of metaphysics in the tossing waves of ideology if it fails to satisfy the criteria. He goes on then to apply the criteria to the history of philosophy and, cryptically but clearly, he eliminates such candidates for the science of metaphysics as Idealism, Naturalism, Empiricism, Existentialism, Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis. Moreover, if he maintains that 'moderate realism' alone survives, he is far from being uncritical of its present state, and he insists on its openness as a system.

The volume of essays of Dr Hawkins provides a rather different approach to the modern dilemma. It is written against a background of British Philosophy, and in it Dr Hawkins traces the fortunes of philosophy since the time of Descartes. Part I treats of the fluctuations of the critical problem from the Cartesian 'cogito' to the pyrrhic victory of Kant. The second part of the book is a very candid account of the twentieth century revival of empiricism which centres round Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein. This part concludes with a consideration of the parallel continental developments of Existentialism and of the Hegelian and Feuerbachian origins of Marxism. In part III Dr Hawkins proposes the basis of reconstruction, a reconstruction grounded on an enlarged empiricism, and on the possibility of metaphysics.

In the concluding chapter of his book Dr Hawkins returns to the question of a perennial philosophy, a central philosophical tradition which persists and developes, and here he joins Dr Martin. Both men are convinced of the value of Thomism. Both bring out clearly the ground of much of the opposition to it: for Dr Hawkins, emotional equilibrium rather than intellectual power is what is most lacking in British philosophy, while to Dr Martin it is clear that the positing by the critic of propositions for which there is no attempt to obtain evidence is ideologizing, not philosophizing. Yet both men are aware of the danger intrinsic in Thomism, the danger of complacency, isolationism and stagnation on the part of both pedagogues and text-book writers. However, diagnosis and criticism are one thing, therapy another. Dr Martin has made an essential preliminary distinction, while Dr Hawkins has pointed, somewhat inadequately, to the grounds of reconstruction. But I would contend that more is required. The natural inclination to regard the scholastic revival as an established fact, and Thomism as a practically closed system, is all too strong. Yet, a little reflection will show that the revival of the last seventy years has been a series of reversals of supposedly sound positions, and a growing consciousness of our lack of appreciation of the full riches of the medieval synthesis of St Thomas. One might well suggest that, like Lazarus at the tomb, the philosophy of St Thomas, resurrected after four centuries, is still bound round in winding cloths—cloths stiffened over the years by Scotist conceptualism, Suarezian systematization and rationalist principles. One might suggest that St Thomas would not feel at his ease with our six metaphysical disciplines or their order of presentation, and that he would perhaps wonder why metaphysics was not meta-physics, and even meta-psychology and meta-ethics.

I would contend then, in the words of Wittgenstein, that 'solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism' (Tracratus 5. 64). I would

contend that Aquinas will be fully understood and developed only if we face a radical introspection in the context of the full sweep of modern knowledge, and also if we pledge ourselves to faithful adherence to the canons of hermeneutics in approaching his works. Nor do I suggest that the last centuries of philosophy have nothing to offer : I merely point to the need for a genuine understanding of what Aquinas understood, as a basis for the higher synthesis demanded by the growth in knowledge, scientific and otherwise, since his day.

PHILIP MCSHANE.

HISTORY

THE MATERIAL FOR VICTORY. By Andrew J. Kettle. Edited by L. J. Kettle. Dublin : Fallon. 1958. Pp.xxi+132. 12s. 6d.

Andrew J. Kettle, a north County Dublin farmer, an able advocate of tenant-right and a secretary of the Land League, died in 1916. His wish was that his son Tom Kettle should publish the memoirs he wrote in his old age. Tom Kettle, however, fell in the first World War in the same year as his father died. In this little volume we are given, at last, Andrew Kettle's memoirs, edited by another of his sons.

In many ways these recollections provide a useful addition to the literature on the political and social history of nineteenth century Ireland. Kettle was well placed to observe the developments of the period. He was highly respected by Parnell and, in turn, this shrewd farmer remained to the end a loyal though at times critical supporter of Parnell. Again, since Kettle came to Home Rule through the agrarian movement, his memoirs are all the more interesting because he tended to judge events in terms of the needs of the tenant-farmers and the often-forgotten agricultural labourers. The Kettle memoirs throw some light on Isaac Butt's tactics in the late eighteen-sixties in relation to land questions, but possibly the most valuable sections in the book are those concerned with the decisive years 1880-2.

The general election of 1880 and the return of the Liberals to office, under Gladstone, brought with them new opportunities and new problems for the Irish nationalists. From 1879 onwards the effect of the New Departure policy has been to draw the Land League and, it seemed, Parnell dangerously close to revolutionary methods of action. Inevitably this radical tendency disturbed the influential rightwing elements among the Home Rulers. Parnell, still working to consolidate his hold on the party, could not afford to neglect this considerably body of opinion within the Parliamentary Party. With Gladstone back in power, Parnell's task was in fact to preserve something of the aggressiveness of the Land League without allowing the agrarian movement to drift into rebellion. His problem was made no easier by the evictions in Ireland and Forster's promise of heavyhanded police methods.

The year 1880–1 proved very much of a turning point in the history of the Home Rule and land movements as the Kilmainham Treaty was to show. In the face of the threat of coercion and the determination of the House of Lords to yield little on the land question, many nationalists felt that the time had come to pay less attention to Parliament and more to the business of

pressing ahead with the land war. Michael Davitt, it would appear, favoured a policy of sending Parnell and some of his principal supporters to the United States, to rouse Irish-American opinion and to collect funds while Davitt, Dillon and the officers of the Land League were to remain in Ireland to face Forster and coercion.

This plan Andrew Kettle criticized as one of ' dispersion ' when what was needed, he argued, was a concentration of all their forces in Ireland under Parnell's leadership. His counter-proposal was that the Irish members should withdraw from Parliament, having first protested against the coercion measures, and return to Ireland. There they should, as Kettle put it in his memoirs, ' strike back by calling for a suspension of the payment of all rent until Parliament would deal with the land question.' What Kettle wanted was a brief, acute struggle which would force an embarrassed Liberal government to drastically reform the Irish land system. One thing Kettle was anxious to avoid was a prolonged agrarian dispute, inflicting hardship on both landlords and tenants.

For a short time, early in 1881, it would appear from Kettle's memoirs that Parnell favoured his plan though it was accompanied by the obvious risk of serious trouble in the countryside should the government not capitulate in time. The arrest of Michael Davitt and the suspension of 36 Home Rule members of parliament did not, however, bring about that quick, decisive struggle which Kettle and, in slightly different terms, Davitt had hoped for. Instead, Parnell played for time and in doing so, he took into account the divided state of Home Rule opinion on the 1881 land bill. The moderates and the Catholic Hierarchy welcomed the measure while the extreme elements in the Land League denounced it as utterly inadequate. The rash move of arresting Parnell, in October 1881, saved him from having to withdraw in too obvious a manner from the radical position held by Kettle and Davitt. The Kilmainham Treaty opened the way for a new phase in the relations between the Liberals and the Home Rulers, though as Kettle fairly observed the settlement of 1882 did not get to the roots of the Irish land problem.

Kettle's memoirs, though they suffer from the defect of having been written down so many years after the events described, add a great deal to what we know of the details of these negotiations and arguments in the nationalist camp in the period 1880–2. In much more general terms the memoirs cover the period between 1882 and Birrell's land act of 1909. Throughout, Kettle's devotion to the cause of land reform remains apparent. With equal clarity, too, there emerges his strong distrust of William O'Brien's qualities as a political leader and as an agitator on land questions.

Politics and firm, thoughtful comments on political leaders are the essential elements in these memoirs, but the first chapter constitutes something of an exception. In it Andrew Kettle gives us an account of farming life in north County Dublin in the years before and after the famine which should make rewarding reading for the student of social history. It helps to emphasise a point, sometimes forgotten, that a story of uniform misery does not do justice to the pattern of regional differences in pre-famine Ireland.

KEVIN B. NOWLAN

THE SMALL GERMAN COURTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY. By Adrian Fauchier-Mangan. Translated by Mervyn Savill. Methuen. 1958. 292 pp. 32s.

THE LAST MEDICI. By Harold Acton. Methuen. 1958. 327 pp. 32s.

Studies in decadence, if attractive at all, are only so in small doses. Even the two writers under review, talented as they are, can hardly conceal the basic monotony of their subjects. Perhaps the chief interest of both books is the general background of the *ancien régime* in Europe which each author depicts so well. This is Count Almaviva as he must have been in real life, without benefit of Mozartian magic.

M. Fauchier-Magnan, who takes the superiority of Gallic civilization for granted, thinks that the trouble with the polite society of eighteenth century Germany was that it attempted the impossible task of grafting a higher culture onto an intrinsically barbarian society. At the same time he frankly regrets the disappearance of the weakened Germany of the *ancien régime* and the substitution of the menace to Europe which a powerful, united Germany has provided. He does not ask whether France herself, with her ' divide et impera ' policy, may not have done something to determine by reaction the character of united Germany. But perhaps this was outside the scope of this scrappy, chatty book.

Mr Acton's book, the revised edition of a work originally published in 1932, is baroque tragi-comedy to M. Fauchier-Magnan's rococo burlesque. Despite the comic episodes in which the book abounds, the main impression left on the reader is one of pity for a once great dynasty which declined politically and even in the end physically. Most of the period treated is covered by the reign of Cosimo III (1670-1723), whose career and character provide the unifying theme for the book. In his time, as Mr Acton observes, the ' death-rattle ' of the dynasty ' had become very loud indeed ' (p. 24) and most of Cosimo's time was spent in trying to arrange that the dynasty should be permanently perpetuated. His successor, Gian Gastone, was unable to do so but seems in other ways to have been a typical monarch of the Enlightenment and the heterodoxy of his time merits investigation as the background to the more famous Febronianism current in Tuscany later in the century.

J. B. Morrall.

THREE CARDINALS : NEWMAN—WISEMAN—MANNING. By E. E. Reynolds. Burns & Oates. 1958. ix + 278 pp. 25s.

Of the making of many books on Newman there is no end ; but Mr Reynolds has had the happy idea of combining a study of Newman's life with those of the two other great English Cardinals of the nineteenth century. It cannot be said that Mr Reynolds breaks new ground in his use of source material in the same way as he did in his previous life of St John Fisher. But there is value in having the lives of the three princes of the Church set out, as it were,

in parallel columns, with a final attempt at comparison and synthesis. Mr Reynolds's conclusion is that, though Newman's practical organizing ability was not so great as that of either of the two other Cardinals, his ultimate influence was greater : ' His influence endures for his was one of the formative minds of the Church.' (p. 266)

There is a good summary chapter on Newman's contact with Ireland over the Catholic University, but Irish readers will probably miss any mention of Manning's role, which recent research shows to have been important in the Home Rule controversy of the 1880s.

JOHN B. MORRALL.

NAKED TO MINE ENEMIES. The Life of Cardinal Wolsey. By Charles Ferguson. Longmans, Green & Co. 1958. 543 pp. 25s.

Mr Ferguson, an editor of *The Reader's Digest,* has written a life of Wolsey which is clearly designed to attract a popular audience but which at the same time is based on accurate and intelligent use of source material. It is hard to believe that Mr Ferguson will supersede Pollard, and perhaps naturally he allows the narrative of colourful events to take precedence of the less exciting study of the administrative details of Wolsey's long predominance. But as a full-scale picture of home and foreign events in the early sixteenth century, this book has much to commend it, though often the overwritten style jars.

JOHN B. MORRALL.

EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES. By J. N. D. Kelly, D.D. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1958. xi + 501 pp. 30s.

Dr Kelly, the Principle of St Edmund's Hall, Oxford, has already placed theological students under a debt of gratitude by his *Early Christian Creeds* (London, 1950). In this admirable book he has made available for English readers a brilliant survey of patristic theology up to the time of the Council of Chalcedon in 451.

For Anglican students this will replace Bethune-Baker's *Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine.* Much new material has come to light since this work was published in 1903, and subsequent editions could not be really satisfactory, even with the addition of foot-notes and appendices. A completely new book was called for. From another aspect, the approach of Dr Kelly to his task is that of an historian. He has the gift of lucid exposition to a high degree, and his aim is to expound as impartially and understandingly as possible the doctrine of the Church of the Fathers. This attitude reflects what may be called the more catholic climate of contemporary religious scholarship. Bethune-Baker, on the other hand, reflects the background of his time. ' . . . Christian doctrines are seen as human attempts to interpret human experience—the unique personality of Jesus of Nazareth supreme among those experiences.'

We must not expect, therefore, an original book, although Dr Kelly has his own point of view, supported by solid learning, on many topics. Nor is this book creative in the proper sense. The author concentrates on his task of exposing the doctrine of the Fathers. In the preface, we find the admission that ' I have had to deny myself the pleasure of investigating some of the wider problems which the evolution of dogma inevitably raises. To take but two examples, no attempt has been made here either to define the intrinsic nature of orthodoxy or to assess the impact of Hellenism on the original Gospel.' We hope that Dr Kelly will some day find time for another book on these topics. If we form a correct estimate of his honesty of purpose, the truth is bound to benefit : ' Magna est Veritas, et praevalebit.'

There is a short introductory section, dealing with the background, tradition and scripture, and the Holy Scriptures. Here we may note that the chapter dealing with the relation of scripture and the ' argument from the Fathers ' is excellently presented.

Then, in two main sections, the development is traced, before Nicea and from Nicea to Chalcedon. The early tradition on the Eucharist as a Sacrifice is clearly presented, and the theology of the Apologists has rarely been so sympathetically expounded. The great merit of this book is its clear treatment of the development of Christology. We may note that Dr Kelly will have nothing to do with the so-called differences between the Christology of St Leo and St Cyril of Alexandria. His conclusion is that St Cyril ' would have acquiesced in the Chalcedonian settlement and would have been embarrassed by the intransigence of his over-enthusiastic allies ' (p. 342).

I found chapter XV, ' Christ's Mystical Body ', the least satisfactory in the book. This is not to belittle Dr Kelly's achievement. But we must remember that prejudice—even unconscious prejudice—will usually betray itself. This is not the place to attempt a detailed criticism of this chapter, but we may say that Dr Kelly appears at nearly every step of his argument to whittle down patristic texts and historical facts, so that finally, in his own words, ' the real framers and promotors of the theory of the Roman primacy were the popes themselves ' (p. 419). This statement might be made in a sense that would be acceptable, but that would not do justice to Dr Kelly's thesis.

A final chapter on eschatology, ' The Christian Hope ', concludes the book.

In conclusion, the easy style of the writing conceals from us the solid scholarship which gives body to this book. A short, useful bibliography for further reading is added to each chapter, and there is an excellent general index.

PATRICK O'CONNELL

FAITH AND MORALS. Part I, Faith. Part II, Morals. By T. V. Fleming, S.J. Melbourne : Messenger Office, 333 Church Street. 1956 and 1958. Pp. 166, 233. 4s. 6d. 6s. 6d. (Australian)

THESE two volumes provide a course in religious doctrine for ' senior pupils in secondary schools.' It is evident that the term ' secondary school ' is used, as in Ireland, to denote a school of the ' grammar ' type, providing education up to the age of about eighteen. The author is particularly well qualified

for the task he has undertaken. He was formerly professor of philosophy at St Stanislaus's College, Tullamore, is now professor of theology at Canisius College, Pymble, N.S.W., and had many years of practical teaching experience in secondary schools. This course in doctrine developed, in fact, out of notes compiled when he was teaching at Riverview College, Sydney. It was first published in one volume in 1952. After it had been used extensively in schools of various types, the author sent out a questionnaire seeking suggestions for improvement. The work was then completely revised and republished in two volumes. It has been officially recommended for use in the archdiocese of Sydney.

The author's plan is eminently practical. He takes it for granted that pupils of the age which he envisages are reasonably well grounded in the dogmas of the Apostles' Creed, in the teachings of the Commandments and the theology of the sacraments. He aims at putting before them in their final two years ' the salient points . . . on which perseverance as a Catholic depends ', and rightly avoids the danger of obscuring the essential by a mass of detail. In the first volume, which deals with apologetics, he picks out the great main issues on which a Catholic must be prepared to defend his faith, and deals with them ably and concisely. His own early scientific training enables him to deal in a particularly satisfactory way with the problems arising out of the relations between religion and the physical sciences. One interesting feature of his treatment is that he sets out the positive doctrine of the Church in comparatively brief form. The details are filled in by the proposal of objections commonly voiced by non-Catholics, which are very fairly stated and answered.

In the second volume the aim is to put before the pupil the ideal of the Christian life and to give him the motivation and the means to live according to it. The basis of this ideal is the commandments, the counsels and the theological and moral virtues. The commandments are dealt with in the light of the virtues which they call for, the aim being ' to awaken idealism and generosity in God's service instead of creating an attitude of merely trying to avoid sin and minimising one's obligations.' Particularly well done are the chapters on Formation of Character, Citizenship, the Catholic Social Order and the Catholic Philosophy of Life.

The criticism may be offered that in such a course, intended to send out the pupils well-armed into the battle of life, room might have been found for some chapters aiming at deepening their knowledge and estimation of the supernatural life. However, this subject would hardly come within the scope of either volume, and could well be dealt with in supplementary lessons given by the teacher.

These two volumes are a welcome addition to the comparatively small number of religious knowledge text-books suitable for secondary school pupils. They embody all the best principles of religious pedagogy, are written in a clear and attractive style, and are obviously the work of one who knows both the needs and limitations of the young people for whose use they are intended.

FERGAL MCGRATH